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Drodzy Czytelnicy.

Niniejszy zeszyt kwartalnika *Silva Iaponicarum* zawiera dwa artykuły poświęcone kwestii bezpieczeństwa.
Beata Maciejewska skupia się na kwestii bezpieczeństwa w erze nuklearnej, próbując odpowiedzieć na pytanie w jaki sposób mit bezpieczeństwa (*anzen shinwa*) ewoluował podczas rządu drugiej kadencji premiera Abe Shinzō.
Druga z autorek, Katarzyna Podlipska, bada, w jaki sposób uczestnicy międzynarodowych Obozów Pokoju pochodzący z trzech wyspiarskich społeczności — Okinawy, Jeju i Tajwanu — na nowo zdefiniowali pojęcie bezpieczeństwa oraz jak ich współpraca wpłynęła na postrzeganie bezpieczeństwa w regionie Azji Północno-Wschodniej.

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Kraków – Poznań –Toruń – Warszawa – Kuki
marzec 2020

Dear Readers,

This issue of *Silva Iaponicarum* contains two papers on the subject of security.
Beata Maciejewska focuses on the issue of security in the nuclear age, simultaneously attempts to answer how the safety myth (*anzen shinwa*) has evolved under the second Abe administration.
The second contributor, Katarzyna Podlipska, investigates how participants of International Peace Camps of three island communities — Okinawa, Jeju, and Taiwan — have redefined the concept of security, and how their cooperation has influenced the perception of security in Northeast Asia.

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Cracow – Poznań –Toruń – Warsaw – Kuki
March 2020

読者のみなさまへ

読者のみなさまへ
『Silva Iaponicarum 日林』の本号は、安全保障に主題した 2 本の論文を掲載しています。
ベアタ・マチエイエフスカ(Beata Maciejewska)氏は、原子力時代における安全保障上の問題に焦点を絞り、「安全神話」が、第二次安倍晋三政権下でどのように進化してきたのか、 という問いに答えようとしています。
カタジナ・ポドゥリプスカ（Katarzyna Podlipska）は、沖縄、済州、台湾 3 島のコミュニティ出身の「平和の海」国際交流キャンプ参加者がどのように安全保障の概念を再定義したのか、彼らの協力が北東アジア地域における安全の認識にどのように影響を与えたのか、という問題を追究しています。

編集委員会 E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

2020 年 3 月 クラクフ・ポズナニ・トルン・ワルシャワ・久喜

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Evolution of *anzen shinwa* in Post-Fukushima Japan: Trajectories of Abe's Nuclear Energy Export Policy in Light of the "Safety Myth"

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ABSTRACT

This article offers an insight into the evolution of the concept of the nuclear "safety myth," scrutinized not only through the lens of its overall postwar development under the "nuclear village" framework, but predominantly illuminated by the trajectories of overseas nuclear energy expansion under the second Abe administration. It is argued here that despite a profound impact of the Fukushima disaster,[1] the myth has not been entirely debunked, but evolved into the "under control" paradigm.

KEYWORDS: "safety myth," "nuclear village," nuclear energy export policy, the second Abe administration

1. Introduction

For Japan – a prime example of a resource-deprived and energy-starved country that is forced to import over 80 per cent of their oil and gas (World Nuclear Association 2017) – nuclear energy became an indispensable component of postwar consensus[2] of economic growth and domestic security. Over the decades, the consecutive governments elevated the position of nuclear energy within Japan's energy portfolio as a strategically significant domestic energy source. Furthermore, nuclear energy capacity has been depicted as a "cheap" alternative to imported fossil fuels and a crucial element of the steady development of the economy (Kingston 2016: 64). Consequently, the nuclear power share in pre-Fukushima Japan was noticeably high, with 54 commercial nuclear power plants that supplied 30 per cent of the country's entire power output (Carpenter 2012: 13).

[1] The March 2011 disaster refers to the triple catastrophe (earthquake, tsunami, and a meltdown of the nuclear reactor) with no precedent, formally known under the name of the Great Eastern Japan Disaster (*Higashi Nihon Daishinsai*, 東日本大震災).

[2] Mochizuki (2016: 78) identifies the following consensus as "an amalgamation of pacifism, the so-called 'nuclear allergy,' political and security realism, and techno-nationalism."

The second administration of Abe Shinzō (安倍晋三), marked by the 2012 landslide victory,[3] sharply reanimated previously latent anxieties about the supposedly overtly nationalistic and revisionist nature of emerging premiership – a radical agenda summarized under a "departure from the postwar regime" (*sengo dakkyaku*, 戦後脱却) slogan.[4] After his abrupt first-term departure (2006-2007), which fits perfectly in the widespread pattern of the revolving door of multiple weak prime ministers (Machidori 2012), Abe found his way to reelection on the platform of economic agenda – the so-called Abenomics.[5] While the economic implications of Abenomics have been already preliminarily explored,[6] the scholarly analysis of the nuclear energy export policy – depicted as one of the core objectives under the "third arrow" – has been greatly overshadowed by the "under control" slogan, which undoubtedly has gained recognition as one of the most widespread catchphrases of Abe.

This article postulates that this "under control" rhetoric is, in fact, a multi-dimensional, new form of the "safety myth" (*anzen shinwa*, 安全神話). The author intends to explore this multivocality by scrutinizing the significance of the original myth, particularly as a phenomenon fuelled by the so-called "nuclear village" (*genshiryoku mura*, 原子力村), and applying this knowledge to a case study of nuclear energy export policy. This article demonstrates the trajectories of safety-oriented rhetoric, with the aim to identify to what extent the "safety myth" – a mechanism

[3] In December 2012 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, *Jiyū Minshutō*, 自由民主党, usually abbreviated to *Jimintō*, 自民党) won 294 seats. Referring to the public disappointment with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, *Minshutō*, 民主党) and the dire post-Fukushima economic reality, Mochizuki and Porter (2013: 38) argue that this electoral triumph should be perceived as the juncture of social, economic, and political difficulties faced by Japanese society at the eve of the second Abe administration.

[4] Under the banner of unburdening Japan from the so-called "masochistic" (*jigyakuteki*, 自虐的) history and escaping from the "postwar regime," Abe has made a series of changes to security policy, such as the new National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Security Council (NSC), the "State Secrecy Law," the "Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers," and the breach of the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Consequently, Abe's foreign and security policy is commonly regarded as "highly charged with ideological revisionism" (Hughes 2015: 1).

[5] Abenomics – a platform designed to boost the sluggish Japanese economy – constitutes of three "arrows": fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and a sizeable pack of structural reforms ranging from the labor market to higher female participation in the workforce.

[6] While some scholars underline that – particularly at an early stage of Abenomics implementation – "responses in the markets were quite significant," with the Nikkei 225 saw a substantial, 88 per cent rise from November 14, 2012, to the end of 2013 (Aramaki 2018: 286, 294), others focus on negative ramifications of the policy package, such as the increasing number of workers engaged in unstable employment with bleak prospects of wage increases (Ito 2014: 103–107).

traditionally employed in the nuclear discourse by the so-called "nuclear village" members to solidify the position of nuclear energy and elucidate the alleged superiority of this source of energy – has been transformed in the post-Fukushima era. While analyzing the "safety myth" within the broader panorama of nuclear industry development, this study focuses predominantly on the issue of the practical application of a new form of the "safety myth" within Japan's energy policy, as exemplified by the expansion of nuclear energy overseas. It is argued here that while the traditional aspect of the nuclear "safety myth" seems to fade away in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, its new form has emerged. The article provides an insight into the ideological and legal underpinnings of this new "safety myth," followed by an inquiry concerning trajectories of overseas nuclear energy expansion.

2. The "Safety Myth" Concept within the Panorama of Nuclear Policy

Japan's postwar nuclear-oriented policy has been considered as a puzzle, enjoying a surprisingly stable, yet simultaneously internally inconsistent, equilibrium. While a reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence – the so-called "nuclear umbrella" (*kaku no kasa*, 核の傘) – is arguably the most pronounced dimension of Japan's postwar nuclear policy,[7] a commitment to global nuclear disarmament (which gravitated toward a strong advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation regime[8]), as well as to developing civil nuclear program,[9] remain equally significant to provide a full picture of a concept of "nuclear policy" in contemporary Japan. Concerning the former, Japan has adopted a stunning range of measures, including a series of international treaties and agreements (e.g., the 1955 bilateral agreement with the U.S., the decision to join the International Atomic Energy Agency[10]), as well as domestic legislation.[11] The latter has developed as a

[7] Here, nuclear policy is understood in a broad sense, referring not only to nuclear power generation but also to the contentious issue of the possession of nuclear weapons.

[8] Japan became a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on February 3, 1970.

[9] The onset of nuclear energy in Japan is strongly linked with influential actors – Nakasone Yasuhiro (中曽根康弘, 1918–2019) and Shōriki Matsutarō (正力松太郎, 1885–1969) – who considerably shaped the nuclear policy at the early stage of its development. The former made strenuous efforts to introduce a budget for nuclear energy production and research, while the latter served as the chairman of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, Genshiryoku Iinkai, 原子力委員会).

[10] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an organization established in 1957 with the overarching aim of promoting "peaceful use" of nuclear energy.

[11] The Three Non-Nuclear Principles (*Hikaku San Gensoku*, 非核三原則) – delineated by Satō Eisaku in his speech to the House of Representatives in 1967, and obliging Japan to not "produce,

less pronounced, yet integral element of the nuclear puzzle, resulting in a status of the third-largest global user of nuclear energy, ranking only behind the United States and France (Schneider et al. 2011: 13). The domestic civil nuclear energy program, discussed in the context of Japan's technological potential to create a closed nuclear fuel cycle (Hippel and Hayes 2018), does not resonate well with Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Concerns over "the bureaucratic project to convert Japan into a plutonium-dependent superpower" (McCormack 2007: 2) reflect the multi-layered character of nuclear discussion even more intensely, touching on issues such as the feasibility and desirability of developing nuclear weapons. This ongoing debate on the contemporary history of nuclear Japan is greatly overshadowed by a tragic past of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Fukushima, but simultaneously it should also focus on a wider picture, as represented by Rokkasho,[12] Tsuruga[13] or Hamaoka.[14]

Within this unique framework, two concepts – the "nuclear allergy"[15] and the "safety myth"– vividly illustrate the complexity of social interactions, which has evolved against the backdrop of accelerated development of domestic nuclear industry. Whereas the former has been predominantly forged by nuclear incidents (such as the F/V Lucky Dragon 5 incident[16])

possess, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil" (Kokkai kaigi roku kensaku shisutemu 1967) – were followed by the Four Pillars of Nuclear Policy (*Kaku Yon Seisaku*, 核四政策, 1968), and the Atomic Energy Law (*Genshiryoku Kihonhō*, 原子力基本法), passed on December 19, 1955.

[12] A nuclear reprocessing plant situated in Rokkasho village (Aomori Prefecture), known as "a complex for nuclear enrichment, reprocessing, and waste storage facilities" (Kingston 2013b: 173), is considered to be a highly contentious issue both due to environmental concerns, as well as concerns about nuclear proliferation.

[13] Tsuruga nuclear power plant witnessed a nuclear accident in 1981. Although the accident was of minor consequences, due to its status of the first domestic nuclear power plant accident, it has cast doubts on atomic energy's reliability.

[14] Hamaoka is a nuclear power plant situated in Shizuoka Prefecture, which, due to its location in the subduction zone of two tectonic plates, is commonly characterized as Japan's most hazardous nuclear facility. The power plant was shut down by the Kan administration.

[15] The so-called "nuclear allergy" (*kaku arerugī*, 核アレルギー), which is defined by Sakamoto (2016: 275) as a "general dislike and suspicion of nuclear technology," is sharply contrasted with the vigorously conducted nuclear program that resulted in the surprisingly high number of nuclear plants (Ōta 2015: 85).

[16] The term F/V Lucky Dragon 5 incident (*Daigo Fukuryū Maru jiken*, 第五福龍丸事件) refers to the accident, caused by nuclear fallout from the United States Castle Bravo thermonuclear weapon test at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. The incident resulted in the death of Kuboyama Aikichi – one of the members of the 23-member crew of Japanese fishing boat F/V Lucky Dragon 5 (Ōta 2015: 86) – and served as a trigger for a widespread anti-nuclear movement that "became an agent of diffusion for Japan's "nuclear allergy"" (Solingen 2007: 66).

and has fluctuated over decades[17] the latter became arguably the most persistent element of Japanese non-nuclear identity. The seeming incongruity concerning the parallel development of a strong "nuclear allergy," and of an idea of transforming Japan into a "nuclear state"[18] with one of the most advanced civilian nuclear energy programs, has not ceased to be the subject of discussion in academia (Aldrich 2014: 79; Pickett 2002). Undoubtedly, the "nuclear allergy" is not convergent with the mainstream nuclear energy-centered policy, as has been clearly illustrated by a vast array of opinions expressed by the most prominent LDP politicians, including the 1967 Fukuda's[19] statement emphasizing the need to outgrow the "nuclear allergy" (Harrison 1996:7). In stark contrast, the nuclear "safety myth" has garnered due recognition in the political circles. The crux of the historical narrative of the "safety myth" – which continued to form the kernel of domestic nuclear policy – lies in the successful process of convincing the general public about the superiority of nuclear energy as an economically profitable, stable, domestically generated, clean, and, above all, absolutely safe source of energy. The foundations for a positive image of nuclear energy and the subsequent forging of the nuclear "safety myth" in the nuclear-resistant Japanese society[20] were laid, among others, by Shōriki Matsutarō. During his 84-year-long life, Shōriki was involved in a surprisingly high number of activities, starting from politics,[21] sport (he was a judo master and the founder of the Yomiuri Giants baseball team[22]) to entrepreneurship (as the founder of the Nippon Television Network and the president of Yomiuri Shimbunsha, one of the largest Japanese newspaper companies). Shōriki – often portrayed as "a

[17] The visible fluctuations in the level of the public support for the concept of non-nuclear Japan (s. Solingen 2007: 66-67) suggest – as Kitamura (1996:13) argues – that the "nuclear allergy" appeared to be "a flexible phenomenon," affected greatly by both exogenous factors (such as China's nuclear test), as well as domestic ones.

[18] The concept of a "nuclear state" (*genshiryoku rikkoku*, 原子力立国), characterized by the comparatively high level of nuclear-generated electricity set out between 30 to 40 per cent to 2030 (McCormack 2007), has been illuminated by the METI's 2006 "New National Energy Policy".

[19] At that time, Fukuda Takeo held an influential position as the LDP Secretary-General.

[20] A highly negative opinion about nuclear power – strongly associated with fear of "atomic and hydrogen bombs, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or war" – was shared by approximately 70 per cent of the respondents who took part in the first public-opinion poll on the utilization of nuclear power conducted in 1968 (Utsumi 2012: 175). Paradoxically, a majority of the same group (specifically almost 70 per cent) showed approval for the promotion of "nuclear energy for peaceful use" (ibid. 175).

[21] His success in the 1955 election was followed by an appointment to the position of Minister in charge of nuclear energy and, eventually, the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan (AEC) in 1956.

[22] Due to his prominent role in propagating this sport in Japan, he was acclaimed as "the father of professional baseball".

high profile champion of nuclear power" (Sovacool and Valentine 2012: 107) or even "the father of nuclear power" (Utsumi 2012: 190) – exerted a profound impact on both perception and development of nuclear energy in postwar Japan. For example, Shōriki's electoral slogan – "second industrial revolution through atoms for peace" – adopted to secure a seat in the 1955 House of Representatives election (Utsumi 2012: 184) indicates clearly to what extent that prominent actor relied on the concept of "peaceful nuclear energy". As the scholar (2012: 188) further notes, in the aftermath of the Lucky Dragon incident, which gravely jeopardized further development of nuclear energy, Shōriki skillfully utilized his newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* to launch an advertising campaign, particularly a series of articles under the title "The Energy of the Sun in Our Hands at last." Also, Shōriki's notable contribution to the popularization of atom and nuclear energy at that early stage of its development in Japan is considered to be of utmost importance. It can be exemplified for instance by his role in breaking Hiroshima's resistance toward nuclear energy by organizing the Hiroshima event, described as "a massive success attracting over 100,000 people over a three-week period in May 1956" (Sovacool and Valentine 2012: 108). Interestingly enough, the powerful character of the "safety myth" remained unchanged even in the wake of tragic nuclear accidents (Three Miles Island 1979, Chernobyl 1986) because, as Shindō (2016:129) notes, the severity of those negative developments was undermined by the Japanese scientists on the grounds of allegedly significant disparity between Japan and other countries concerning the level of scientific expertise and technological development.

The concept of the nuclear "safety myth" has also undergone significant metamorphosis, particularly under the impact of two waves of global interest in civilian nuclear power concerning (1) an image of nuclear energy as "safe and necessary" (Kingston 2013b: 220), built intensely in response to energy crisis triggered by the oil shocks of the 1970s; and (2) a reputation of effective tool to combat global warming problem, spurred by a rise of environmental awareness since the 1990s. The "safety myth" has been the most widespread rhetoric, but it can hardly be considered as the sole mechanism employed by the "nuclear village." Cost-efficiency – the deep-seated belief in a "too cheap to meter" aspect of nuclear electricity (Diesendorf 2012: 50) – has been widely propagated by pro-nuclear advocates, alongside with the possibility of generating nuclear power in Japan and the "clean" character of this energy source.[23] This vision of

[23] An image of nuclear energy as a "clean" source of energy, has been particularly promoted in the aftermath of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. To achieve internationally binding targets for the reduction

nuclear energy as "cheap" has been firmly established due to the summary of generation costs of energy included in the governmental White Papers. A comparative study of power generation costs, which illustrates the cost dynamics in 2011 and 2014, strongly suggests that nuclear energy is the most cost-effective (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2015).

The propagation of the myth has been carefully orchestrated by the so-called "nuclear village." The term has been employed in the discourse on Japanese politics primarily to encapsulate the cozy relationships between the influential groups of people who actively promote nuclear energy in Japanese society. It is traditionally established that the term refers to the conservative LDP politicians, bureaucrats, [24] nuclear power-related companies, and the supporters of the nuclear policy among Japanese academia, [25] but Honma (2016: 24) further supplements this list with additional actors: Hitachi, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., along with construction companies and other regional companies; the media; and advertising agencies (e.g., Dentsu Inc.).[26] The "nuclear village" community is depicted as privileged since it immensely benefited from a wide spectrum of advantages, such as vast financial and lobbying resources (Kingston 2016: 71), the institutional advantages (Hymans 2011), and the benefit of scale, as reflected by "too big to fail" argument (Samuels 2013). The community is also heavily criticized because it exerts pressure on the media and scholars, thus muzzling the independent coverage of the nuclear policy. For decades the issue of dismantling these cozy ties between politicians, bureaucrats, and large utility companies has remained an insoluble problem.

The "nuclear village," however, has encountered two fundamental types of obstacles in its vigorous pursuit of energy self-sufficiency dream. First and foremost, although the postwar era has witnessed the largely peaceful

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of greenhouse gas emissions, the Japanese government envisaged increasing nuclear power generation by about 30 per cent by 2011. Additionally, the number of nuclear utilities was supposed to go up to 12 new nuclear plants. These plans, however, met with only partial success because, in reality, merely 5 new utilities were built in the 2000s (World Nuclear Association 2017).

[24] Specifically, two administrative agencies – the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, *Keisanshō*, 経産省) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT, *Monbukagakushō*, 文部科学省; before the merger in 2001 known as the Ministry of Education or *Monbushō*) – are perceived as particularly engaged in the process of nuclear energy promotion.

[25] Nuclear energy development has been supported by many research institutes, with the University of Tokyo at their lead.

[26] Dentsū Inc. is a leading advertising and public relations Japanese company operating worldwide, with a long history that can be traced back to 1901.

coexistence of "three Ds" (**d**eterrence, **d**isarmament, and robust **d**evelopment of civil nuclear power industry), in parallel with diverse and mutually conflicting perceptions of economic security based on domestic nuclear energy generation, an issue of nuclear power periodically became highly divisive, which galvanized strong anti-nuclear social moods, generated social tensions, either in the form of an outward-fuelled wave of public discontent or of domestic protests.[27] A classic example of the former is a widespread reaction to the tragedy of the Lucky Dragon 5, whereas the latter can be illustrated by the violent public response to a string of industrial diseases, including notorious cases of the Minamata disease (*Minamatabyō*, 水俣病). Second, the issue of becoming a nuclear plant host stirred up controversies among local communities. In the backdrop of these developments, financial resources[28] proved to be greatly conducive to an enticing environment for nuclear sector expansion and to luring the local governments to host nuclear power plants. A multitude of potential benefits, including the creation of new companies in the region, the prosperity of lodging facilities, substantial government subsidies, and the development of public works (Shindō 2016: 84), resonated well with many local municipalities' aspirations to revive depopulation-stricken local economies of Fukushima, Fukui, Aomori, or Niigata prefectures. The phenomenon boosted higher susceptibility to the nuclear propaganda of "life improvement" propagated by the "nuclear village" (Honma 2016: 15), while their vulnerability made them particularly responsive to the "compensation policy" of the central government (Calder 1988). To provide a fertile ground for the development of the "safety myth," a broad repertoire of policy instruments has been adopted by consecutive Japanese governments. While systematically developing and implementing a wide range of methods that have supported the implementation of the national agenda, the central government proved to be particularly effective in addressing the most nuclear-resistant groups (notably fishing cooperatives, local government leaders, youth, and women) to render them less prone to oppose nuclear technology. Aldrich (2014) elucidates this multivocality of strategies deliberately designed to alter citizen preferences and reduce resistance to controversial nuclear facilities by identifying five categories

[27] To ease social tensions, a vast amount of money was pumped into the promotional activities of Japanese nuclear companies. For example, Tokyo Electric Power Development Expenses responded to the Chernobyl accident by almost doubling its expenses – from 12.1 billion yen in 1986 to 22.4 billion yen in 1990 (Honma 2016: 18).

[28] The activities of the nuclear village are commonly characterized in the context of lavish financial resources, as exemplified by the onset of the nuclear research program. 1954 witnessed an impressive budget for nuclear energy – 230 million dollars.

of state tools: authority tools, [29] incentive tools, [30] capacity tools, symbolic/hortatory tools, and learning tools. In particular, METI has established its reputation as a major actor that has greatly fuelled the positive image of nuclear energy by employing a wide range of hortatory tools, including awards ceremonies to pro-nuclear local politicians, [31] personal visits of bureaucrats to targeted communities,[32] or the creation of the Nuclear Power Day[33] (Aldrich 2014: 83-84). This extensive array of policy instruments was designed not only as specific mechanisms for improving the image of nuclear power but also as soft social control techniques for inducing public support for nuclear energy.

The process of building positive image of nuclear energy has also been supported by an immense number of advertisements aimed at the promotion of nuclear power in Japanese society, and the impact of the uncritical media (Honma 2016: 11). As a powerful instrument of influencing societal attitude, the media constitute a crucial component in the "nuclear village" puzzle. The media are implicitly regulated by the hierarchical media culture, firmly grounded on the membership in Japan's press club (the so-called *kisha kurabu*, 記者クラブ) system,[34] and various financial incentives. Whereas the former is considered to promote the type of journalism in conformity with the official governmental line, while concurrently negatively affecting the independence of journalists (Kingston 2017; Chiu 2014) and discouraging investigative journalism (Earp 2011), the latter has boosted a long-term and wide-scale promotion of nuclear energy. Honma's investigation reveals that over a span of four decades (1970-2011), advertisement activities for the nuclear power sector were fuelled by a vast amount of financial resources – an estimated 2.4 trillion

[29] Among authority tools, the Land Expropriation Law (*Tochi Shūyōhō*, 土地収用法, 1951), which "restricted the right of private property ownership when deemed necessary for protecting the 'public interest'" (Tanji 2007: 114), provides arguably the most illustrative example of mechanisms utilized by the central government.

[30] Aldrich (2014) highlights the impact of incentive tools by reference to the example of the Three Power Source Development Laws (*Dengen Sanpō*, 電源三法).

[31] The Citation Ceremony for Electric Power Sources Siting Promoters (*Dengen ricchi sokushin kōrōsha hyōshō*, 電源立地促進功労者表彰) was held annually in July.

[32] Personal visits of bureaucrats quickly became the bureaucratic norm, with the one paid by the former science and technology minister in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa complex (Niigata Prefecture) being arguably the most striking example of this tendency (Aldrich 2014: 83).

[33] The Nuclear Power Day (*Genshiryoku no hi*, 原子力の日) is celebrated annually on 26 October (Honma 2016: 16).

[34] The system is perceived as a major source of privileges, such as excellent access to government agencies, a right to participate in the press conferences, and some degree of legal protection (Stucky and Adelstein 2012), but it also promotes intimidation of freelance journalists, who as non-members are forced to obtain information in alternative ways.

yen (Honma 2016: 11-12). Simultaneously, however, journalists are also subjected to legal intimidation, as vividly illustrated by a libel suit against Tanaka Minoru – a glaring example of the strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) as noted by the Reporters Without Borders (2013). Tanaka – a journalist widely recognized for his long-standing engagement in investigative reporting on the nuclear energy industry – was sued by Shirakawa Shirō, president of the nuclear safety company New Tech, and one of Japan's most potent nuclear industry figures, for a total of 67 million yen (Stucky and Adelstein 2012). The bone of contention was an article published in the weekly *Shūkan Kin'yōbi* on December 16, 2011, revealing the cozy relationship between the president, Japan's nuclear industry, and politicians. Fortunately for Tanaka, August 12, 2013, witnessed the withdrawal of the suit, but the chilling effect can arguably have a lasting impact in the journalistic circles on the objectivity of journalism, particularly that concerning nuclear issues.

In addition to the influence of domestic "nuclear village," Japan is also deeply enmeshed in the global nuclear industrial complex, particularly due to the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation. With the onset traced back to the 1950s, and the stage of deeper cooperation reached with the 1988 Japan-U.S. Nuclear Power Cooperation Agreement[35] (Kobayashi 2014: 107), the bilateral cooperation has acquired a well-earned reputation of the world's longest-standing partnership in the field of civil nuclear energy. Japan was a pioneer among the countries that responded to President Eisenhower's grand vision by joining the "Atoms for Peace Program."[36]Due to the U.S. permission given in 1988, Japan is allowed to reprocess plutonium from the U.S.-originated spent fuel.[37] Consequently, Japan has gained a unique status of the sole non-nuclear state that is allowed under international law to enrich uranium and extract plutonium with minimal scrutiny (Kingston 2016: 65). Naturally, any changes introduced to the nuclear status quo, including plans of phasing out, fuel serious concerns about the future usage of the separated plutonium stockpiles also in Washington. The nuclear

[35] The 1988 Agreement was an amended and extended version of the "Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" signed in 1968.

[36] U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower introduced his grand vision concerning the peaceful usage of atomic energy, known under the title "Atoms for Peace," during the speech to the UN General Assembly in New York City, delivered on December 8, 1953. The decision to join the initiative in 1958, followed by increased cooperation in the field of expertise, as well as equipment and fuel sharing during the 1960s, also proved to be rewarding in financial terms, with at least 150 million dollars contributed by Japan to the U.S. nuclear R&D programs and paid to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in forms of substantial license fees (Uyehara 2000: 23-24).

[37] Under the provision of this permission, Japan is obliged to meet the "energy-generation only" condition.

development of Japanese companies has been greatly boosted by partnerships and alliances with foreign companies, including Toshiba and U.S. General Electric (GE); Hitachi and Westinghouse Electric; and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and French Areva. The mid-2000s witnessed a critical stage of such bilateral cooperation, with a massive purchase of a 77 per cent share of Westinghouse Electric Company by Toshiba Corporation at the price of 5.4 billion dollars, only to be followed by the formation of GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Holdings LLC in the United States, and Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy Ltd. in Japan in 2007. Inevitably, as Kingston (2016: 64) notes, the American-Japanese nuclear cooperation has been profoundly shaped by the vested interests of the corporate combines, such as Hitachi-GE or Westinghouse-Toshiba. Simultaneously, however, through this kind of extensive linkage with international nuclear companies, Japanese firms have gained the status of significant players in the nuclear energy sector. Apart from the issue of mutually fuelled vested interest within the global "nuclear village" nexus, among the wide spectrum of issues inextricably related to Japan's nuclear energy industry, such as plutonium recycling, mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel, and fast-breeder reactors, the issue of storage of separated plutonium provides yet another aspect of the nuclear agenda deeply embedded in the nexus of the American-Japanese power politics. Due to its magnitude, the issue is carefully scrutinized by scholars, who either perceive the phenomenon as potentially devastative[38] or illuminate the linkage between stockpile issue and the "stay nuclear" option in light of pressures exerted by Washington (Trento 2012). Undoubtedly, in considering a dearth of operational power plants, the situation becomes increasingly grave. The data provided by the Atomic Energy Commission (2016) clearly depicts the gravity of the situation concerning separated plutonium management. Since only 10.8 tons (out of a total number of 47.9) were stored domestically, Japan has to rely heavily on the U.K. (20.9) and France (16.2). A paucity of an efficient long-term system for nuclear management and nuclear waste disposal, combined with Rokkasho's insufficiency to successfully deal with the nuclear waste problem, increasingly aggravates the situation, simultaneously stimulating concerns over the genuine sense of safety.

In the backdrop of these developments, the "safety myth" has proved to be surprisingly persistent and prevailing. Even a series of nuclear scandals

[38] Separated plutonium, also labeled as weapons-usable plutonium, is depicted as a factor with the potentiality to jeopardize the non-proliferation regime (Kingston 2013a). This opinion is further supported by Honma (2016: 152), who underlines the fact that the total amount of plutonium possessed by Japan allows building more than 5,000 nuclear bombs.

exposed in the 1990s[39] was not able to demolish the *anzen shinwa* rhetoric. It was not until the Fukushima disaster that the myth was punctured, though it has not entirely collapsed. It is commonly agreed in academia that the Tokyo Electric Power Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident – the world's second most destructive nuclear disaster[40] – constituted a critical turning point in Japan's nuclear history and overall energy policy, one that can be paralleled only by wartime nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the aftermath of the disaster, Japan's energy mix, previously based predominantly on fossil fuels and nuclear power, was dramatically altered due to widespread abandonment of nuclear power (*datsu genpatsu*, 脱原発) movement. Consequently, Japanese politics in general, and nuclear policy, in particular, underwent a major upheaval. While it is generally agreed worldwide that among all types of energy, nuclear energy "is arguably the most politicized one" (Müller and Thurner 2017: 2), in the immediate post-Fukushima period the level of politicization was strikingly high (Table 1).

Level	**Action**
International	A number of pro-nuclear countries dramatically changed their nuclear policies.[41]
Domestic – Central Government	The DPJ administration embarked on a non-nuclear policy.
Domestic – Local Government	The then Fukushima governor Satō Yūhei incorporated the theme into the prefectural reconstruction vision.

Table 1. Outline of abandonment of nuclear power (drafted by the author)

While globally the Fukushima disaster has undoubtedly reinforced an increasingly prominent and long-term anti-nuclear trend, Japan has adopted an ambiguous stance. Initially, Japan dramatically reduced the

[39] The 1990s witnessed a spate of attention-grabbing nuclear accidents: a liquid sodium leak at the Monju fast breeder reactor (December 1995), a fire at the Tokaimura reprocessing plant (March 1997), and an accident at Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co. (September 1999).

[40] The Fukushima nuclear accident was marked as seven on the seven-grade international scale of the seriousness of incidents. The severity of the accident can be compared only to Chernobyl, which was given the same highest mark (Carpenter 2012: 4).

[41] The previously heavily nuclear-reliant countries, such as Germany, Italy, or France, decided to either abandon their nuclear policies or restrict them considerably. In particular, Germany has drastically transformed its nuclear energy policy by shutting down eight of its oldest reactors and planning to phase out nuclear power completely by 2022.

number of nuclear facilities at home to zero. Despite a description of the DPJ government as "political change without policy change" (Lipscy and Scheiner 2012) – a term coined to highlight a general absence of significant policy shifts under the new administration – nuclear policy saw a powerful, yet forced policy alteration that resulted in a total shutdown of nuclear power plants. Noda's introduction of the nuclear-zero policy was preceded by the Kan administration's bold decisions, such as the establishment of the Energy and Environment Council (Enerugī Kankyō Kaigi, エネルギー・環境会議), promotion of public participation in the policy-making process, and the issuance of a new "Innovative Energy and Environmental Strategy"[42] in September 2012. Nevertheless, the anti-nuclear DPJ administrations were accused of poor crisis management and ineptitude. In the post-Fukushima reality, nuclear concerns were perceived as potentially highly salient and highly sensitive political issues. Arguably, the Fukushima tragedy possessed a latent power to become a "critical juncture" that could reset the trajectory of public views on the nuclear issue, as well as the nuclear-related policy-making process. It was expected that the re-emergence of anti-nuclear sentiment could create a political environment that would drastically change the paradigm of the postwar nuclear policy agenda. Nevertheless, Kingston (2013a: 11) assesses that Fukushima failed to become a truly game-changing event due to the ongoing impact of the "nuclear village" community, considerable advantages it still enjoys in terms of the energy policy-making process, and enormous investments at stake. The fairly limited impact of the Fukushima disaster is also reflected in Aldrich's view that the event "has only slightly slowed the state's attempt to further its nuclear energy goals" (2014: 79). Indeed, initially it seemed to make nuclear policy more thoroughly politicized and volatile than ever before, resulting in the implementation of the "zero-nuclear" policy under the DPJ auspices, but with time this policy turn proved to be only temporary. The disaster, however, forced the "nuclear village" community to significantly redesign the ideological, institutional, and legal architecture of the nuclear policy. Consequently, the post-Fukushima nuclear power policy is in a state of flux. Simultaneously, however, the specific symbiosis of the "nuclear village" and nuclear "safety myth" left a long-lasting legacy in Japan, and it paved the way to a new form of *anzen shinwa*, with Prime Minister Abe as a central actor.

[42] This new strategy, with its overarching objective of phasing out nuclear power by the end of the 2030s, accompanied by not allowing for new construction of nuclear power plants, closely corresponded to the newly-lit widespread anti-nuclear sentiments.

3. Construction of the New "Safety Myth": Ideological and Legal Underpinnings

Although the disaster pushed the energy policy toward disjuncture from a traditional, conspicuously pro-nuclear LDP energy policy-making, this landmark development has been reverted by Abe and his nuclear policy agenda. Abe – identified as a prominent member of the "nuclear village" and a staunch advocate of nuclear power, as widely recognized within academia (Kingston 2013a; Mark 2016: 44-45) – not only rejected the radical anti-nuclear agenda imposed by the DPJ[43] but also marked a return to the dominant paradigm of nuclear safety. Arguably, there are manifold drivers behind Abe's nuclear agenda. Concerning historical legacy, Abe strives for continuity in strengthening Japan's position within a global nexus of pro-nuclear advocates. Domestically, he pursues solution for ailing Japan's nuclear power sector. Internationally, he aims at building the status of a prominent diplomat and a decisive leader who adopts a proactive stance in shaping Japan's geopolitical position.

Abe has created a complex pattern of foreign policy, with overtly highlighted elements of international engagement and leadership, within which the nuclear energy export policy has been placed as a vital link between demands of domestic nuclear industry, particularly the members of the "nuclear village," and a global nexus of nuclear interdependence – both exerted intense pressure on the governmental decision-making process. Japan – often analyzed by the prism of its distinctive historical status (a sole nuclear victim[44]) and legal attributes – is commonly referred to as a country that possesses unique credentials to exert a positive influence on the international community toward the attainment of the "non-nuclear world" objective. While taking advantage of this widespread image of Japan as a significant contributor to global peace, Abe has launched a campaign for reinvigorating nuclear power. The first two years of the second administration witnessed Abe's stunning return to power in the December 2012 landslide election victory, and the consolidation of his leadership in a repeated victory in December 2014. The consolidation of political power coincided with the intensification of "under control" rhetoric – rhetoric that implicitly refers to *anzen shinwa* legacy. Within this

[43] The DPJ not only introduced radical phase-out policy, but its post-Fukushima environmental policies also embraced other related issues, such as the 25% emissions reduction target.

[44] Japan has developed its unique anti-nuclear credentials, which are firmly grounded on the identity of a country that became "the only victim of an atomic bomb" (*yuiitsu no hibakukoku*, 唯一の被爆国). This identity is also reflected in the concepts of the "peace state" (*heiwa kokka*, 平和国家) and the "postwar pacifism," and embodied by the postwar Constitution with its renowned Article 9, identified as "the hallmark of Japan's heretofore postwar identity" (Ellings 2006: 3).

nuclear "safety myth" framework, Abe has made a feverish attempt to revive the delusion of the "absolute safety" of nuclear power. After reestablishing his parliamentary strength and effectively ceasing the "twisted Diet"[45] period, Abe was given much leeway to pursue his nuclear-related objectives. A partial revival of the "nuclear village" has been viable due to the "reversion policy" adopted by the Abe administration. The abolition of the DPJ's independent Energy and Environment Council and a swift return to national energy policy at the helm of METI are only two examples of such a shift. As a leading representative of the "nuclear village," Abe has continued to control the public narrative concerning nuclear issues by employing a broad spectrum of measures. At the legislative level, Abe established the National Security Council (NSC, *Kokka Anzen Hoshō Kaigi*, 国家安全保障会議) in December 2013.[46] The establishment of NSC is vital in the nuclear policy discourse since – apart from its primary function of coordination of self-defense policy – this administrative organ is also at the helm of manufacturing and selling weapons overseas. At the ideological level, Abe has repeatedly provided an official assurance that "the situation is under control." This concept – originated in the speech delivered on September 7, 2013, at the 125th Session of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) – is particularly insightful (*Shushō Kantei* 2013b). It proves that the propagation of the "safety myth" has continued, although it took a refurbished form under the newly established "under control" catchphrase. The background of the emergence of this renewed "safety myth" was, as Kingston (2013a: 2) indicates, highly pragmatic and fueled by the economic benefits of a quick restart of idled nuclear reactors, as well as the prospects for Tokyo to become a host for the 2020 Olympics. It could be argued that this kind of renewed *anzen shinwa* rhetoric has been of paramount significance particularly regarding the efficiency of international nuclear cooperation. The second Abe administration – largely characterized by its proclivity to prioritize economic growth over social appeals to anti-nuclear sentiment – leans heavily on this new form of the "safety myth," which relies on strong ideological and legal underpinnings.

3.1. Proactive Diplomacy

[45] The so-called Twisted Diet (*nejire kokkai*, ねじれ国会) refers to the situation when the ruling party lost the majority in the House of Councilors (the higher house in the Japanese bicameral Diet).

[46] Due to Abe's initiative, the NSC replaced the Security Council (*Anzen Hoshō Kaigi*, 安全保障会議, established in 1986) as an organ that coordinates the national security policy.

Although the disaster alone could serve as a premise to discredit the nuclear industry in general, and Japanese nuclear technology in particular, the Abe administration attempted to convince the international community of Japan's unique mission in the post-Fukushima world. Japan's foreign policy – widely portrayed as reactive, low-profile, and low-risk (Hughes 2015) – has shifted significantly under the second Abe administration toward a more dynamic approach, and this transformation concerns also outward-oriented nuclear agenda. As has been already suggested, the post-Fukushima nuclear-oriented foreign policy is firmly grounded on two pillars: while in the background, it is underpinned by Japan's long-held general mission to contribute to a non-nuclear world – a pursuit which stems from Japan's unique non-nuclear credentials – in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster a special mission of rekindling the belief in Japanese nuclear technology emerged.

The former, shaped by the dramatic experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is inextricably linked with Japan's important "responsibility to take the lead in efforts by the international community to realize a world free of nuclear weapons." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018: 14-15, 222). Ideologically, Japan has consistently been building a lasting legacy of the non-nuclear state by establishing a strong image of the most prominent advocate of the international non-proliferation regime. Despite the fact that Japan attaches importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by conducting multiple actions to support the non-proliferation agenda (such as attendance of Foreign Minister Kono in the Tenth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in September 2017), Abe's non-proliferation record track remains ambiguous. Abe's proactive stance of an ardent supporter of non-proliferation, adjusting to the former U.S. President Obama's vision of the non-nuclear world, with the participation in the summit with President Obama in April 2015, and release of the joint statement are considered as the most vivid examples of such non-proliferation efforts. Simultaneously, however, his attitude is starkly contrasted with the ambiguity in Japan's non-proliferation commitment, as illustrated by (1) a refusal to sign a UN pledge concerning the ban on using nuclear weapons (April 2013); (2) voting against a historic resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly to convene negotiations in 2017 on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons (December 2016); or (3) abstention from the meeting at U.N. Headquarters in New York concerning the negotiation over a treaty outlawing nuclear weapons (March 2017).

The latter focuses predominantly on the concept of a "proactive contribution." The idea is arguably the most precisely depicted in the following excerpt from the "Strategic Energy Plan":

> "Particularly because nuclear power generation is expected to be increasingly used going forward in emerging economies surrounding Japan, including China, Southeast Asian nations and India, it is **the responsibility that Japan must fulfill** and the world expects it to fulfill to **make proactive contributions to the improvement of nuclear safety**, peaceful use of nuclear power, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the world and also contribute to countermeasures against global warming, by **sharing the experiences and lessons learnt from the TEPCO's Fukushima nuclear accident with the international community** and also in light of the perspective of maintaining and further developing Japan's high-level technologies and human resources involved." (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2018: 69-70) [emphasis added]

In this context, an elusive notion of improving nuclear safety culture by sharing the bitter lesson of the Fukushima disaster is strongly linked with providing nuclear power technologies to other countries, including exports of nuclear power plants. Watanabe (2014: 9) highlights the linkage between the restart of nuclear plants and the export of nuclear energy, and notes its significance for neoliberal reforms under the second Abe administration. In light of long-term prospects for further expansion of global nuclear power market, Watanabe (2014: 89) argues that joint development and sales of weapons, along with the export of nuclear power plants, is becoming the linchpin of the "strategic diplomacy" (*senryaku gaikō*, 戦略外交) of the Abe administration. Abe's recognition of the great potential in overseas nuclear power markets is clearly reflected in his proactive nuclear-oriented diplomacy. His "strategic diplomacy" is ideologically centered on concepts of a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" and "Japan's Foreign Policy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map." Among the four priorities[47] listed in the "Diplomatic

[47] In a comparative perspective, the initial set of four objectives – strengthening the Japan–U.S. Alliance; deepening cooperative relations with neighboring countries; promoting economic diplomacy; and a further contribution to global issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014) – has been supplemented by additional two goals of (1) contributing to the peace and stability of the Middle East; and (2) promotion of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018: 9-19).

Bluebook 2014" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014), the third objective – strengthening economic diplomacy as a means of promoting the revitalization of Japanese economy – is crucial for further discussion. It is based on two axes: (1) strategic promotion of high-level economic partnerships with the objective of expanding export opportunities; and (2) bolstering Japan's strategic resource diplomacy. Under this "Proactive Contribution to Peace" paradigm, Abe has strikingly elevated his presence at international stages, as illustrated by a high number of foreign visits.[48] Against the backdrop of Japan's deteriorating profile in the international nuclear energy market – a natural consequence of the elimination of nuclear power – Abe has made a meaningful effort to reverse the tide of negative implications for Japan's nuclear potency. In his numerous speeches, the Prime Minister portrays the competitive advantage of the Japanese nuclear energy market, built on its unique, although traumatic experiences.

> "I consider it Japan's duty to share with the world the experiences and the lessons gained through the severe accident and to contribute to the improvement of nuclear safety." (□h□shō Kantei 2013a)

While announcing a two trillion-yen public-private deal to construct a nuclear power plant in Turkey (*Nikkei Asian Review* 18.03.2018.), Abe referred to the dramatic legacy of the Fukushima nuclear accident. Analogically to the postwar experience as a forerunner of a global non-nuclear initiative, and due to its reputation as "a sole nuclear victim," Japan under Abe's premiership reinvented its image as an actor that is obliged to share the lessons of the 2011 triple meltdown with the world.

> "Some may have concerns about Fukushima. Let me assure you, the situation is under control." (□h□shō Kantei 2013b)

This speech, delivered at the 125th Session of the International Olympic Committee in Buenos Aires, focused on another aspect of the post-Fukushima rhetoric: an emphasis on the government's successful crisis management, summarized by the catchphrase "under control". Abe has dedicated himself to continuously accelerating the momentum toward "making-positive-contribution-to-safety" rhetoric. Sharing bitter experience with the international community, referring to a notion of the

[48] According to official data (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018: 6), as of January 29, 2018, the Prime Minister has visited 76 countries and regions (135 countries and regions in total).

"peaceful usage of nuclear energy," [49] convincing others about swift progress concerning the Fukushima crisis management – all these factors became core elements meant to enhance nuclear safety around the world.

> "We will fulfill our responsibility in dealing with the issue of climate change as well as the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world." (Asahi Shimbun 2018b)

In a similar vein, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga also touched on the issue of Japan's responsibility for the environmental aspect of nuclear energy (the issue of climate change), also emphasizing Japan's role in the "peaceful use" of nuclear energy in the world. This kind of speeches, which has played a significant role in contributing to positive global perceptions of Japanese nuclear technology and enhancing Japan's regional credibility as a development partner, resulted in a further array of bilateral nuclear agreements.

3.2. Legislative Measures

Under the Japanese legal framework, grounded firmly on the 1947 constitution, as well as other documents, [50] access to information concerning nuclear issues should be unrestricted. In the aftermath of the landslide victory in the Upper House election in July 2013, Abe was granted much leeway to enforce some highly controversial decisions, including the introduction of the secrecy law legislation. The "secrecy law," officially known as the Special Secrets Protection Law (*Tokutei Himitsu Hogohō,* 特定秘密保護法)[51] was passed on December 6, 2013. In light of this development, mounting concerns over the looming curtailment of the freedom of the press have been articulated by scholars who, amid the general tendency to weaken the system of democratic values under the second Abe administration (Stockwin 2017: 113),[52] identify new legislation

[49] It is noteworthy, however, that, as some scholars (e.g. Takahashi 2012: 77) argue, "peaceful usage" is inextricably linked with military usage.

[50] As stipulated by the Japanese constitution (Article 21), freedom of assembly and association, press, and all other forms of expression is a fundamental right of every citizen. This freedom is also guaranteed by Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Japan in 1979.

[51] In English literature other translations, such as the "Designated Secrets Law" of 2013, or the "Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets," are also employed.

[52] Stockwin (2017: 112-113) links this weakening process with four important drawbacks of the new law: (1) a vague definition of the notion of "designated state secret", leaving considerable room for a broad interpretation; (2) an inadequate mechanism for overseeing the administration of the law; (3) too strict punishment; and (4) the greatly extended period of protection (up to sixty

as a crucial factor that due to its ambiguity opens doors for multiple interpretations in the future (Repeta 2014: 20), which thus determines Japan's poor performance (Kingston 2017: 1). In a similar vein, international watchdog organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch, the International PEN Club, and the Open Society Justice Initiative, publicly expressed concerns over gradual erosion of Japan's media freedom (Repeta 2014: 13). The issue has been highlighted, among others, in the report of the Special Rapporteur (Kaye 2017)[53] and reflected in the alarmingly sharp drop in the global ranking of media freedom, which Japan experienced under the second Abe administration (Reporters Without Borders 2012; 2017). The law has been widely criticized as devoid of transparency: a category of "sensitive information" has been only broadly outlined, and roughly divided into four groups (defense, diplomacy, public safety, and counter-terrorism) without providing clear definitions of each sub-category. Instead of a precise definition, there is an ambiguous general description with lists of examples of the types of information covered. The second objection regarding this legislation is related to its stringency. Under the provisions of the new law, a journalist who inappropriately accessed classified information faces a five-year imprisonment, whereas ten-year-long punishment could be imposed on a public servant who disclosed classified information. Due to the great severity of punishments,[54] the new Japanese "secrecy law" is easily distinguishable from its counterparts in other democracies, and among the U.S. allies, it is considered as the most restrictive penalizing system. Some pundits also refute an argument about the allegedly flawed character of previous Japan's secrecy law (Halperin and Hofsommer 2014: 6), pointing out that under the former legal framework,[55] state secrets were already adequately protected (Repeta 2014: 20), and that the Abe administration failed to provide a full and persuasive

years).

[53] In the report, Kaye addresses a wide variety of issues by vocalizing concerns over the scale of legal changes proposed by the Abe administration, which can create a possibility "for derogations in times of emergency beyond what is permissible under the international human rights law" (2017: 4-5). Simultaneously, the expert underscores the significance of the media independence, stresses the complex character of government-media relationship (ibid.: 6-8), illustrates the difficulties of the print media in reporting on politically sensitive issues, such as the Fukushima disaster and the "comfort women" issue, (ibid.: 8-9), and expresses concerns about the adoption of the "Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets" (ibid.: 12).

[54] Apart from being subjected up to ten-year imprisonment, an offender can be also punished by a maximum 10,000,000 yen fine.

[55] The last significant change was made in 2001 and concerned the revision of the "Self-Defense Forces Law" (*Jieitaihō*, 自衛隊法) that included a new provision protecting information designated as "defense secrets" (*bōei himitsu*, 防衛秘密).

explanation concerning the significance of new law, or to support it by an extensive social consultation (Halperin and Hofsommer 2014: 3). Despite this bitter criticism, the new legislation was pushed through the Diet at a frantic pace.[56] Even more disturbingly, as Repeta (2014: 19) underlines, as far as the label of "specially designated secret" is attached, neither the social value of revealed information (concerning, e.g., corruption, public health malpractices, or environmental threats) nor public interest can justify unauthorized disclosure. The curtailment of fundamental social rights renders the new legislation disturbingly similar to the "Peace Preservation Law" of 1925, enforced in the immediate aftermath of the extension of the electoral rights to all males over the age of 25. Simultaneously, however, the potential social ramifications of the "secrecy law" can arguably go far beyond the issue of limited access to public information. Importantly, apart from broad societal consequences caused by gagging the press or restricting the public's right to know, the legislation should be also scrutinized as a significant measure "that gave largely unchecked discretionary power to government officials to designate documents as state secrets" (Nakano 2016: 168). Consequently, it can be potentially useful to break the impasse in the development of the domestic nuclear sector and maintain the "safety myth." While on the one hand, it thwarts any attempts to divulge or report sensitive information about the Fukushima nuclear disaster, particularly its scale and the progress of post-disaster management, thus effectively curtailing the activism of whistleblowers and journalists, it can also distort information about the actual safety level of Japan's nuclear reactors. The high probability of this scenario was reflected in official rhetorics, and confirmed in November 2013 by minister Mori,[57] who assessed the law as possibly applicable to the nuclear power industry if its safety is potentially jeopardized by terrorists (Chiu 2014). The fact that any leakage of public information can be classified as a "violation of law", and thus be subject to prosecution, has seriously affected the quality of journalism, particularly of independent and investigative journalism, which frequently revealed a depressing pattern of negligence and moral laxity among nuclear industry officials. Combined with Abe's favorable position due to the results of the 2013 Upper House

[56] While September 3, 2013, saw the release of the summary of the proposed "secrecy bill," the law was implemented on December 6. Furthermore, the interval between the initial release of the summary (September 3) and the approval of a draft bill by the Abe administration, followed by the submission of the document to the Diet (October 25), was only one-month long.

[57] Apart from being in charge of food safety and other consumer issues and measures to address Japan's low birth rate prior to September 2014 Cabinet reshuffle (Yoshida 2014), Mori Masako was also nominated by Abe as the minister in charge of the legislation.

election and his ability to secure a considerable number of seats in both chambers of the Diet, this notorious "secrecy legislation," rammed through the Diet in December, allowed Abe to fully develop his nuclear agenda.

As the government that "has been active in passing energy-related legislation" (Incerti and Lipscy 2018: 614), in April 2014 the Abe administration introduced significant energy legislation – new "Strategic Energy Plan" (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2014). As the 2002 "Basic Act on Energy Policy" stipulates, a "Basic Energy Plan" should be issued regularly, ideally every 3-4 years. Consequently, the first plan was drafted in 2003, followed by successive plans in 2007, 2010, and 2014. The issuance of this particular document is of paramount importance since it determines the direction of nuclear energy in the irrevocably changed post-Fukushima environment. The "Basic Energy Plan" announcement serves as a tangible sign of reaffirming the place of nuclear power in Japan's energy portfolio. Although some scholars appreciate the high level of comprehensibility and magnitude of proposed changes, depicting it as a "window of opportunity" for the energy policy (Kucharski and Unesaki 2017), the efforts towards the preservation of nuclear energy continuity cannot be ignored. Although a direct depiction of nuclear energy as safe has been omitted in official documents due to the devaluation of safety-based rhetoric, this long-term energy strategy alludes to the "safety myth" anyway. The document identifies nuclear power as "an important base-load power source." Three features listed in the strategy, namely (1) superiority in the stability of energy supply and efficiency; (2) low and stable operational cost; and (3) lack of GHG emissions during operation (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy 2014: 24), strongly reflect the significance of the "mythical triad" of nuclear energy image as a domestic, cost-effective, and "clean" source of energy. This new national energy strategy, characterized as "a stunning demonstration of the nuclear village's resilience in power politics" (Kingston 2016: 71), demonstrated a discernible shift from the initially approved vision of non-nuclear Japan to the policy of "restarting nuclear reactors once their safety has been confirmed," while implicitly suggesting that the focus of attention has been shifted away from the severely discredited "safety myth" toward more neutral aspects of economic profitability and the eagerly promoted issue of the environmental protection. In this context, the issuance of the 2014 "Basic Energy Plan" can be perceived as a landmark, which inaugurated the process of regaining the status of "nuclear" in national politics. The general direction of reestablishing the nuclear status quo, as indicated in the "Basic Energy Plan" of 2014, has been further solidified in the "Plan

for Electricity Generation" to 2030 and the proposal of increasing the proportion of nuclear energy in the nation's power supply to 20-22 per cent in the FY of 2030 (Table 2). It has been highlighted that the target percentage, as proposed by the Abe administration, is unattainable unless more than thirty nuclear reactors are brought into operation (Tsuneishi 2015: 175; *Asahi Shimbun* 2016). Such an ambitious goal not only necessitates a wide-scale restarting process, but it also implies that this process may concern those nuclear power plants which have already exceeded the 40-year operational lifespan limit.

Year	**Coal**	**Petroleum etc.**	**Natural Gas**	**Nuclear Energy**	**Hydropower**	**Renewable Energy**
2010	25.0	7.5	29.3	28.6	8.5	1.1
2013	30.3	14.9	43.2	1	8.5	2.2
2030	26	3	27	20~22	8.8~9.2	13.4~14.4

Table 2. Composition of the power supply in Japan (%)[58] (Tsuneishi 2015:175)

Furthermore, although new forms of regulatory oversight and stringent safety regulations have been introduced, the impartiality of this safety framework and its resistance to political pressures have commonly been questioned. Although a new, independent watchdog institution was established,[59] the pressure exerted on NRA by the Abe administration, in a form of the public call for swift decisionmaking on nuclear restarts (Incerti and Lipscy 2018: 621), is in a glaring contradiction to previously strongly emphasized overarching objective of nuclear safety.

Date	**Policy**	**Contentious Issue**
December, 2013	introduction of the "secrecy law"	concerns about lack of transparency and potential chilling effect on the quality of journalism
December 2013	establishment of the National Security	its role in the manufacturing of weapons and their sale abroad

[58] While numerical values for 2010 and 2013 depict the actual situation, in the case of 2030, a set of data is based on the forecasts of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.

[59] Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA, *Genshiryoku Kisei Iinkai*, 原子力規制委員会), established in September 2012 to replace the discredited Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, is responsible for creating new nuclear regulations and determining whether current Japanese plants can resume operations.

	Council (NSC)	
April 11, 2014	the new "Strategic Energy Plan" was adopted by the cabinet	the internally inconsistent duality of goals: the reduction of dependence on nuclear energy has been promoted simultaneously with the maintenance of nuclear power as an important "base-load power source"
July 3, 2018	the government adopted METI's new "Strategic Energy Plan" as a cabinet decision	despite a few novelties, such as a stronger emphasis on renewable energy and a new statement on plutonium stockpile, the document does not revamp the vision of nuclear power as an "important base-load power"

Table 3. Outline of selected nuclear energy-oriented legislation (drafted by the author)

As can be seen, all the above decisions undertaken by the government are characterized by ambiguity and a lack of clarity. For example, the METI's future energy mix projection, which followed the issuance of the new "Strategic Energy Plan," revealed to what extent the objectives delineated in the policy document were blurred. Compliance with an objective of 20-22 per cent nuclear power share in 2030 not only requires the restarting of existing reactors but also underlines the need for replacement of old reactors with new ones. Naturally, these mutually contrasting goals cannot be reconciled.

4. Analysis of the Nuclear Energy Export Policy

From boosting a sluggish Japanese economy, ailing the domestic nuclear industry,[60] to the significant contribution to "the pursuit of Japan's foreign economic and political goals in strengthening key bilateral relationships and opening up investment opportunities with emerging economies" (Corben 2017) – nuclear exports nowadays is portrayed as a panacea for grave maladies of the post-Fukushima reality. It can be argued that the main driver behind the government's overseas nuclear power plant

[60] The global nuclear market – characterized by the substantial capacity of the 448 reactors, and steady expansion, with as many as 59 new reactors under construction at the beginning of 2017, and another 143 planned for the next three decades (Rubio-Varas and de la Torre 2017: v) – is perceived as lucrative. For example, profits offered by the vast Indian nuclear market, estimated to be worth over 100 billion dollars, is depicted as the primary motive behind the Indo-Japan nuclear agreement (Khan 2016).

expansion is the current status of the domestic nuclear industry. Shaken to the core in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the nuclear industry in Japan is commonly characterized in terms of bleak business prospects – brought to a standstill due to a high number of idled nuclear plants, and the additional costs of safety investments. The estimated cost of such changes – conducted under the new Nuclear Regulation Authority standards to increase resilience to prospective natural disasters – ranges from ¥100 billion to ¥200 billion for each reactor (*Japan Times* 20.01.2019).

The ongoing nuclear crisis, an absence of reliable watchdog institutions, an overwhelmingly negative public opinion toward nuclear power, limited transparency of disaster management process, grave concerns over nuclear safety, the loss of the credibility of large utility companies – all these characteristics of the post-Fukushima reality have failed to prevent the Abe administration from embracing a conspicuously pro-nuclear policy. Consequently, under the second Abe administration atomic plant projects,[61] undertaken by Japanese companies and strongly supported by the government, have mushroomed globally. If throughout the majority of the postwar period Japan was mostly the recipient of the U.S.-led nuclear expertise and technology, after 2012 this tendency has changed.

As has already been illustrated, the momentum behind nuclear reinvigoration was sustained for several reasons. In particular, against the backdrop of chaos of disaster management and a failure to deal effectively with nuclear issues, Abe emerged as a seemingly strong and decisive leader, who promised to take Japan again on the "under control" path. Comparatively, Abe's government came to power with greater leeway to pursue his agenda, including energy policy. In particular, the specific political environment that emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the DPJ and subsequent splintering of the opposition has proved to be favorable to Abe's agenda. Consequently, adoption of these heavily criticized policies – even in spite of public aversion – became viable without paying any considerable political price. An intensive effort for rekindling the "myth of safety" of Japanese nuclear technology has borne fruits in the form of wide-scale nuclear energy export. Since active promotion of the overseas sale of Japanese nuclear power plants through top-level diplomacy has long been a pillar of Japan's growth strategy under

[61] Notice, however, that the phenomenon of the government-supported overseas nuclear energy export has not been restricted solely to the second Abe administration. Before reverting to the anti-nuclear stance, the DPJ's administrations had also been actively involved in the promotion of nuclear energy technology export, as illustrated by a series of nuclear agreements with Vietnam, Russia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, or South Korea (Mochizuki 2016: 97).

the second Abe administration, the nexus of nuclear cooperation has been expanding steadily, and it has covered a growing number of countries. Furthermore, apart from a number of bilateral agreements, Japan under Abe's leadership has also been involved in negotiations with potential recipients of Japan's nuclear technology. Under his Abenomics agenda, and "proactive contribution" activism, Abe won plaudits domestically and internationally.[62] He made strenuous efforts to render his slogan "safety first" highly credible. In order to promote Japan's peaceful nuclear technology exports abroad, Abe has adopted extensive diplomatic measures. He has been vigorously engaged in talks with a broad spectrum of countries, including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia.[63] For instance, the UAE negotiations with Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashif al-Maktoum led to the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement, which made Japanese firms suppliers of components for the ongoing construction of a nuclear power facility in the UAE. Although sometimes his efforts were not brought to fruition,[64] many other meetings ended successfully, resulting in a growing number of overseas contracts for the Japanese nuclear energy sector. Such extensive nuclear cooperation became viable primarily due to official approval and assistance. In the case of Japan, the commercial nuclear power sector is inextricably linked with the government that has lavishly supported a large number of nuclear projects. As the media note, the government-affiliated organizations, such as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) or Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, are heavily involved in the process of financial securing of overseas investments. For instance, JBIC was to have financed 70 per cent of the Turkey project (McNeill 2019). A

[62] For example, multilateral efforts to revitalize the Japanese economy earned Abe the depiction of a Superman-like figure on the cover of the *Economist* in May 2013. In a similar vein, Christine Lagarde (Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund) praised Abe's initiative to promote women's presence in society during her keynote speech at the World Assembly for Women in Tokyo in September 2014 (Lagarde 2014).

[63] According to official data (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018: 237), as of the end of 2017, Japan has concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with 14 countries (Canada, Australia, China, the U.S., France, the UK, Kazakhstan, the ROK, Vietnam, Jordan, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, India) and one international organisation: the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

[64] For example, although Abe lobbied the Visegrád Group (a group of Central European countries consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) for Japanese nuclear exporters in June 2013, no binding legal agreements were then reached. Nevertheless, as Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki's official visit to Japan, paid in January 2020, indicates, the future of Japanese-Polish nuclear cooperation is still a significant topic in bilateral relations (Chancellery of the Prime Minister 2020). Furthermore, concerning the construction of Poland's first nuclear power plant, Poland is currently likely to import Japanese solutions (BiznesAlert 2020).

scale of this nexus of interconnections in the global nuclear power market is effectively illustrated for example by the nuclear power project in Wales, where, apart from Hitachi, also its subsidiary Horizon is involved. Bearing in mind only purely economic factors, it can be argued that the revival of confidence in the domestic market and a reduction of the trade deficit are major factors that stand behind Abe's aggressively promoted policy of Japan's nuclear exports. Sarmiento-Saher (2013) suggests the existence of such a dual rationale behind Abe's strong emphasis on promoting the sale of Japanese nuclear power infrastructure and technology. In this context, the Prime Minister's nuclear push may serve both as a method of alleviating the trade deficit and a tool for "rebuild[ing] confidence in a highly skeptical Japanese public regarding Japan's own atomic energy industry." To put it differently, the set of policies fits into the general logic of Abenomics as a growth strategy in general and a panacea for ills of the sluggish nuclear industry.

Target Country	**Current Status**
France	Valid agreement The agreement concerning the deepening of cooperation on nuclear exports was signed in June 2013.
Lithuania	Cancelation A project to build a nuclear power plant by Hitachi was voted down in the 2012 national referendum.
Vietnam	Cancelation In 2016, Vietnam resigned from a US$ 11 billion deal due to safety fears.
India	Valid agreement In November 2016, Japan signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India.
U.K.	Suspension The Hitachi's project to build two reactors in Anglesey (Wales) was halted.
Turkey	Uncertain status: reportedly set to abandon In 2013 both governments reached an agreement on Japan's export of nuclear power plant technology to Turkey, which resulted in the plan of the construction of four reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in the Sinop area, with the view of starting a commercial operation in 2023. The plan, however, was shelved due to ballooning

	costs.
U.S.	The Toshiba's plans of building four nuclear reactors (V.C. Summer in South Carolina and Vogtle in Georgia) ended with a bankruptcy filing by Westinghouse Electric Company in 2017.
Taiwan	Shelved The plan to build a nuclear plant in Taiwan was postponed in 2014.

Table 4. Summary of Japanese overseas nuclear energy export policy (drafted by the author)

As the above table indicates, the majority of overseas nuclear initiatives have faced daunting challenges. Although it is claimed that the global nuclear energy market is promising, issues of both viability and efficiency of such extensive, nuclear-centered overseas projects cast a long shadow over Abe's plans of further nuclear expansion. The current Abe administration seems to follow the path of twisted logic, turning a blind eye to the financial aspect of this project. The global complex nexus of Japan-led nuclear initiatives has been shaken to the core, with Hitachi's suspension of its involvement in the Wylfa nuclear power project in Wales – which has thrown "Britain's energy plans into chaos" (McNeill 2019) – being the most recent example of this profound tendency. The ballooning costs of these nuclear-related overseas investments are commonly cited as justification for downsizing the scale of nuclear projects. Indeed, as *Japan Times* (20.01.2019) underlines, financial issues became a stumbling block for all major overseas projects, including Hitachi's initiative to build two reactors in Wales (the initial cost estimate soared from ¥2 trillion to ¥3 trillion), Mitsubishi's plan to build four reactors in Turkey,[65] and Toshiba's substantial losses incurred by its subsidiary Westinghouse Electric Company in its nuclear power plant projects in the United States.[66] All these projects have been either halted or hampered due to their questioned profitability and the swelling costs of investments. Furthermore, due to the cancelation of plans concerning the construction of a four-reactor plant in central Ninh Thuan Province (Vietnam), [67] 2016 saw another major

[65] In the case of the Japanese investments in Turkey, the original estimate of roughly 2.1 trillion yen has skyrocketed over time, and the rising costs have doubled the projected final price to around 5 trillion yen (*Mainichi* 04.01.2019).

[66] 2017 witnessed a major setback for Toshiba. This flagship Japanese company faced the bankruptcy of Westinghouse Electric and was forced to offload its American subsidiary.

[67] As *Asahi Shimbun* (2018a) demonstrates, the 2010s saw failure in the augmentation of regional nuclear partnerships. The Abe administration has also embarked on expanding nuclear cooperation

impediment to a smooth implementation of nuclear cooperation. The decision of the Vietnamese government, allegedly motivated by safety and financial issues, severely hit the Japanese nuclear energy market, seriously jeopardizing the interests of a consortium of Japanese firms that included TEPCO – the operator of the ruined Fukushima Daiichi plant.

Apart from the financial aspect, the very concept of nuclear export contains a myriad of risks, including environmental issues, potential political and diplomatic losses, and a possibility of seriously damaging Japan's international reputation as a forerunner of a non-nuclear world. During the period of this unprecedented overseas nuclear expansion under the auspices of the Japanese government, some pundits noted that the continuation of Tokyo's nuclear export agenda would have serious repercussions due to the political, financial, and strategic risks enmeshed in the extensive nuclear export (Corben 2017), while others underlined a profusion of drawbacks and failures in this overseas expansion. It is suggested that a grim scenario of nuclear energy expansion should be considered as plausible, which covers a wide variety of hazards, including not only nuclear accidents, such as the Fukushima calamity but also a spate of industrial-environmental disasters that occurred in Japan in the 1970s.

The ethical aspect of nuclear power export is also questioned. A case in point is the nuclear agreement with India. The Indo-Japanese bilateral ties, which historically experienced decades of divergent trajectories and remained lukewarm until 1991, have entered a new stage of cooperation under the Modi and Abe administrations. Abe's appreciation of India as an important economic partner is visible, among others, in the depiction of a bilateral relationship as a phenomenon characterized by "the greatest potential in the world" in December 2015 (Pardesi 2018: 14). The India-Japan strategic partnership, underpinned by Modi's "Act East" policy and Abe's push for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" as one of the pivotal objectives of Japanese Prime Minister's diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018), is feverishly debated due to the nuclear cooperation issue. The agreement was proceded by a six-year-long negotiation process, and by signing a memorandum on cooperation in December 2015 by Indian and Japanese prime ministers Narendra Modi and Abe. The signing of the civil nuclear deal in November 2016 was followed by an approval of the agreement by Japan's parliament in 2017. Some scholars depict it as a positive development. For instance, Pardesi (2018: 30) assesses the nuclear

in the region, contributing to the development of nuclear power plant construction plans in Vietnam and Taiwan. Neither of the projects, however, came to fruition, and they were either shelved (Taiwan, 2014) or retracted (Vietnam, 2016).

deal as mutually significant: as a useful measure for India to adequately address its growing demand for energy for its rapidly expanding economy, as well as the challenge of curbing carbon emissions; and an equally beneficial instrument for Japan to boost its domestic economy and the stagnant nuclear energy industry. Nevertheless, this emerging Indo-Japanese nuclear partnership is also a bone of contention among scholars and pundits. The civil nuclear agreement with India – a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – arouses controversies of moral nature and thus has been strongly criticized as "a further deviation from Japan's traditional nonproliferation principles" (Corben 2017). The Indo-Japanese nexus responds to an ever-changing geopolitical environment in Asia, and – as Chand and Garcia (2017: 317) suggest – it can be described through the prism of "convergence of interests primarily galvanized by the common securitization of China and its assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region." Nuclear vested interests and broader efforts to counter Chinese growing socioeconomic influence in the region have completely transformed Japan's viewpoint – from an outspoken critic of India's nuclear weapons program, with a refusal to join the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to a supportive partner that actively contributes to enhancing India's civilian nuclear industry. The growing nuclear collaboration with India may be viewed as the biggest litmus test of Japan's nuclear export policy. Furthermore, selling nuclear infrastructure to earthquake-prone or politically volatile countries raises doubts about potential harmful consequences, both for the receivers (Turkey[68] and India, accordingly), and for the international reputation of Japan.

5. Conclusion

This article has discussed the nuclear energy export – an element that "by no means constitutes a 'fourth arrow' in Abenomics" (Sarmiento-Saher 2013). The nuclear energy policy has been analyzed against a backdrop of a dynamic process of transformation of the nuclear "safety myth" in post-Fukushima Japan.

First and foremost, this article has demonstrated that a nuclear energy policy – a peculiar blend of top-down directives and well-funded instruments, carefully implemented within a broader "nuclear village" agenda – has been fuelled and internally orchestrated by the concept of the nuclear "safety myth." While recognizing the salience of the myth,

[68] Turkey and Japan are characterized by the same feature: their susceptibility to catastrophic earthquakes.

however, I also note it has been significantly transformed due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Naturally, this disaster has greatly overshadowed Japanese politics from 2011 onwards. It has affected the failure of the DPJ, accused of glaring ineptitude in overcoming the post-disaster crisis, and paved the way to new "under control" policy aspect, so feverishly pursued by Abe on numerous occasions. In a long-time perspective, though, the Fukushima nuclear disaster failed to be the commonly predicted policy turning point (Incerti and Lipscy 2018: 608). Surprisingly, despite the tragic spectrum of the post-Fukushima reality, the nuclear energy aspect of Abe's agenda has gained momentum, followed by the acceleration of nuclear energy export. In this context, it is argued here that the radical picture of political, economic, and social changes spurred by the Fukushima accident, is starkly contrasted with a gradual and cumulative transformation of the nuclear energy policy under the new "safety myth" paradigm. Whereas the former occasioned a myriad of controversies, peddled by scholars and the media, the latter can be viewed as a "quiet" transformation that has attracted considerably less attention. Consequently, when it seemed that the tangled skein of the "absolute safety myth" was at least partially unraveling, Abe keenly embarked on his policy based on "under control" rhetorics. As has been demonstrated, in the post-Fukushima era, a series of interlocking and mutually reinforcing developments have been laying a foundation for this new, outward-oriented dimension of Abe's nuclear agenda.

Secondly, Japanese nuclear policy constitutes a symbolic juncture, where the non-nuclear identity — often couched in an idealistic language of the famous "peace clause" (Article 9) or Japanese society's "nuclear allergy" — has been confronted with hard economic rationale, fueled not only by the compound interest of the "nuclear village" but also exacerbated by external pressure, exerted both at official state levels (e.g., bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements), and at a supranational level, as illustrated by the multinational consortia and their corporate benefits. To a large extent, the nuclear aspect of Abenomics has been developed in parallel with the LDP's general preference for nuclear power, with the continuing impact of the "nuclear village" whose vested interests remaining the predominant force that shapes nuclear policy. Under this framework of the new "safety myth," economic concerns are believed to eventually eclipse those of social, ideological, or environmental origins. Simultaneously, however, under the second Abe administration, Japan's nuclear policy – traditionally compartmentalized between "three Ds" of deterrence, disarmament, and

development of robust civil nuclear power industry – is developing toward a new, more internationally oriented dynamics (Table 5).

	"Safety Myth"	**New "Safety Myth"**
	Domestic-oriented	Outward-oriented
Objective	steady development of domestic nuclear energy market	promotion of overseas nuclear energy export to overcome domestic nuclear industry stalemate
Additionally Supported by	cheap energy myth clean energy image lavish financing system	pro-active diplomacy legislative framework lavish financing system

Table 5. Evolution of "safety myth": summary (drafted by the author)

Thirdly, the article underscores the significance of Abe in rekindling the "safety myth" paradigm. I argued that, despite operating in the environment that has been fundamentally hostile to the maintenance of the nuclear status quo and the preservation of the "safety myth," Abe has contributed to the re-emergence of *anzen shinwa*, thus gradually reinvigorating the mainstream, overtly pro-nuclear energy policy. While it can be argued that diminishing domestic prospects of the nuclear industry in Japan have encouraged the shift of the Abe administration toward overseas expansion, this article emphasizes the multivocal character of this phenomenon, with its meticulously designed legal and ideological architecture.

Lastly, in his attempt to re-cement nuclear power in Japan's energy mix and refuel the "safety myth," Abe is stubbornly clinging to his policy of promoting the export of nuclear energy technology. While attempting to perpetuate the refurbished version of *anzen shinwa*, the Abe administration achieved an initial success, followed, however, by a series of setbacks. In retrospect, the current nuclear agenda of Abe reflects deep-seated problems with finding equilibrium between ensuring nuclear safety and the commercial character of "peaceful usage of nuclear energy," strictly oriented at economic profits. Although it seems that despite numerous failures, the Japanese nuclear energy sector has not completely abandoned overseas projects – with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries's hopes for striking deals in India, and Toshiba's involvement in talks with Energoatom, a Ukrainian power company, to supply turbine generators for use in its

nuclear plants being the most recent examples (McNeill 2019) – it is also highly unlikely that the Japan-led nuclear energy export will evolve into a grand-scale global phenomenon. Undoubtedly, the development of the nuclear energy policy requires an extensive debate on future energy policy, with the multiplicity of actors involved in the process. The second Abe administration – characterized by "the direct and indirect pressure of Government officials over media, the limited space for debating some historical events and the increased restrictions on information access based on national security grounds," (Kaye 2017: 17) – in its quest to boost nuclear infrastructure exports as a pillar of Japan's economic growth, is far from being constructively engaged in promotion of a thorough discussion. While the overall impact of Japan's nuclear tragedy has not been fully assessed, and its follow-up ramifications have not been adequately addressed or successfully dealt with,[69] Abe's activism may be conducive to creating merely an illusion of safety, built under the guise of sharing the bitter nuclear lesson with the world and making proactive contribution to responsibly promote global spread of the "peaceful use of nuclear power."

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[69] In September 2019, three former TEPCO top executives have been found not guilty of professional negligence. (Harding 2019). As this lenient approach toward TEPCO effectively illustrated, Japan is still facing the problem of critically reflecting on its sordid nuclear past caused by a mixture of bureaucratic ineptitude, highly unsatisfactory response to this man-made calamity, professional negligence, and moral laxity.

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Redefining Security in Northeast Asia: Emergence and Evolution of Just Security Concept in 2014-2016

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ABSTRACT

In the second decade of the 21st century, the tension-ridden region of Northeast Asia saw intensified exchanges regarding security between its civil societies. This article focuses on the cooperation between civil societies of three island communities – Okinawa, Jeju, and Taiwan – and Just Security concept, which emerged and evolved during "Peace for the Sea" International Peace Camps held in 2014-2016. Its main objective is to clarify how the Peace Camps participants have redefined security, what influenced their security perception, and how their vision of security differs from Traditional Security – as defined by the Realists – that is prevalent in the region.

KEYWORDS: island security, traditional security, new security concepts, Okinawa, Jeju, Taiwan, civil society, Just Security Concept, Peace for the Sea

1. Introduction

In the second decade of 21st century, security concerns in Northeast Asia were brought to the fore by the China's activities on the seawaters, which include the systematic breach of the Japanese territorial waters by Chinese ships, the controversial deployment of an advanced missile defence system THAAD in South Korea amid strong objections of China and Russia, the increase in military expenditures[1], or nuclear and ballistic missile tests conducted by North Korea that prompted a direct exchange of threats between North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, and the president of the United States, Donald Trump. The deep division of Northeast Asia into two blocks – with one being the maritime-based alliance of U.S., Japan, and South Korea, and the other being the land-based alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea – and the looming threat of nuclear war hinted that military security remains the top priority of the states.

[1] According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditures in Northeast Asia jumped from USD 253 billion in 2012 to USD 315 billion in 2016 (SIPRI 2016).

The spike in regional tensions was followed by the intensified exchanges between the civil societies of Northeast Asia. Their drive to reconstruct security and give it a strong foundation based on people's power and the enduring links between communities regardless of their nationality resulted in the emergence of new security concepts. The Just Security concept, which emerged and evolved during "Peace for the Sea" International Peace Camps organized by and held in Jeju, Okinawa, and Taiwan in 2014-2016, is one of them.

First, the article takes a look at the Traditional Security concept as defined by Realists. In particular, it considers the environment, ends and means of the Traditional Security and the way they are manifested in Northeast Asia. Further, it seeks to identify the origins of the Just Security concept and its evolution during 2014-2016 to clarify how the communities of the three islands have redefined security and what influenced their security perception. Finally, it compares the Traditional and Just Security concepts to determine how the vision of security of local island communities differs from the vision of security of the states.

2. Traditional Security in Northeast Asia

Traditional Security – often referred to as "state security" or "national security" in the Realist thought – was comprehensively conceptualized in the 20th century. Walter Lippmann, a journalist and an informal advisor to several U.S. presidents, such as Woodrow Wilson, provided one of its first definitions. In 1943, Lippmann (1950: 51) wrote "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war", pointing out the existence of external threats to the core interests of the nation and determination of the state to use force to protect them. A few years later, Harold Lasswell, American political scientist, introduced his understanding of this concept stating "The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from foreign dictation. National security policy implies a state of readiness to use force if necessary to maintain national independence". Similarly to Lippmann, Lasswell (1950: 50) called attention to outside threats and implied that the state is justified to use force to protect itself from them. He also specified what values are important to the state and could legitimize the use of force: these are freedom and independence from foreign rule and territorial integrity. As the Cold War progressed, new complementary concepts, such as "deterrence" and "containment," and elements of "security" gradually emerged, leading to the more explicit interpretation of "security" in military terms (Buzan

2009: 34-44; Haftendorn 1991: 3-17). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which ended the Cold War, new types of security gained attention, i.e., food, water, or energy security, but military security remained the priority.

To put it simply, Realists define Traditional Security in military terms – the state and its ability to defend itself against external threats are at the core of this concept. It consists of several other important elements (Table 1), which, as Buzan (1983: 215) postulates, can be grouped into three categories: environment (characteristics and assumptions about the world, in which states operate), ends (objectives of the national security policy), and means (techniques, resources, instruments, and actions used to implement or preserve security).

Environment	**Ends**	**Means**
State-centrism Military-centrism Material character of threats Stability and peacefulness of the domestic political order States compete for security in the anarchic world (no world government and other institutions of law and rules enforcement) Self-help Security dilemma Existence of violent peace	State/national survival Repelling external/foreign threats Protection of territorial integrity Protection of political independence Protection of national interests / core values Realization of internal and international objectives of the state	Use of force Power politics (arms races, alliances, the balance of power) Deterrence Containment

Table 1. Elements of the Traditional Security Concept
Source: compiled by the author (Podlipska 2019: 31)

How these elements translate into the security developments that could be observed in recent years in Northeast Asia? The Japanese government that was formed after the 2012 election – with Shinzō Abe as the Prime Minister – lifted the ban on arms exports, approved the right to exercise collective self-defense and started to put more emphasis on building up Japan's military capabilities, which raised regional tensions, especially in

China. Park Guen-hye, the South Korean president elected in 2013, decided to take a harder stance against North Korea. In the long-term, her decision led to the announcement of the final agreement regarding the deployment of an advanced missile defence system THAAD reached by the U.S. and South Korean defence forces in July 2016. It prompted Pyongyang to issue threats of retaliation, while China and Russia, fearing that THAAD will penetrate their territory and gather sensitive information for Washington, strongly objected to the deployment. North Korea continued conducting tests of nuclear and ballistic missile technology in spite of the United Nations' ban, inviting new sanctions and the charged exchange of threats – involving promises of total annihilation – between the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, and the U.S. president, Donald Trump. China's aggressive activities on the East China Sea and the South China Sea, Chinese territorial disputes with neighbouring countries and Beijing's focus on increasing military capabilities coupled with the U.S. joint military exercises with Japan and South Korea further propelled distrust between the Northeast Asian states. Increasing defence budgets, nuclear proliferation, prevailing uncertainty, and a rise in tensions prove that traditional military power does not contribute to resolving the present and emerging problems.

3. The Emergence of the Just Security Concept

The rise in tensions and intensified militarization of Northeast Asia prompted local civil societies to take action and consider the current security architecture. In particular, the residents of the three islands of Okinawa, Jeju, and Taiwan feel deeply insecure due to the strategic location of the islands and the presence of military bases and installations on their land. Concerns about the current security environment led them to join their efforts to create an alternative to security based on military power. The islanders came up with an idea to organize "Peace for the Sea" International Peace Camp to bring together activists, students, and regular people from different islands of the region with an aim to build solidarity among islands' residents, learn and share experiences of each island's struggle against state, corporate and military violence, rethink democracy and find ways towards sustainable peace for people and their environment.
The first camp took place in 2014, in Jeju, followed by events organised in Okinawa in 2015, and in Taiwan in 2017. The initiative managed to produce a sense of unity, understanding, and trust between its participants, who shared their ideas on how to improve the situation in the region without resorting to violence and promote peaceful existence.

Through discussions, workshops, and interaction that took place during 2014-2016 Peace Camps, the activists from all participating islands agreed that the source of their insecurity is the nation-state and the military-industrial complex. They pointed out that states are the source of state violence [2] committed against islands' residents and other marginalized people, whose interests are often sacrificed for corporate profits. Military-industry complex, on the other hand, contributes to this violence by lobbying projects that degrade the natural environment and deprive indigenous people of their land. The participants further argued that the government and the military fuel nationalistic sentiments and distrust between citizens of neighbouring countries under the pretext of national security, creating a narrative of "the enemy," against whom the islands should be fortified to be secure (s. "Peace for the Sea" statements 2014, 2015, 2016).

The islanders concluded that their perception of security differs from the one propagated by the nation-state. They proposed an alternative vision of security under the name of Just Security, and defined it as security that does not prioritize nation-states and military-industrial complex, but puts the citizens first without discriminating any nationality and ethnicity, affirms people's rights to live in unpolluted environment together with their responsibility to protect the water, land, and air upon which the people depend to survive, and protects the interests of island residents – particularly women, who are vulnerable to sexual violence due to the presence of U.S. military bases, and other marginalized people (ibid. 2014, 2015, 2016).

4. Evolution of the Just Security Concept in 2014-2016

The concept of Just Security evolved, as new elements were added over the years. They were compiled in Table 2, which illustrates how security is socially constructed by the grassroots. What are the main reasons for the concept's evolution and its subtle changes? Four reasons can be identified: (1) changing security environment in the region, especially around the islands; (2) place, where Peace Camp was held in a given year; (3) profile of the participants; and (4) extent of accumulated experience and knowledge.

First, the changing security environment around the islands is explained, and the adjustments that occurred in "scope" and "source of insecurity" of all three peace camp editions are analysed. The first camp was held in Jeju,

[2] Military, economic, ethnic, gender-based, and environmental violence were mentioned as part of state violence.

in 2014, where "militarization of the islands and the sea," "military and state violence," and "anti-democratic militarism" were identified as sources of people's insecurity. At the beginning of the same year, China started actively building artificial islands on the reefs in the South China Sea, i.e., Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, and Subi Reef, and turning them into military and logistical bases, which raised security concerns in the U.S., and, in consequence, in the region (Friar 2016). Beijing also continued its ventures into Japanese territorial waters – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) counted up to forty-four Chinese vessels from January until the end of July 2014 (MOFA 2018) – further fuelling militarization of the sea. At the same time, governments of Japan and South Korea continued pushing for the construction of new military bases in Henoko (Okinawa) and Gangjeong (Jeju) against the will of islands' residents. The disregard of people's opinions by the governments strengthened their conviction that militarism is harmful to democracy and democratic processes. Crimes and acts of misbehaviour committed by the U.S. service-members proved that no islands' resident could feel free from military violence: in June 2014, South Korean officials had to "strongly" request that the U.S. military better control its personnel, after one of its members attempted to steal a taxi, and two others were accused of "inappropriately touching female employees of a popular water park" (Rowland and Chang 2014); in the same year there were twenty-seven cases of arrest involving personnel stationed in Okinawa under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)[3] (Burke and Sumida 2016).

	First Peace Camp (Jeju), 2014	**Second Peace Camp (Okinawa), 2015**	**Third Peace Camp (Taiwan), 2016**
Referent Object	People (residents of the three islands – Jeju, Okinawa, Taiwan)	People (residents of Jeju, the islands of Taiwan, and Okinawa and the other Ryūkyū Islands, including Miyakojima, Ishigaki, Yonaguni, and Amami-Oshima)	People (residents of Jeju, the islands of Taiwan, Okinawa and the other Ryūkyū Islands, Luzon, and Hainan)
Scope	Security that: – promotes	Security that: – promotes solidarity	Security that: – promotes

[3] SOFA is an agreement that sets the legal framework under which the personnel of the U.S. operates in the host nation.

	solidarity between the islands; – protects islands' environment (land, water, air) – protects people's right to peaceful oceans, which are considered the common human inheritance.	between the islands; – protects the islands' environment (land, water, air) – protects peoples' right to peaceful oceans, which are considered the common human inheritance; (ADDED): – ensures the right of self-determination of islands' residents (e.g., living according to their will); – promotes the creation of alternative political communities based on the sustainable economy, the ethics of coexistence, and people's (islanders') shared responsibility to preserve peace.	solidarity between the islands; – protects islands' environment (land, water, air) – protects peoples' right to peaceful oceans, which are considered the common human inheritance; – protects the right of self-determination of islands' residents; – promotes the creation of alternative political communities based on the sustainable economy, the ethics of coexistence, and people's (islanders') shared responsibility to preserve peace. (ADDED) – creates sustainable peace in demilitarized Asia-Pacific; – protects the people, especially vulnerable ones: indigenous people, people who live on the periphery, women; – protects natural resources and identity (especially

			of indigenous people); – ensures freedom from fear of war; – ensures participation of indigenous people in policy-making; – ensures just and peaceful community life.
Source of Insecurity	– the militarization of the islands (through the construction of new military bases in Henoko and Gangjeong), and the sea – military and state violence – anti-democratic militarism	– the militarization of region (especially the islands and the sea) – state-military-industry complex – anti-democratic militarism (ADDED) – nationalism (negative and aggressive aspect of the concept)	– the militarization of region (especially the islands and the sea) – state-military-industry complex – anti-democratic militarism – nationalism (negative and aggressive aspect of the concept) (ADDED) – U.S. military and military of their own states
Means	Security achieved through: – demilitarization of the islands (Jeju, Okinawa, Taiwan); – restoration of all three islands	Security achieved through: – solidifying the triangular line of peace among the three islands (Taiwan, Jeju, Okinawa) – learning from each other's struggles and experience	Security achieved through: – building solidarity among islands and their people; – demilitarization of the islands; – abandonment of forcible development;

[4] The Battle of Okinawa was the last major battle of the Pacific War fought on the island of Okinawa. White Terror in Taiwan was the suppression of political dissidents that lasted from 1947 to 1987. Jeju uprising and April 3rd incident occurred on South Korean Jeju Island from April 1948 to May 1949.

	to their former existence as peaceful communities; – establishment of the Demilitarized Peace Area without military bases in Okinawa, Taiwan, and Jeju.	– promoting inter-island solidarity among their communities in Jeju Island of South Korea, the islands of Taiwan, and Okinawa and the other Ryūkyū Islands, including Miyakojima, Ishigaki, Yonaguni, and Amami-Oshima; – preserving the memory of tragedy and hardship (e.g., the Battle of Okinawa, White Terror in Taiwan, Jeju uprising and April 3rd incident)[4]; – building a strong transnational community; – putting a stop to military exercises, which escalate tensions and waste natural resources; – putting a stop to construction of new military bases and helipads (namely, the naval base at Gangjeong, the helipad at Takae, the radar base at Yonaguni, the bases at Ishigaki, Miyakojima, and Amami-Oshima, the base at Henoko). Plus: the means mentioned during the	– education of the next generations (e.g., about the meaning of true peace). – participation of indigenous people in policy-making and inclusion of their ideas and expertise in attaining sustainable peace and secure humanity in national and global agendas. Plus: the means mentioned during the First and the Second Peace Camp.

		First Peace Camp.	

Table 2. The evolution of the Just Security Concept in 2014-2016
Source: Podlipska (2019: 198-200)

In the face of the abovementioned sources of insecurity, the participants of the first Peace Camp concluded that Just Security should protect islands' environment – land, water, air – and people's right to peaceful oceans, as well as promote solidarity between the islands. This definition was expanded during the second Peace Camp, held in Okinawa in 2015, and included "an assurance of the right of self-determination of islands' residents (i.e., living according to their will)" and "promoting the creation of alternative political communities based on sustainable economy, the ethics of coexistence, and people's (islanders') shared responsibility to preserve peace." Similarly, "the source of insecurity" saw two additions: nationalism and industry.

The expansion of these definitions was caused by the following developments. In order to make Japan stronger, the second Abe administration led up to the adoption of war bills by the Japanese Parliament, despite massive protests throughout Japan. Shortly thereafter, in the face of continued pressure from the central government to build a new military base in Henoko, Onaga Takeshi (the Governor of Okinawa) gave a speech in front of the United Nations Human Rights Council, in which he stressed that pushing for the construction of the new base in Henoko is a violation of human rights and the right to self-determination of the Okinawan people (Wanklyn 2015). Around the same time, an Aegis destroyer entered the harbour of the nearly completed naval base in Gangjeong, Jeju, thus indicating that Jeju's identity as the Island of Peace will soon cease to exist (Save Jeju Now 2015).

In 2016, during the third Peace Camp held in Taiwan, participants broadened their understanding of "security" by adding the following elements to the existing definition: (1) creation of sustainable peace in demilitarized Asia-Pacific; (2) protection of the people (especially vulnerable ones, such as indigenous people, people who live on the periphery, and women); (3) protection of natural resources and identity (especially of indigenous people); (4) participation of indigenous people in policy-making; and (5) guarantee of just and peaceful community life. Again, a few events spurred them to include these items. In April 2016, Gangjeong's community kitchen faced demolition. That decision was motivated by a project of building there a four-lane entry road to the cruise terminal, which was planned to be constructed in 2017. The community

kitchen held a special meaning for Gangjeong residents and activists: it was a place, where they gathered and shared meals through their continuing struggle against base construction; some called it a "spiritual pillar of struggle". Consequently, the loss was a serious blow to the community. The Korean navy delivered another powerful blow when they demanded U.S. $2.98 million from 116 individuals and five organizations for the delay in the construction of the base (Huh 2017). The situation in Okinawa also took a turn for the worse. In May 2016, the body of raped and murdered Shimabukuro Rina was found. Since the perpetrator was an American contractor at a military base on Okinawa and a former marine, this tragic event has reconfirmed that women are especially vulnerable to military violence. Furthermore, Okinawa's right to self-determination was violated in July, when five hundred riot police officers from outside the prefecture came to the island to ensure that the construction of helipads in Takae is carried out without any delays. This resulted in regular confrontations between riot police and protesters. Taiwan, on the other hand, entered the path of militarization: the new government announced a policy to make Taiwanese warships domestically in order to develop the country's military industry (PfS 2016). Lack of citizens' inclusion in policy-making, lack of effective protection from military violence, and lack of protection of local communities led peace camp participants to adopt a broader definition of security.

As has been previously mentioned, another reason for the evolution of the Just Security concept is the place where the Peace Camp was held in a given year. Since the first Peace Camp took place in Jeju, Jeju residents (mainly from Gangjeong) were responsible for the organisation of the event, e.g., for coming up with the schedule and activities for participants, so they focused on problems they knew best. These problems included: the construction of military bases and people's struggle to prevent it, the environmental damage caused by the bases, and other aspects of the U.S. militarism. The second Peace Camp, held in Okinawa, focused not only on the U.S. military bases, but also SDF bases on Yonaguni, Ishigaki, or Miyakojima. Participants could see with their own eyes, how the will and pleas of Okinawans to abandon the plan to construct a new base in Henoko are ignored by the Japanese central government, and how much environmental damage military bases cause. Visit to the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, dedicated to the Battle of Okinawa, drew their attention to the necessity to preserve the memory of war, tragedy and hardship, and to prevent historical revisionism. Since the problems and security questions discussed during the second Peace Camp

were not limited to the main island of Okinawa, but included also smaller islands in the Ryūkyū Archipelago, such as Miyakojima, Ishigaki, Yonaguni, and Amami-Oshima, they were included in the "referent object" of the Just Security concept; the same goes for Taiwan's smaller islands, such as Lanyu Island (Orchid Island) or Ludao Island (Green Island)[5]. The third Peace Camp, held in Taiwan, focused on indigenous people and their struggle with the central government and industry sector, which carry out projects that deprive indigenous people of their land and pollute the environment, in which they live. This led to the broader inclusion of "indigenous people" in the Just Security concept.

The next factor that influenced the process of the concept's construction is the profile of the participants: while the first and the second Peace Camp's participants were from Taiwan, Jeju, and Okinawa, representatives from Luzon (Philippines) and Hainan (China) joined the third Peace Camp. They contributed their ideas and stories regarding indigenous people, and created a forum that fosters understanding and solidarity between its partakers, and promotes the processes of healing from the wartime past. The "referent object" of the Just Security concept has expanded once again and included also residents of Luzon and Hainan.

The last factor to influence the construction of the Just Security concept over the years is the extent of accumulated experience and knowledge. The first Peace Camp marked the beginning of cooperation between residents of the three islands: it has laid the foundation and created a framework for further closer partnership. The next peace camps built on their predecessors, increasing participants' knowledge and awareness regarding threats to their security and possible ways to prevent or eliminate them.

In order to actualise the Just Security concept, over the years, the representatives of three islands introduced a couple of solutions, which can be divided into two groups: (1) solutions based on undertaking certain actions, and (2) solutions based on discontinuing or restraining certain actions. The first group includes: (1) affirming the coexistence of all living creatures; (2) building a strong transnational community of friendship and solidarity; (3) preserving the memory of war; (4) expanding the peace movement and supporting neighbouring anti-war movements; (5) providing peace education to younger generations; (6) organizing Peace Island Sea Olympics to promote solidarity between islanders, and peace and security in the region (sailing race rather than arms race); (7) renaming the East China Sea into the Sea of Peace and Coexistence; and (8)

[5] Discussions regarding the 'referent object' of the Just Security concept during the first Peace Camp were limited to Jeju, the main island of Okinawa, and the main island of Taiwan.

integration of indigenous people's participation and expertise in attaining sustainable peace and secure humanity into national and global agenda. The second group includes: (1) the abandonment of forcible development; (2) putting a stop to military exercises, which escalate tensions and waste natural resources; (3) putting a stop to the construction of new military bases and helipads.

However, the most interesting idea is the creation of the Demilitarized Peace Area without military bases in Okinawa, Taiwan, and Jeju (Picture 1). Its purpose would be "the reduction of tensions in Northeast Asia and restoration of all three islands to their former long-standing existence as peaceful communities at the maritime crossroads of the region" (PfS 2015). The demilitarized peace triangle would ban armed conflict, the construction of military bases and facilities, military exercises, port visits by warships and military aircraft, the passage of ships for military purpose, and meetings for military purpose within its boundaries[6].

The geographical scope of the Just Security encompasses the islands of Okinawa, Jeju, and Taiwan, and the sea of the Demilitarized Peace Area[7].

[6] Idea discussed during "Peace for the Sea" International Peace Camp 2016 held in Taiwan.

[7] Jeju, Taiwan, and Okinawa constitute the core of the Just Security. While the author can be sure that these islands will continue to cooperate, she lacks the same certainty towards Hainan and Luzon, who participated in the Peace Camp for the first time in 2016.

Picture 1. Demilitarized Peace Area – Okinawa, Taiwan, Jeju East China Sea map
Source: Wikimedia 2007, Podlipska (2019: 204)

5. Comparison of the Traditional and the Just Security Concepts

The Just Security concept introduced by the residents of the three islands presents an interesting alternative to the existing Traditional Security concept that relies on building up national power and military defence. In order to find out the main differences between these two concepts, I will compare them in five categories: 1) referent object; 2) scope; 3) actor(s); 4) means; and 5) source of insecurity (Table 3).

Category	**Just Security**	**Traditional Security Concept (Realism)**
Referent Object	People (particularly islanders, and indigenous people)	State
Scope	The security that protects	The security that seeks to

	the interests of island residents and other marginalized people, giving them priority over military-industry complex and nation-states, and ensures their rights to live in an unpolluted environment and right to self-determination.	defend states from external aggression, and one that is dependant on the state's ability to deter or defeat such attack.
Actor(s)	People, local governments, and central governments	State, with decision-making power centralized in the government
Means	Security relies on the solidarity between the islands and is achieved through continuous exchange between regional communities, creation of the Demilitarized Peace Area, integration of indigenous people's participation and expertise in attaining sustainable peace and secure humanity into national and global agenda.	Security relies on building up national power and military defence. The common forms it takes are alliances, arms races, the balance of power (achieved through containment or deterrence strategy).
Source of Insecurity	Nation-state, military-industry complex, the militarization of the sea	Other states, military threats
Geographical Scope	Islands: Okinawa, Jeju, Taiwan (and Hainan, Luzon)	Whole world
Year of Proposal	2014-2016 (evolving during the consecutive Peace Camps)	From the 16th century; conceptualized in the 20th century

Table 3. Comparison of the Traditional and the Just Security concepts
Source: Podlipska (2019: 204-206)

First, the referent object – an object that is being threatened and needs to be protected – should be considered. In the case of the Traditional Security, the referent object is the state. The Traditional Security concept assumes that if the state is secure then so are its citizens, thus giving priority to the state's interests over people. The state is eligible to go as far as to restrict its citizens' freedoms if it deems it necessary for the preservation of national security. The Just Security, on the other hand, is people-centred; it focuses on the citizens' well-being and the protection of their rights and freedoms, and on promoting dialogue between people and communities.

The scope of security in both concepts also significantly differs. In the case of the Traditional Security, the security seeks to defend the states from external aggression but is dependants on the state's ability to deter or defeat such attack. The Just Security, on the other hand, focuses primarily on addressing concerns and insecurities of island communities. Thus, it seeks to protect interests of island residents and other marginalized people, prioritising them over military-industry complex and nation-states, and strives to ensure their right to live in the unpolluted environment and their right to self-determination.

In Traditional Security, the state – with decision-making power centralised in the government – was identified as the main actor that can provide security. In Just Security, however, the people were recognised as the ones who are responsible for ensuring sustainable security.

Next, the means used to implement and guarantee security should be considered. Traditional Security relies heavily on the military capabilities of the state. In order to build up military power and defence, the state invests immense amounts of money in armaments, and/or seeks alliances with other states to maintain the balance of power. Just Security is on the other end of the spectrum; it is embedded in a notion of solidarity among people and cannot be brought through force. Means to achieve this type of security include building a strong transnational community of friendship and solidarity; preserving the memory of war; expanding the peace movement and supporting neighbouring anti-war movements; providing peace education to younger generations; participation and integration of indigenous people's expertise in attaining sustainable peace and secure humanity into national and global agenda, putting a stop to military exercises, which escalate tensions and waste natural resources; putting a stop to the construction of new military bases and helipads (PfS 2014,

2015, 2016). The islanders also proposed the establishment of the Demilitarized Peace Area – a space without military bases, which would encompass Okinawa, Taiwan, Jeju, and the sea between them. Its purpose would be "reduction of tensions in Northeast Asia and restoration of all three islands to their former long-standing existence as peaceful communities at the maritime crossroads of the region" (PfS 2015, Statement). Armed conflict, military base/facility construction, military exercises, port visits by warships and military aircraft, the passage of ships for military purpose, and meetings for the military purpose would be banned within its boundaries[8]. Since Okinawa, Taiwan, and Jeju lie in the heart of the Northeast Asia region, creating such demilitarized space would have a positive impact on the islands and regional security.

Finally, in Traditional Security, other states, and military threats they pose, are identified as the source of the state's insecurity. This means that every state, in the long run, should be considered an enemy or potential enemy; even if a certain state is an ally today, tomorrow it can turn into an adversary – mutual suspicion is dominant, as opposed to mutual trust present in the Just Security concept, which recognizes nation-state and military-industry complex as the source of people's insecurity.

6. Conclusions

Someone might ask why the security concept constructed by small island communities should matter? Compared to the mainland, islands are small pieces of land, so could they influence the whole region? The answer is: yes. It is without a doubt that security of the islands and the region, where they are located, are closely intertwined. Growing militarization of the islands to prepare for the perceived threats that are posed by the other states in the region only increases the tensions. The construction of new military facilities or deployment of new types of weapons and military vehicles invites distrust and stronger feelings of insecurity, which one day could turn into an armed conflict. In such a case, the mainland would certainly try to contain the conflict in its outskirts – the islands. This is why constructing islands' security through the means that do not encourage suspicion and distrust of other states is important (Gabe 2017: 14-18).

The residents of the three discussed islands – Okinawa, Jeju, and Taiwan – set out to jointly find the solution to security issues that plague their communities. Their long-term aim is to create an environment where everyone, regardless of their nationality, can enjoy sustainable peace without sacrificing anyone in the process. At this point, their aspirations

[8] Idea discussed during "Peace for the Sea" International Peace Camp 2016 held in Taiwan.

seem somewhat utopian: the activists do not posse the access to the top policy-makers, thus exerting significant influence on the decision-making processes of states still remains beyond their reach. They are aware of this and, at this stage, focus on building strong transnational community and creating more aware and politically engaged citizens who would join their cause and support policymakers who share their vision. If they fail to do so, their ideas will remain just ideas.

It needs to be stressed that the residents of the islands are able to discuss such matters and actively voice their discontent and critique towards the state only because of the democratic system. The use of democratic freedoms, such as freedom of speech or freedom of assembly (including freedom to hold meetings, marches, and demonstrations) helped establish the transnational connection between the islands and enabled the construction of Just Security – concept that wants to free security from borders and territoriality, and invites people to actively participate in its construction.

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