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

Drodzy Czytelnicy.

Oto specjalne podwójne wydanie kwartalnika *Silva Iaponicarum* 日林 2010. Zeszyt zawiera teksty przesłane przez uczestników wątku okinawiańskiego międzynarodowej konferencji japonistycznej *Japan: New Challenges in the 21st Century*, która została zorganizowana przez Zakład Japonistyki KO UAM w dniach 25-27 listopada 2011. Konferencja odbyła się w Katedrze Orientalistyki Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu we współpracy z Polskim Stowarzyszeniem Badań Japonistycznych, przy wsparciu Fundacji Japońskiej w ramach programu Grant Program for Intellectual Exchange Conferences.

Na 15 maja 2012 przypada 40 rocznica zwrotu Okinawy. W roku 1972, po dwudziestu siedmiu latach okupacji, Stany Zjednoczone zwróciły Okinawę władzom japońskim. Od tamtego czasu świat zmienił się znacznie: w roku 1989 runął Mur Berliński, Chiny zmieniły się w światową potęgę, a atak na World Trade Center z 11 września 2001 otworzył nową erę zmagań z terroryzmem. Mimo tego jednak Okinawa wydaje się trwać w realiach zimnowojennych. Amerykanie niezmiennie utrzymują na archipelagu znaczne siły wojskowe, które zajmują 18 procent głównej wyspy i 10 procent całości obszaru prefektury. Kilometry ogrodzeń z drutu kolczastego przecinające wyspę wywołują wrażenie, że w trakcie ostatnich czterdziestu lat nie zmieniło się tutaj nic albo bardzo niewiele.

Takie wrażenie pozostaje jednak błędne: Okinawa zmieniła się, tak samo jak amerykańscy żołnierze, którzy starają się nawiązywać stosunki z lokalną społecznością na zasadach pokojowych i dążą do poprawy swego wizerunku na wyspach. Ciągle zdarzają się wypadki z udziałem żołnierzy, poziom zanieczyszczenia i zagrożenia powodowanego przez amerykańskie samoloty wojskowe przekracza dopuszczalne normy, zaś przestępstwa popełnione przez wojskowych i ich rodziny niezmiennie odnotowywane są przez statystyki. Jednocześnie władze wojskowe zdają sobie dobrze sprawę z tego, że obecnie nawet drobne incydenty mogą wywołać poważny kryzys w stosunkach japońsko-amerykańskich, w wyniku czego nie mogą sobie one pozwolić na wykazywanie wobec lokalnej społeczności postawy kolonialnej arogancji sprzed czterdziestu lat.

Zmieniła się także sama Japonia. W trakcie ostatnich czterdziestu lat państwo to podpisało i ratyfikowało wiele międzynarodowych konwencji dotyczących praw człowieka. Fakt ten w sposób istotny zmienił naturę relacji między państwem i społeczeństwem, w ramach których to ostatnie stało się coraz bardziej świadome i silne w egzekwowaniu praw obywatelskich. Na tym właśnie zasadza się istota tak zwnego „problemu okinawskiego": nieważne, jak intensywnie rząd dążyłby do złagodzenia amerykańskiej obecności na ziemi okinawskiej, region ten pozostaje niezmiennie zapóźniony wobec standardów praw człowieka przyjętych przez Japonię.

Zmiana zaszła również w dynamice społecznej „walki o Okinawę." Podczas gdy w przeszłości ruchy skierowane przeciw bazom wojskowym wykazywały się większą centralizacją i zorganizowaniem wokół partii politycznych oraz związków zawodowych, współcześnie wykazują one raczej tendencję do rozdrobnienia i skupiania się wokół organizacji pozarządowych. Zwiększył się także zakres pojęcia „walki o Okinawę," które obecnie prowadzona jest pod sztandarami praw kobiet, ochrony środowiska itp. Nie jest to już kwestia wyłącznie lokalna, ale wpisuje się ona w kontekst globalnej walki o prawa człowieka.

Rocznica zwrotu Okinawy każdego roku wywołuje wspomnienia z przeszłości. Wojenne dzieje regionu były szczególnie tragiczne, jako że na wyspie doszło do najbardziej krwawych walk Wojny na Pacyfiku, w których wojska japońskie i amerykańskie zmagały sie przez trzy miesiace wiosny roku 1945. Powojenna okupacja może w pewnym sensie zostać uznana za logiczną konsekwencję klęski Japonii w wojnie, co wyjaśnia, dlaczego wspomnienia bitwy do dziś prześladują mieszkańców Okinawy. Rany wojenne pozostałe w świadomości Okinawiańczyków nie zabliźnią się, dopóki wojska amerykańskie pozostają na ich ziemi.

Niniejszy zeszyt kwartalnika *Silva Iaponicarum* stanowi pierwszą tego rodzaju publikację poświęconą Okinawie, zaś cztery zamieszczone w nim artykuły dotyczą tematów kluczowych dla zrozumienia realiów Okinawy współczesnej. Prof. Hoshino Ei'ichi, jeden z głównych prelegentów konferencji, bada wpływy baz wojskowych na życie lokalnej społeczności, odwołując się do tej problematyki z perspektywy teorii bezpieczeństwa człowieka (ang. *humuan security*). Dr Beata Bochorodycz wprowadza temat

organizacji pozarządowych walczących o ocalenie mało znanego ssaka morskiego diugonia (piersiopławki, *dugong dugon*). Autorka ukazuje, jak Okinawiańczycy umiejętnie sposób wykorzystują kwestie ochrony środowiska w walce z rządami amerykańskim i japońskim, które planują budowę na Okinawie nowej bazy wojskowej. Artykuł autorstwa dra Stanisława Meyera przedstawia przegląd aktualnej sytuacji pozostałych mniejszości narodowych w Japonii, gdyż Okinawczycy to bynajmniej nie jedyna grupa w Japonii, która nie może w pełni korzystać z praw obywatelskich. Autor dokonuje porównania sytuacji Ajnów, żyjących w Japonii, Koreańczyków oraz Okinawiańczyków i wskazuje różnice w strategiach ich aktywności politycznej. Zamykający zbiorek artykuł Sigrid Hofmeister-Watanabe przedstawia projekt artystyczny służący upamiętnieniu Bitwy o Okinawę. Przedsięwzięcie to, w którym wykorzystano okinawiańską pieśń ludową, można zaliczyć do swego rodzaju anty-pomników, które nie odzwierciedlają narracji oficjalnych, ale wspomnienia i doświadczenia tych, których głosy pozostają często niedostrzegane i lekceważone.

Kolegium redakcyjne E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

Poznań-Kraków-Warszawa-Kuki, czerwiec 2011

Dear Readers,

This is the special double edition of the *Silva Iaponicarum* 日林 quarterly. The fascicle contains the texts based on the papers delivered by the participants of the Okinawan events of the international conference on Japanese studies *Japan: New Challenges in the 21st Century*, which was held at the Adam Mickiewicz University Chair of Oriental Studies on 25-27th November 2010. The conference was organized in co-operation with Polish Association for Japanese Studies, with a financial support from The Japan Foundation Grant Program for Intellectual Exchange Conferences.

15 May 2012 marks the 40th anniversary of the Okinawa Reversion. In 1972, after twenty-seven years of military occupation, the United States returned Okinawa to the Japanese administration. The world has dramatically changed since then: Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989, China turned into a global power, and September 11 attack on the World Trade Center launched a new era of war against terrorism. Okinawa, however, seems to be frozen in the cold-war constellation. The Americans continue to keep large military forces in Okinawa that occupy eighteen percent of the main island, or ten percent of the entire prefectural territory. Kilometers of barbed wire fences cutting across the island give an impression that nothing or little has changed here in the past forty years.

Such impression is, however, somehow misleading: Okinawa has changed, and so has the American military, who tries to amicably cohabitate with local people and to soften its image. Accidents involving the military still happen, noise pollution caused by American aircrafts exceeds admissible limits, and crimes committed by military servicemen continue to feed statistics data. The military authorities, however, are well aware of the fact that nowadays even a small incident may trigger a serious crisis in Japanese-American relations, and therefore they cannot deal with local people with a colonial arrogance as they did forty years ago.

Japan has changed too. During the past forty years Japan signed and ratified a number of international covenants on human rights.

This has significantly changed the nature of relations between the state and society, with the latter becoming more aware of and more powerful to exercise civic rights. And this is what constitutes the core of so-called “Okinawa problem”: however the government tries to soften the presence of American military on the Okinawan soil, Okinawa continues to lag behind Japan proper in terms of human rights standards adopted by Japan.

What has also changed is the dynamics of the civic “Okinawa struggle.” Whereas in the past the anti-bases movements were more centralized and organized around political parties and worker unions, today they tend to be more fragmented and organized around NGOs. The “Okinawa struggle” has expanded its agenda and nowadays it is conducted under the banner of women’s rights, environmental protection etc. It is no longer a local issue, but it falls within the context of global fight for human rights.

Each year, the reversion anniversary invokes memories of the past. Okinawan wartime history was particularly tragic, as the island became a site of one of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific War, where the Japanese and American armies were fighting for nearly three months in Spring 1945. The postwar occupation was in a manner of speaking a logical consequence of Japan’s defeat, and this is why the memories of the battle continue to haunt the Okinawans. As long as the Americans stay on the Okinawan soil, old war wounds in the Okinawan psyche may never be healed.

This issue of *Silva Iaponicarum* is the first of such kind solely dedicated to Okinawa. The four articles presented in this volume discuss topics that are essential to understanding modern Okinawa. Hoshino Ei’ichi, one of the kyenote speakers of the conference, investigates the implications of military bases for the life of local people, presenting it from the perspective of the problem of human security. Beata Bochorodycz introduces the topic of anti-bases movements in the context of the rise of NGOs in Japan. The “Save the Dugong Movement,” that is taken as case study, demonstrates how the Okinawans skillfully use the issue of environment protection in their fight against Japanese and American governments, who intend to construct a new military base in Okinawa. The paper by Stanislaw Meyer gives an overview of the situation of other minorities in Japan. The Okinawans are not the only people in

Japan, who cannot exercise their citizenship rights to the full extent. Meyer compares the situation of the Ainu, Zainichi Koreans and the Okinawans and demonstrates differences in their political agendas and strategies. Finally, the paper by Sigrid Hofmeister-Watanabe describes an art-project commemorating the Battle of Okinawa. The project, which features Okinawan folksong in its center, falls into the genre of the so-called Counter-Monuments, i.e. monuments that do not reflect official narratives, but memories and experiences of people, whose voices are often disregarded and neglected.

The editorial board E-mail: silvajp@amu.edu.pl

Poznań-Cracow-Warsaw-Kuki, June 2011

読者のみなさまへ

*Silva Iaponicarum 日林*２０１０年春夏号をお届けいたします。本号には、２０１０年１１月２５～２７日、ポズナニのアダム・ミツキェヴィチ大学東洋学科で開かれた国際日本学会議【日本――２１世紀の新しい挑戦】の沖縄セッション参加者から寄稿された論文が掲載されています。学会は、同大学日本学科が主催、ポーランド日本学会が共催、国際交流基金・知的交流会議助成プログラムでの後援で催されました。

２０１２年5月１５日は、沖縄返還から４０回目の記念日にあたります。１９７２年、沖縄占領から２７年目に、アメリカ合衆国は日本政府に沖縄を返還しました。当時から、世界は大きくその相貌を変えました。１９８９年にベルリンの壁が崩壊し、中国は世界的大国に成長し、２００１年9月１１日のＷＴＣ攻撃から、世界はテロとの戦いという新しい時代に入りました。それにもかかわらず、沖縄は今も冷戦時代の現実にとどまりつづけているように見えます。アメリカは沖縄に強大な軍事力を駐屯させています。その面積は沖縄本島の１８パーセント、沖縄県の１０パーセントを占めています。鉄条網の柵が何キロメートルにもわたって島を分断している風景からは、最近４０年間に何一つまたはほとんど変化が行われなかったという印象を受けます。

しかし、こうした印象は誤りです。沖縄は変貌しましたし、アメリカ軍の兵士たちも、現地社会と平和的な関係を確立しようと努め、沖縄諸島における自らのイメージの向上を目指しています。相変わらず米国軍人が関与した事件は起きていますし、アメリカ軍機による環境汚染と危険は許容水準を越えています。いまだに、軍人とその家族による一定数の犯罪も摘発されています。同時に、軍政府は、些細な出来事であってもそれが日米関係の深刻な危機をもたらしかねない現状を十分に理解し、現地社会に対して、４０年前に見られた、傲慢な植民地支配者を思わせる態度を示すことはあり得ません。

日本自体も変貌を遂げました。最近４０年間に、人権に関する多数の国際条約に署名・批准しました。この事実は、国家と社会の関係

のありかたを本質的に変え、日本社会は市民権の要求を次第に意識的かつ強力に行うようになりました。実は、そこにこそ、いわゆる「沖縄問題」の本質があります。政府が沖縄諸島におけるアメリカ軍の存在を以下に緩和しようと努めようと、この地域が日本が認める人権水準の面ではなはだしく後れを取っているのに変わりはないのです。

変化は、市民の「沖縄闘争」の力学にも生じました。軍事基地に反対するかつての運動はより大きく中央化し、政党と労働組合のまわりに組織されていましたが、現代のそれは、細分化とＮＧＯの周りに集中する傾向を示しています。「沖縄闘争」の概念範囲も広がりました。現在の「闘争」は、女性の権利と環境保護の旗の下に展開しています。これはもはや地方問題ではなく、地球規模での人権という文脈に置かれているのです。

沖縄返還記念日がやってくるごとに、過去が思い出されます。この地域の戦争史はとりわけて悲劇的でした――沖縄島を舞台に、１９４５年、日米軍が３か月にわたって戦った、太平洋戦争中最も血みどろの戦闘が起きました。戦後の占領は、戦争で日本が敗北したことの論理的帰結だったといえるでしょう。それによって、沖縄の住人達が今日に至るまでも戦闘の記憶に苦しめられている理由も明らかになります。沖縄住民の意識に残った戦争の傷は、米軍が彼らの土地にとどまるかぎり、癒されることはありません。

季刊誌 *Silva Iaponicarum* 『日林』本号は、沖縄を主題にした最初の刊行物です。収録されている４本の論文は、現代沖縄を理解するカギとなるテーマを扱っています。本学会の基調演説者、星野英一は、軍事基地が現地社会の生活に与える影響を、人間の安全保障理論の観点からこの問題にアプローチしながら、追究しています。ベアタ・ボホロディチは、一般に知られていない海洋哺乳類ジュゴン保護をめぐるＮＧＯの活動を紹介しています。沖縄県民が沖縄への新しい軍事基地建設を計画する米日政府との闘争において、自然環境問題を巧妙に利用していることを示しています。スタニスワフ・メイェルの論文は、日本における他の少数民族の状況の概要を示しました。沖縄県民は、日本国民の権利を十分に享受できずにいる唯一のグループではないのです。筆者は、日本にするアイヌ、朝鮮人、沖縄県民の状況を比較し、彼らの政治活動戦略の違いを証明してい

ます。論集の巻末に掲載されたジグリド・ホフマイステル＝ワタナベの論文は、沖縄戦争を記憶するためのある芸術的プロジェクトを紹介しています。沖縄民謡を用いた本プロジェクトは、公的言説ではなく、しばしばその声が聞き届けられずまた軽んじられている人々の回想と記憶を反映させた、いわゆる「反＝記念碑」に含まれるものです。

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２０１１年6月　ポズナニ・クラクフ・ワルシャワ・久喜

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Ei'ichi Hoshino
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Human In/Security in Okinawa: Under the Development Promotion Regime

I shall feel secure when I know that I can walk the streets at night without being raped (UNDP 1994: 23).

This is the voice of a fourth-grade schoolgirl in Ghana, a quote from the *Human Development Report 1994* (HDR). Her voice reminded me of the year 1995, when three U.S. servicemen brutally gang-raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa, and another case of the rape of a young schoolgirl in Okinawa, which happened in February 2008.

Andrew Linklater wrote about three aspects of states as a source of insecurity. One of them is as following: "(...) they are a source of insecurity where migrants, gypsies, minority nations, and indigenous peoples, among others, do not enjoy the protection of the rule of the law or are barred from enjoying the political and other rights that full members of the community already enjoy" (Linklater 2005: 116).

This paper tries to describe human insecurity in Okinawa, and to investigate issues in applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a developed country.

After reviewing a brief history of Okinawa in Section 1 and some conceptual frameworks of human security in Section 2, Section 3 describes situations in Okinawa with respect to personal security and economic security. Violent crimes, accidents and noise levels are examined with respect to the U.S. military presence, while unemployment rates, average income, and revenue dependence are referred as economic aspects of human security. Section 4 and 5 deal with the Regime for Promotion and Development of Okinawa, its outcomes and its functions. Section 6 describes implications for human security discourse as concluding remarks.

1. Okinawa: a Brief History[1]

Okinawa is a southwestern prefecture in Japan that consists of about 160 islands. About 1.4 million people live on 50 of these islands. Okinawa covers 2,300 square kilometers, while Okinawa Island is the largest island covering 1,200 square kilometers. Its subtropical climate makes Okinawa a popular resort destination.

[1] This section is mainly based on descriptions in Okinawa Prefectural Government (2004).

In the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, not only American and Japanese soldiers but also many local civilians lost their lives. More than 230,000 people died, and almost a quarter of the population of Okinawa was lost.
Okinawa was expendable in the war, for buying time and protecting the national polity under the emperor. It was “nothing to do with protecting Okinawa, and everything to do with slowing down the U.S. advance against the main Japanese islands” (Angst 2003: 142).
After it had landed in Okinawa, the U.S. military began to convert Japanese military bases into their own and construct new ones. Even after Japan’s surrender, they kept building new bases while they confiscated land by force. As a result, Okinawa began to function as the "Keystone of the Pacific Ocean" for U.S. military forces.

Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010)

Figure 1: U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa.

Some 278 cases of rape by GI’s were reported between 1945 and 1951, and this could still be an underestimate. A former Okinawa councilwoman Takazato Suzuyo said the cases of abuses committed by the U.S. troops during this period were never solved and those who committed them were never punished. The documented cases included incidents such as women

being gang-raped in front of their husbands and fathers (Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence 2005).

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 put Okinawa under the control of the U.S. administration. While Japan enjoyed the so-called peace constitution under Article 9, Okinawan people could not enjoy the same security level as other Japanese people enjoyed.

Even after the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, the excessive concentration of military bases on the islands was not improved (Figure 1). This bilateral alliance, being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems due to the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa, which are accepted as a "security cost" (Minamiyama 1999: 16). The continuing U.S. military presence gives a constant reminder of the traumatic episode in the battle of Okinawa.

Base Concentration

Although more than 60 years have passed since the end of World War II, Okinawa still functions as the "Keystone of the Pacific Ocean" for U.S. military forces. U.S. bases in Okinawa account for about 75% of all facilities exclusively used by the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, while Okinawa accounts for only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area. U.S. military bases occupy 18.8% of the main island of Okinawa Jima, where the population and industry are concentrated.

Approximately 60% of U.S. military personnel in Japan are stationed in Okinawa, and about 60% of them belong to the Marine Corps. The concentration of U.S. forces in Okinawa affects a variety of serious concerns and local people's lives: accidents, incidents and crimes caused by U.S. soldiers; everyday noise caused by military aircraft; forest fires caused by live-fire exercises; water pollution from oil leakages; and so on.

Okinawa Prefectural Government insists that a decrease in the number of U.S. forces in Okinawa would reduce the number of incidents and accidents related to U.S. servicemen and would lead to lighten the excessive load on the Okinawan people. Faced with a series of criminal cases committed by military personnel, the Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and municipal assemblies have passed resolutions requesting a reduction in the number of U.S. armed forces. They are expressions of the general consensus of Okinawan people (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).

2. Concept of Human Security[2]

The concept of security is therefore a battleground in and of itself... Who would want to keep the concept narrow and why? ... Who might want to keep some issues off the security agenda and why? (Smith 2005: 57-58).

Human security represents an effort to re-conceptualize security in fundamental ways. It is an analytical tool which focuses primarily on security for individuals, not states. Thus, exploring options that are aimed to mitigate the threat to personal security becomes a primary goal of policy recommendations and policy behaviors. As the definition of security extended from military security to human security, the causes of insecurity are also expanded from military threats by antagonistic nations to threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environment, community and personal safety. So the policy initiatives that apply the idea of human security have incorporated these considerations into its policy making, and have reduced the emphasis on military forces in its policy behavior. Therefore, human security has following characteristics: people-centered, multi-dimensional, interconnected and universal (Jolly and Ray 2006).

Human Development Report 1994

As Jolly and Ray (2006: 4) pointed out, "The concept of human security emerged as part of the holistic paradigm of human development cultivated at the UNDP by former Pakistani Finance Minister Mahbub ul Haq, with strong support from the economist Amartya Sen." *Human Development Report 1994* was "the first major international document to articulate human security in conceptual terms with proposals for policy and action."
The 1994 report argued that the concept of security has "for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people" (UNDP 1994: 22). The concept of human security tries to expand this narrow interpretation to include the safety of individuals and groups of people from various threats such as poverty, hunger, disease, disaster, violence and political instability; and protection from "sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life" (UNDP 1994: 23). The 1994 report identifies seven core elements that reflect the basic needs of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental

[2] This section is largely based on descriptions in Jolly and Ray (2006).

security, personal security, community security and political security (Jolly and Ray 2006).

Commission on Human Security Report 2003

In 2001, the Commission on Human Security (CHS), chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, was established to explore the concept of human security and to make recommendations for policy. According to the CHS report (2003), human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment."
Highlights from the CHS report are as follows:

- The international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. The state often fails to fulfill its security obligations, and at times has even become a source of threats to its own people. Attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people, to human security.
- The report is a response to the threats of development reversed, to the threats of violence inflicted. That response cannot be effective if it comes fragmented, from those dealing with rights, those with security, those with humanitarian concerns and those with development.
- Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development.
- Human security complements "state security" in four respects:
- Its concern is individual and community rather than the state
- Menaces include more than threats to state security
- The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone
- Achieving human security includes empowering people

Jolly and Ray (2006: 4) stressed, "The report noted that human security complemented state security because its concern was focussed on the individual and the community, whose agency and well-being represented an integral part of state security. Achieving human security therefore included not only protecting people but empowering people to fend for themselves."
The linkage between security and development is explicit in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's report of 2005, *In Larger Freedom*. He insisted that "all people have the right to security and to development" (Annan 2005: 5). We could describe the linkage as two contrasting views of the state: "One 'leg' of human security is in the human-rights tradition that sees the state as the problem and the source of threats to individual security. The other is in

the development agenda that sees the state as the necessary agent for promoting human security. Both are reflected in these UN policy documents" (Thakur 2005).

Human Security in Japanese Foreign Policy

After 1994, some governments showed interest in the concept of human security and adopted it as a central theme of their foreign and defense policies. The Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments, in particular, were top runners in incorporating human security concerns into their respective foreign policies (Jolly and Ray 2006).

According to MOFA, "Human Security is a perspective to strengthen efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity. The most important element of Human Security is to enhance the freedom of individual human beings and their abundant potential to live creative and valuable lives" (MOFA 2001).

Prime Minister Obuchi delivered his speech, "Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia," at Hanoi in 1998, when the Japanese government clearly located "Human Security" in its foreign policy. On other occasion, Prime Minister Mori stated that Japan sees human security as one of the main pillars of its diplomacy at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. He also said that the Japanese government intended to establish an international committee for human security (MOFA 2001).

In 1999, the Japanese government materialized Obuchi's commitment in his Hanoi Speech by establishing the UN Trust Fund for Human Security at the UN Secretariat with an initial contribution of $4.6 million. In the following years, Japan announced its intention to make further contributions to this fund. Japan's total contributions have amounted to $297 million (1999-2006). Thus, the Japanese government is serious about promoting human security in terms of "freedom from want" in international contexts.

3. Describing Human Insecurity in Okinawa

While Japan's total contribution to the UN Trust Fund is almost $300 million, the government seems to be indifferent to human insecurity in Okinawa. In the following section, I would like to examine some of the major impacts of the Japanese government's choices in its national security policy on human insecurity in Okinawa, by applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a country in the global north. Here we focus on personal and economic insecurity within an Okinawan context.

Personal Insecurity: In 1995, three U.S. servicemen of the Marine Corps abducted and gang-raped a thirteen year-old schoolgirl. The news prompted immediate powerful Okinawan responses. “These included the demand by women's groups in Okinawa to publicize the crime and increase protection for women, ... renewed protests by landowners forced for decades to lease lands to the U.S. military, and strengthened” (Angst 2003: 137).

Governor Ota called for the reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa and refused to sign over extensions of land-lease agreement on some U.S. communication facilities. A debate over the nature and role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was sparked. Especially, the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) regarding the treatment of U.S. military personnel accused of crimes were major concerns among others (Angst 2003).

“Media coverage shifted from the rape to ‘larger’ political issues of land lease, base returns, and troop reduction, pointing out the long-standing victimization of Okinawans” (Angst 2003: 138). In September, 1996, the first prefectural referendum was held in Okinawa. When asked about the review and the rewriting of SOFA and reduction of U.S. bases, about 482,000 voters (89%) answered “Yes”, which accounts for 53% of all eligible voters. Only 46,000 voters said “No”.

In response to these developments, the governments of the U.S. and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) as “a consultative committee to reduce the excessive burden of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa” (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004: 12). In the SACO final report published in 1996, eleven facilities, including Futenma Air Station for the Marine Corps, were said to be returned. If all of five thousand hectares of land were returned, it would exceed the total land area returned since reversion in 1972 (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).

But, the return was conditional: there should be substitute facilities offered elsewhere in Japan. The new site chosen for the substitute of Futenma Air Station was Henoko, on the northeast coast of Okinawa’s main island. The plan calls for Japan to build a new Marine Corps air-sea base for American use.

Personal Insecurity as Security Cost

In February 2008, there was another case: the rape of a fourteen-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, an Okinawan feminist NGO, immediately published a statement and called for public attention (OWAAMV 2008).

... We have been imposed with the burden of hosting U.S. military and bases. For 62 years, the lives of women and children in Okinawa have been made insecure by the presence of the U.S. military and bases. ...
We call for the withdrawal of the U.S. military in order to abolish such violence. We argue that the military is a violence-intrinsic institution. And true security cannot be realized by the military in our community nor between nations. ...

All the municipal assemblies have passed resolutions to protest, and another Prefectural People's Rally was held in March, while the plaint was withdrawn, so that there were no judicial procedures for the perpetrator. He did not sit in judgement on the case.
In the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, Governor Nakaima answered on the case, saying that he could not choose between the security of the Asian-Pacific region and protecting the girl's safety. "The Okinawa problem" has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance, being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems due to the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa, which are accepted as a "security cost" by mainland Japanese (Minamiyama 1999: 16). Now the Okinawan governor included the personal insecurity of Okinawans as such a security cost.

Impacts of U.S. Military Presence
Crimes, Accidents, and Living Conditions: The serious impact of the U.S. military facilities on the Okinawan people's lives lies in crimes. Between the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 and the end of December 2003, more than five thousand criminal cases, committed by military personnel and military-related people, were recorded, which includes 540 serious crimes and 977 assault cases (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).
Figure 2 shows the number of crime cases by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa since 1972. Serious cases include murders, rapes and so on. It is notable that the number of crime cases were more than 200 a year for the first 12 years after reversion, but that there have been fewer than 100 a year for the latest 12 years but one. Though the number of crime cases has clearly decreased recently, it also should be noted that there have still been more than 50 a year for the last 10 years, and there are serious crimes like murders and rapes every year.

A local newspaper (*Ryūkyū Shimpō*, October 22, 2008) reported that US-Japanese governments agreed in 1953 that Japan would give up jurisdiction on US soldiers' crimes in Japan except in serious cases. In the following five years, till 1958, Japan did not take 97% of crimes to court. Dale Sonenberg, a member of the international law division of the US forces in Japan, mentioned this issue in his 2001 article on SOFA in Japan, saying that the agreement was unofficial and Japan has been following this agreement until the time of the article's writing. Thus, the number of cases has decreased in recent years, there is still the serious negligence of domestic insecurity.



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010)

Figure 2: Crime Cases by U.S. Soldiers in Okinawa, 1972-2009 (case).

Furthermore, a Prefectural Government booklet describes other impacts of the heavy U.S. presence on the lives of Okinawan people as follows. "Specifically, daily air craft noise, military aircraft crashes (fighters, helicopters, etc.), oil and fat spills, red soil runoff, mountain forest fires caused by live-firing exercises and other incidents and accidents stemming from U.S. base activities result in health-related problems among residents

living in the vicinity of bases and other negative impacts on Okinawan people and the environment" (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8). Figure 3 shows the number of U.S. maneuvers-related accidents in Okinawa between 2001 and 2009. They are, from bottom to top, a large number of aircraft-related accidents, a small number of stray bullets, water pollutions, wilderness fire and others. As the Prefectural Government booklet argues, "With only a minor miscalculation, aircraft accidents have the potential to be tragic, possibly resulting in the deaths of local residents. These accidents therefore cause a great deal of anxiety not only among residents living in the vicinity of the bases, but also among all Okinawan citizens" (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8).



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010a)

Figure 3: U.S. Maneuvers-related Accidents in Okinawa, 2001-2009 (case).

On August 13, 2004, a heavy assault transport helicopter, a CH-53D, crashed into the Okinawa International University Administration Building, whose campus is next to the Futenma Air Station. Fortunately, no one was killed. After the crash, U.S. Marines from the base invaded and occupied a

large section of the University campus for their investigation. The investigation into the cause of this accident by the Japanese has not been completed, but the U.S. Marines have already resumed flights of all aircraft, including the CH-53Ds.

Another serious impact of the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people's lives is noise pollution. The prefectural government established several measuring stations near Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station to record noise levels. Figure 4 shows that, at almost all measuring stations, the noise levels measured exceed the WECPNL level of 70, the standard set by the Ministry of the Environment. The Prefectural Government booklet expressed great concerns that “such noise pollution will affect the daily lives and health of local residents, as well as education by interrupting classes at schools adjacent to the bases” (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8).



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2008)

Figure 4: Noise Levels of Kadena and Futenma, 1995-2006 (WECPNL).

What is to be Done With U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa?

According to an Okinawa opinion poll in 2007 by the Okinawa Times (800 voters Random Digit Dialing), answers to the question "What is to be done with U.S. military bases in Okinawa?" were: keep the status quo 13%, gradual closure or reduction 70%, and complete closure right away 15%.

Some may say that, to the proportion of impacts described above, too many Okinawans say "No" to the U.S. bases. But, I believe there are at least three good reasons for that. First, freedom from fear. In order to feel "secure", you have to be liberated from not only physical threats but also mental ones such as past trauma, fear to be beaten, or concerns over your own future. The mental side of security constitutes the core of human security.

Second, protection of human dignity. Okinawa was expendable in the battle of Okinawa, in the San Francisco Treaty, and in today's formation of the Japan-US alliance. "[T]here is growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions" (ICISS Report on R2P, 2001). In Okinawa, human dignity is felt to be violated.

Third, memories of the battle of Okinawa. Japanese troops were stationed in Okinawa to protect the territory and not the people. Japanese soldiers killed some Okinawa people they suspected to be spies, because they spoke the local language, which soldiers could not understand. Some were expelled from caves where they were hiding; there were food dispossession; and some were forced to commit group suicide or family suicide.[3] For Okinawans, the lesson of the war is: the military does not protect people.

4. Regime for Promotion and Development of Okinawa

In terms of economic insecurity, *Human Development Report 1994* (HDR) mentions income insecurity and job insecurity in industrial countries. "Income insecurity has hit industrial countries as well. ... Minority ethnic groups are usually among the hardest hit ... With incomes low and insecure, many people have to look for more support from their governments. But they often look in vain" (UNDP 1994: 26). "Many people in the rich nations today feel insecure because jobs are increasingly difficult to find and keep. ... Young people are more likely to be unemployed ... Even those

[3] People were told, "When being captured, men will be killed and women will be raped. So, if there were no way out, you should kamikaze-attack them or commit suicide." See *Sekai* 774 (2008), special issue on Okinawa.

with jobs may feel insecure if the work is only temporary" (UNDP 1994: 25).

In addition to personal insecurity, and instead of economic inequality, let's take a look at Okinawan's perception of inequality by the Okinawa opinion poll in 2007 carried out by the Okinawa Times. With regards to answers to the question "Are there any inequalities between Okinawa and the mainland?": 87% said Yes, 11% said No and 2% DK. When asked "What kind of inequalities are there?" those people who answered "Yes," specified income 48%, the base problem 24%, job 17%, and education 5%.

In fact, the average income of Okinawa is the lowest among Japan's 47 prefectures, while the prefecture's unemployment rate is the highest in Japan. Financial independence is also very low: Okinawa is among the bottom five (Figure 5). When we calculate the Human Development Index (HDI) values, one of the selected indicators of human security, Okinawa is the second lowest among 47 prefectures (Umemura 2003).



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2007)

Figure 5: Economic Inequality, Okinawa vs National Average (index, national average = 100).

Economic Inequality as a Tool to Control

The central government utilizes these economic inequalities as an instrument to control the Okinawa Prefectural Government and to force it to accept the U.S.-Japanese plan to build a new base in Henoko. "The Local authorities in Okinawa were at first extremely negative, but after heavy pressure, in 1998 both the prefectural Governor and the Nago City mayor accepted the principle of base construction and in 1999 the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly endorsed it after a bitter and prolonged 18-hour debate" (McCormack and Matsumoto 2008).

Gustavo Esteva (1992) said the notion of underdeveloped was born on January 20th, 1949, in Harry S. Truman's Inaugural Address. Truman changed the meaning of development, and since then it has always implied "escape from a humiliating situation called underdevelopment." In order to escape from a humiliating situation, people pursue development, welcome foreign aid and FDI as additional capital for development, and mimic the political, economic and societal institutions and way of thinking that are common to developed societies.

In 1972, the Okinawan people were ready to pursue development in Truman's sense. In the reversion movement before 1972, Okinawan people demanded *kakunuki hondonami* 核抜き本土並み (No nukes, catching-up with the mainland Japan). *Hondonami* in politics, economy, and social life. *Kakusa zesei* 格差是正 (catching-up with the mainland) was the other big word at that time. Even thirty some years after the reversion, an editorial of a local news paper describes *Hondonami* and *kakusa zesei* that were not materialized. Though economic growth did occur, catching-up did not.

When people believe in development in Truman's sense, development is the inevitable process for every society. If you apply the right policy, welcoming foreign capital and mimicking developed societies, people in the south, or the periphery, will eventually get wealthy and become a society of high living standards like countries in the north, or the mainland (de Rivero 2001). When foreign capital flew in, exploited nature and destroyed traditional culture, you might call it development. It sounds like an escape from a humiliating situation and also an emancipation of what you already have in your culture and society. It is natural and effective for the central government to utilize economic inequalities as a tool to control the Okinawan people.

Regime for Promotion and Development: A basic policy of Japan and United States was to make Okinawa dependent on two governments. In Okinawa today, the economy is dependent on central government policy,

public finance is dependent on the transfer from central government, and people have seemingly lost independence in their way of thinking. These could be the direct results of the regime for the promotion and development of Okinawa since 1972.

Before the reversion of 1972, Okinawa changed from an agricultural prefecture to a prefecture of service industries. The population in agriculture was nearly 80% before WW2, and became around 20% during the U.S. occupation, losing huge areas of flat land for the construction of bases. Secondary industries grew to 20%, mainly in the construction industries as base construction progressed. Workers in the tertiary industries were less than 40% around 1955, and grew to 60% in 1972 (Tominaga 2003).

Japan's high rate of economic growth in the 1960s did not come to Okinawa. The exchange rate of Okinawa's yen, called B yen, was 120 yen to the dollar, while that of the Mainland yen was 360 yen to the dollar. Because of this policy decision, manufacturing industries, especially export industries, were eradicated and did not grow in Okinawa.

	Period	Budget
1st PPD	1972-81	1,249 Billion Y
2nd PPD	1982-91	2,135 Billion Y
3rd PPD	1992-2001	3,370 Billion Y
PPO	2002-(2008)	1,792 Billion Y
Total		8,546 Billion Y

Source: Miyata (2008)

Figure 6: Program Budget for the Promotion of Okinawa (billion yen).

In 1972, in order for the Okinawan people to welcome reversion, a program for promotion and development was introduced to Okinawa. The Special Treatment Act says the central government is responsible for making Okinawa catch up with the mainland in terms of infrastructure such as roads, ports, airport, schools, and agriculture, and in level of income, so that the Okinawan people could have hopes for future development. In order to protect and foster business, tax rates for alcoholic drinks and gasoline were set lower. The Okinawa Development Agency and Okinawa Development Finance Corporation were established (Miyata 2008).

The policy rationale of the central government to carry out the promotion and development of Okinawa is that (1) it experienced the battle of Okinawa, (2) it was under US occupation for 27 years, (3) it hosts vast military bases (Miyata 2008).

After three 10-year plans, the new Okinawa Promotion and Development Act was passed and another 10-year plan started. This time, the word "development" was dropped, though. Since 1972, about 8.5 Trillion Yen has been spent on the program. About 7.9 Trillion Yen was used for public investment (Figure 6).



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010b)

Figure 7: Prefectural Per-Capita Income, 1972-2007 (%, ten thousand yen).

Outcome of Promotion and Development Regime

The central government reviewed the 30 years of the program, and concluded that it didn't work. The economy is stagnant, public finance

dependence grew, per capita income is the lowest among Japan's prefectures, the unemployment rate is high, a little too many tertiary industries, manufacturing industries are very weak, and financial independence is hard to be achieved (Miyata 2008).

Public investment did not have much of a spin-off effect on production and employment, so that no catching up in terms of average income was achieved. Figure 7 shows the average income per capita for Japan (国) and Okinawa (沖縄), and a ratio of Okinawan's to Japan's (所得格差). The Okinawan income per capita increased from less than 500,000 yen in 1972 to around 2 million yen in 1992. The ratio of Okinawan per-capita income, however, has been around 70% of the national average for more than 30 years.

No catching up in terms of employment has happened. Figure 8 shows the unemployment rates of Okinawan (沖縄県) and Japanese (全国), and the numbers of unemployed in Okinawa (失業者数). As seen in Figure 8, unemployment rates of the last 10 years are worse than before. It was 3% in 1972, and now it is about 8%, because manufacturing industries have not grown out of public investment. Forty-one percent of the working population do not have stable regular jobs, 89% of whom are working poor with an annual income of less than 2 million yen. Inequality within Okinawa is growing.



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010b)

Figure 8: Unemployment Rate, 1972-2009 (%, thousand persons).

Independent revenue sources of Okinawa are the lowest or within the bottom 5 among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2007). In other words, Okinawa is heavily dependent on money from central government. The regime of promotion and development offers high subsidy rates for prefecture cities, towns and villages. Given the incentives, municipalities tend to do a lot of public works, and to have undisciplined public finance and a dependent mind set on subsidies. According to a questionnaire survey to municipalities in 2002, the top request for the New Program for Promotion of Okinawa was the maintaining of the high-rate of subsidy mechanism.

5. Dependence through Regime for Promotion and Development

Functions of Promotion and Development Regime

With 3.8 Trillion Yen and 36 years, why has the Program of Promotion and Development not brought economic independence to Okinawa? Maedomari (2009) summarizes an answer by Oshiro Tsuneo, former professor of the University of the Ryukyus: Because the Promotion and Development Regime is not aimed at the economic independence of Okinawa. The program was intended to be an anchor for U.S.-Japan Alliance. Once Okinawa attained economic independence, the need for land for further economic development would rise, which means more voices for the removal of bases and the U.S.-Japan security treaty would be in danger.

In other words, from the national security view point, it is extremely important to keep Okinawa dependent on the central government, to keep the regional economy dependent on the presence of US military bases. Practicing influence through subsidies and public finance from the central government is called the politics of influence peddling. Other prefectures have had this mechanism established for a long time, while Okinawa didn't have one for 27 years. So, the Regime of Promotion and Development became the substitute for it just after the reversion.

Another role of the regime, according to Shimabukuro (2009), is to keep the base issue away from the municipalities' requests on the promotion and development and public works. The Okinawa Development Agency did not work for projects based on base reduction plan. After the schoolgirl rape in 1995, governor Ota challenged the regime, but he failed to be reelected. He was criticized and made responsible for the recession: the government stopped the flow of public finance because Ota challenged the central government, the critics said.

Because the government could not start construction of the new base in Henoko for nearly 10 years, a new subsidy on the Realignment of the U.S. Forces was introduced in 2007. If municipalities were cooperative to the realignment, then the Defense Minister would give the green light for subsidies. If not, there would be no subsidies. In ther words this was a typical carrot and stick approach.

"Compensation politics" (Calder 2007) is a policy of distributing benefits to who would accept the government's requests. A network of beneficiaries, called the subsidy circle, includes construction companies, the trade union of base workers, an electric company, and land owners. Given the financial difficulties of the central government, and given the introduction of the new subsidy on the Realignment of the U.S. Forces aka political conditionality, *compensation politics* may not be functioning any longer.



Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government (2010a)

Figure 9: Ratio of Base Related Revenue to Gross Prefectural Income, 1972-2007 (%).

Base Related Revenue Dependency

Base related revenue has increased over some thirty years since 1972, while its proportion of gross prefectural income decreased during the same period. U.S. forces related revenue was 78 billion yen in 1972, and it increased to more than 200 billion yen in 2007. The prefectural government admits that it is still a large source of revenue, and an important factor for the prefecture's economic activities (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004). It should be noted clearly, however, that base-related revenue dependency is decreasing. When we examine the ratio of U.S. forces related revenue, it was 15% of gross prefectural income in 1972 and it decreased to around 5% in 2007. During the same period, tourism revenue increased from 6% to 11%.

The picture is different when we look at the municipalities, instead of the prefecture as a whole. The dependency of some municipalities on base-related revenue (% in their total revenues) has been growing lately. It is especially clear among these municipalities in the middle and the north of Okinawa. Surprisingly, many of these municipalities suffer from a higher unemployment rate than average Okinawan municipalities (11.9% in 2005). In other words, base-related revenue dependency does hurt the local economy, instead of promising economic development.

	Dependency	Revenue	Base Related	Unemployment
Ginoza	45.3%	7.50 BY	3.39 BY	7.2%
Kin	33.2%	7.65 BY	2.54 BY	12.1%
Onna	28.0%	6.77 BY	1.89 BY	7.8%
Kadena	19.2%	9.83 BY	1.89 BY	17.5%
Chatan	17.0%	10.39 BY	1.77 BY	11.4%
Yomitan	13.1%	12.73 BY	1.67 BY	12.4%
Nago	11.6%	26.56 BY	3.09 BY	12.5%
Kitanakagusuku	9.9%	5.75 BY	0.57 BY	13.8%
Urasoe	9.7%	34.00 BY	3.29 BY	12.0%
Tonaki	9.5%	1.25 BY	0.12 BY	6.9%

Source: Miyata (2008)

Figure 10: Base-Related Revenue Dependency (%, billion yen).

Some even argue that the reduction of bases would in fact lead to economic development. Here are two examples: one is economic success with the base removal, the other is the economic downturn with base dependency (Maedomari 2009).

In 1981 the town of Chatan reclaimed 66 hectares from a base. It took 20 years, but now they have higher tax revenue, more economic spin-offs, and more employment.

The city of Nago decided to accept the building of the new marine base in Henoko in 1997. Its base-related revenue was 2 billion yen in 1995, while it increased to 9 billion yen in 2001. The rate of base-related revenue in the city budget was 6% in 1997, and it increased to 29% in 2001. But, the unemployment rate worsened from 8.7% in 1995 to 12.5% in 2005. Revenue from corporate tax did not change much. The city's debt increased from 17 billion yen to 24 billion yen in 2004.

The promotion and development regime and *compensation politics* have been working as the mechanism for keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa. The Okinawan people have been trapped in this mechanism, because it is hard for them to free themselves from development as an ideology.

But it is not for sure that *compensation politics* will continue forever. One of the signs is the election of Nago city assembly members in September 2010. Sixteen out of twenty-seven seats were occupied by those members who agree with the mayor, who repeatedly says "There should be no new base in Henoko." It sounds like they are saying, "No, *compensation politics* doesn't work in Nago anymore."

Conclusion: Implications for Human Security Discourse

This paper describes human insecurity in Okinawa. The security of most Okinawans is threatened more by the government imposing a burden of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on them than by threats of armed attack by other countries. For Japan and the Japanese, the world may be becoming more peaceful through such policy choice, but it is no consolation to people suffering human insecurity in Okinawa.

Reframing security in human terms will have profound consequences for how we see the world and how we make choices in public and foreign policy. Applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a developed country, this paper draws the following implications for human security discourse.

(1) The state as a source of insecurity: Barry Buzan said, "Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be

threatened through their state as a result of its interactions with other states in the international system" (Buzan 1983: 364). In this paper, we saw a typical case in the Okinawan context.
(2) Human insecurity as a cost for national security: Kozue Akibayashi said, “We were made to believe that we have to have a military base in order to be secure.” But the resulting effect is contrary to the intention of the military presence. “The military actually creates a situation that gives us insecurity, especially in areas where a foreign military is stationed for a long time,” Akibayashi said (Marianas Variety (Guam), January 29, 2008). Governor Nakaima's answer in the Prefectural Assembly reminds us that human insecurity in Okinawa is a cost for the national security of Japan.
(3) Economic inequality as an instrument to control local government: Cooley and Marten (2006) argue that "the Japanese government's unique system of 'burden payments' provides incentives to Okinawans both to highlight the negative effects of the U.S. presence and to support the continuation of the bases for economic reasons." While a carrot-and-stick policy is not a new thing, economic insecurity in Okinawa is utilized as an instrument to control the local government through *compensation politics* and the subsidies for promoting the Roadmap for Realignment.
(4) Agencies for human security: Their anti-base movement in Henoko and other parts of Okinawa, with the global linkage of civil societies, could function as agencies for human security in Okinawa. "Shifting the focus of security away from preoccupations of military might, ... allows civil society to become an integral part of the system of human protection, not simply the state" (Blaney and Pasha 1993).

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Local Issues and Global Alliances:
US Military Bases and the Save the Dugong Movement in Okinawa

At the end of the Battle of Okinawa,
Mountains were burnt. Villages were burnt. Pigs were burnt.
Cows were burnt. Chickens were burnt.
Everything on the land was burnt.
What was left for us to eat then?
It was the gift from the ocean.
How could we return our gratitude to the ocean
By destroying it?[1]

Okinawa maybe regarded as one of the most dynamic places in terms of civic activities in Japan. The "community of protest" (Tanji 2003) is renowned for the powerful peace, anti-military bases and anti-war movement dating back to the 1950s, of which the All Island Land Struggle (*shimagurumi tōsō*) in the 1950s, or the Return to Motherland Movement (*sokoku fukki undō*) in the 1960s, were the most influential (Arasaki 1996; Kerr 2004). At present, the annual events of the April Peace March organized since 1978, or the human chain surrounding the fences of Futenma (11.5 km) and of Kadena (17 km) airbases, each time draw substantial numbers of participants. Therefore, it might seem only natural that the local civil society there would be very active. The reality is more complicated. The groups are indeed very active but their relationship with the state authorities has been of a very conflictual nature. This article discusses the methods employed by the civic groups in challenging state policies and the implications of such actions.

Okinawan Civil Society

The official statistical data on Okinawa prefecture by the Cabinet Office shows that as of December 2010, among 41,619 non-profit organizations (NPOs) registered in Japan in 47 Japanese prefectures, Okinawa ranks somewhere in the middle, in 26th position, with a total number of 458 groups registered as NPOs (Naikakufu 2011).[2] It ranks below such

[1] A poem displayed in the tent village in Henoko (Kikuno 2009).
[2] The groups are registered under the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities (Tokutei Hieiri Katsudō Sokushinhō) of 1998, and supplemented by another law in 2001. The law

prefectures as Kumamoto and Kagoshima. As for environmental groups, the same data reveals that there are just 156 registered groups in Okinawa, of some 12,003 registered nationally.

The 22nd June 23 International Anti-War Okinawa Meeting Working Committee (Dai 22-kai 6-23 Kokusai Hansen Okinawa Shūkai Jikkō Iinkai Sanka dantai)	1. Association of One Feet Film Movement for Okinawa Battle Record (NPO Public Corporation); 2. Anti-War Land Owners Association; 3. One Tsubo Anti-War Landowners Association; 4. Okinawa Democratic Council; 5. Ginowan Citizens Association to Remove Futenma Airbase and Eliminate Noise Pollution; 6. Ginowan City Employees Labor Union; 7. Itoman Citizens Association to Protect Peace and Life; 8. Ryūkyū Archipelago Activities Center to Make Peace; 9. Ginowan Seminar House; 10. Okinawa Prefecture Council to Propagate Constitution; 11. Okinawa Human Rights Association; 12. Shimajiri Network Against Heliport Base; 13. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence; 14. United Church of Christ in Japan Okinawa District Mission Committee; 15. Association for Civic Solidarity Between Okinawa and Korea Through Movement Opposing the US Military Bases; 16. Okinawa Peace Network; 17. Okinawa YWCA[3]
Working Committee Against the construction of the Heliport in Henoko (Henoko e no Kichi Kensetsu o Yurusanai Jikkō Iinkai)	1. All Japan Network for Japan-Korean Civic Solidarity; 2. Asian Wide Campaign Japan Committee; 3. Nakano Joint Action Against War; 4. Nuchi dō Takara Network; 5. Meiji University Komadai Literary Association; 6. Action Committee for New Anti US-Japan Security Alliance Movement; 7. Nippon Sanmyō Hōji; 8. Save the Dugong Campaign Center; 9. Association to Protect the Northernmost Dugong; 10. No Against Constitutional Revision! Civic Liaison Committee; 11. Hahei Check Editorial Committee; 12. Support for Anger of Uchinanchu! Mitama Civic Association; 13. No to Bases! All Japan Women's Network; 14. US-Japan Security Alliance – Okinawa Joint Struggle Committee; 15. Labor Movement Activists Council; 16. Anti US-Japan Alliance Workers Forum. 17. Association to Preserve Pace Constitution, Eliminate US-Japan Security Alliance and Military Bases, Tōkyō; 18. Association for Peaceful Okinawa without Bases; 19. Association of Okinawa Citizens, Youth Section in Tōkyō; 20. Okinawa Culture Forum; 21. National Christian Council Japan (NCC) Peace and Nuclear Issues Committee; 22. National Christian Council Japan (NCC) Women's Committee; 23. No to Rape!

differentiates between a "licensed public corporation NPO" (*nintei NPO hōjin*) eligible for preferential taxation and *ninshō NPO hōjin*, or a "registered public corporation NPO." Due to formal obstacles, only 190 groups have been granted the former status as of January 2011 (Kokuzeichō 2011), among 41,619 non-profit organizations in Japan registered as of December 2010 (Naikakufu 2011).

[3] 1. 沖縄戦記録フィルム１フィート運動の会; 2. 反戦地主会; 3. 一坪反戦地主会; 4. 沖縄民衆会議; 5. 普天間飛行場撤去及び騒音を追放する宜野湾市民の会; 6. 宜野湾市職員労働組合; 7. 糸満平和と暮らしを守る市民の会; 8. 平和をつくる琉球弧活動センター; 9. ぎのわんセミナーハウス; 10. 沖縄県憲法普及協議会; 11. 沖縄人権協会; 12. ヘリ基地は許さない島尻ネットワーク; 13.基地軍隊を許さない行動する女たちの会; 14. 日本キリスト教団沖縄教区宣教部委員会; 15. 米軍基地に反対する運動をとおして沖縄と韓国の民衆の連帯をめざす会; 16. 沖縄平和ネットワーク; 17. 沖縄ＹＷＣＡ.

	No to Bases! Women's Association; 24. Civic Organization for Consideration of Okinawa; 25. Shinjuku Association to Promote Peace Constitution; 26. Grassroot Movement to Eliminate US Military Bases from Okinawa, Japan; 27. Tokyo Prefecture Headquarter of I Women Council; 28. Eliminate US-Japan Security Alliance! Chōchin Demonstration Association; 29. Peace Circle Tōkyō Network; 30. Peace Circle Mitama Network; 31. Association Opposing Heliport in Nago; 32. Don't Cooperate In and Don't Allow War! Nerima Action; 33. Hongyō Culture Forum Workers' School (HOWS); 34. People's Plan Study Group; 35. Asian Peace Alliance (APA) Japan; 36. Tōkyō Prefecture School Union; 37. Peace News; 38. Women's Democratic Club 'Femin'; 39. Okinawa One Tsubo Anti-War Landowners Association Kantō Block.[4]

Note: To avoid confusion, the names of the organizations are given in Japanese in the footnote.

Table 1. Examples of Civic Groups in Okinawa,

However, the statistics for the Okinawa prefecture is highly misleading. As the case of Okinawa prefecture will demonstrate, a large number of environmental protection, peace, anti-war and anti-military base groups are not officially registered. Those protest and anti-governmental policy movements, which I have named, "citizen-centered networks" of NGOs are structurally and functionally different from the "government-centered groups," that are groups operating in "symbiotic" relations with the state (Reimann 2003: 298-315), on both local and national levels, and very often depend on them for funding. The general goals of both types are similar, such as for instance environmental protection, but the methods of achieving the goals are substantially different. Okinawa presents an ample case of citizen-centered types of activities.

[4] 1. 日韓民衆連帯全国ネットワーク; 2. アジア共同行動日本連絡会議; 3. 戦争に反対する中野共同行動; 4. 命どぅ宝ネットワーク; 5. 明治大学駿台文学会; 6. 新しい反安保行動をつくる実行委員会; 7. 日本山妙法寺. 8. ジュゴン保護キャンペーンセンター; 9. 北限のジュゴンを見守る会; 10. 許すな！憲法改悪・市民連絡会; 11. 派兵チェック編集委員会; 12. うちなんちゅの怒りとともに！三多摩市民の会; 13. 基地はいらない！女たちの全国ネット; 14. 安保—沖縄共闘委; 15. 労働運動活動者評議会; 16. 反安保労働者講座. 17. 平和憲法を守り、日米安保と軍事基地をなくす会・東京; 18. 基地のない平和な沖縄をめざす会; 19. 東京沖縄県人会青年部; 20. 沖縄文化講座; 21. 日本キリスト教協議会（ＮＣＣ）平和・核問題委員会; 22. 日本キリスト教協議会（ＮＣＣ）女性委員会; 23. ＮＯ！レイプＮＯ！ベース女たちの会; 24. 沖縄を考える市民の会; 25. 平和憲法を生かす新宿の会; 26. 沖縄・日本から米軍基地をなくす草の根運動; 27. I 女性会議東京都本部; 28. 安保をつぶせ！ちょうちんデモの会; 29. ピースサイクル東京ネット; 30. ピースサイクル三多摩ネット; 31. 名護ヘリポート基地に反対する会; 32. 戦争に協力しない！させない！練馬アクション; 33. 本郷文化フォーラムワーカーズスクール(HOWS）; 34. ピープルズプラン研究所; 35. アジア平和連合（ＡＰＡ）ジャパン; 36. 東京都学校ユニオン; 37. ピース・ニュース; 38. ふぇみん婦人民主クラブ; 39. 沖縄・一坪反戦地主会関東ブロック

To give the most obvious example, none of the total of seventeen local environmental groups and one out of three national groups involved in the Save the Dugong movement, discussed in detail below, are not included in the statistics. Some indication of the scale of groups related both to the peace, anti-military base and anti-war movements, and also the environmental protection movements active in Okinawa can be seen in the number of participants in such events as the June 23 International Anti-War Okinawa Meeting (6-23 Kokusai Hansen Okinawa Shūkai) organized in June 2005 by 17 groups, or the Working Committee Against the construction of the Heliport in Henoko (Henoko e no Kichi Kensetsu o Yurusanai Jikkō Iinkai) joined as of April 2010 by 39 groups (Henoko e no Kichi Kensetsu o Yurusanai Jikkō Iinkai 2010), all of them listed in Table 1. As aforementioned, none of those groups is registered under Japan's NPO Law.

Save the Dugong Movement

The beginning of the environmental movement focused on saving the Okinawa Dugong can be traced back to 1996 when the governments of Japan and the US agreed upon the relocation of the Futenma Air Station from Ginowan City, and the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) within the prefectural borders in five to seven years. It is worth mentioning that Okinawa hosts close to 75% of all exclusive-use US military installations located in Japan (Map 1).



Map 1. US military bases in Okinawa.

Among those installations, the Futenma Air Station (formally, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, MCAS Futenma) in Ginowana city is the biggest US airbase outside US territory, covering 480 hectares of land, hosting approximately 4,000 marines, and with a runway measuring 2,740m x 45m – all in the densely populated center of Ginowan city (Photo 1).



Photograph 1. Futenma Air Station in Ginowan city.

The second important date for the movement was 1997, when the Nago city referendum on constructing the FRF (a military airport) in the area took place, and the majority of voters (52.85%) expressed their opposition to it. For the relocation and construction of a new airport, the coastal area of Henoko in the eastern part of Nago city in northern Okinawa was chosen, although particular plans for the FRF construction proposed by the Japanese government have changed over time.

The first plan, the "Sea-Based Facility" (SBF) (1,500m x 700m) off the shore of Henoko was proposed in 1997. The SBF was to be constructed by using either the Pontoon Type method or the Pile Supported Pier Type method. The plan was rejected by the Governor of Okinawa after the aforementioned Nago city referendum held in December 1997. The second plan, the "Military-Civilian Airport" (2,500m x 730m) also located off the shore of Henoko was proposed in July 2000. The plan required massive landfill atop coral reefs and seagrass beds. It was strongly opposed by the environmental and peace, anti-base and anti-war movement groups discussed below, whose actions led to the plan being halted. The third plan,

the New Coastal Plan (2m x 1,800m runways) for Camp Schwab (Henoko Point and Oura Bay), also opposed by the aforementioned groups, was presented in October 2005 (photo 2). The Mayor of Nago city agreed upon it in April 2006, and the plan was then incorporated into the "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" announced on May 1, 2006. The Plan requires the landfilling of both the coral reef shallows in the waters of Henoko and the seafloor slopes in Oura Bay, setting the completion of the construction for 2014. After the completion of the FRF, military training exercises using helicopters, vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft Ospreys, and fixed-wing aircrafts will take place at the site. Moreover, the authorities mentioned the possibility of the construction of a pier for military ships in conjuncture with the FRF in Oura Bay (WWF Japan 2006).

Photograph 2. The planned V-shap runway at Henoko.

The problem of the relocation to the northern area near Henoko on Okinawa Island is, however, that the construction of the planned FRF and subsequent military training with aircrafts and movements of ships in the costal area will adversely affect the natural environment. The new airport is to be constructed on a reclaimed site over coral reefs and seagrass beds, which have been the resting and feeding areas for Okinawa's dugongs. The Okinawa dugong (*Dugong dugon*) is a genetically isolated marine, herbivorous mammal (Photo 3), whose numbers in Okinawa are estimated to be less than 50 (The Mammalogical Society of Japan 2000). The dugong has been enlisted as a "Natural Monument" under Japan's Cultural Properties Protection Law since 1972, as an endangered species in the Red Data Book of the Japan's Ministry of Environment, as well as a cultural monument by the Ryukyu authorities since 1955. The animal is also listed

under the US Endangered Species Act, which is of importance due to the later undertaking by some groups of the discussed movement.

Photo 3. A dugong.

Structure of the Movement

The government decision on the FRF construction in Henoko and the organization of the referendum spurred the formation of several environmental groups both in Okinawa and on mainland Japan with the aim to oppose the government's policy.

The movement consists of a network of small groups, which cooperate with each other on particular projects. The first *Joint Declaration to Save the Dugong and Protect Yambaru Against Construction of an Offshore US Military Base and Inland Helipads* released in January 2000 was signed by five local groups: Save the Dugong Fund, Shiraho Reef Protection Society, Okinawa Environmental Network, Yambaru Wildlife Appreciation Society, Full Moon Festival Peace Group and supported by the international World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

From the very beginning the local environmental groups, faced with strong opposition from the national government, sought support from national and international organizations. The list of groups, shown in Table 2, includes groups both on a local and a national level, as well as international organizations that are presently involved in various activities to save the dugong. The movement has been joined by many peace, anti-military base, anti-war, and women's groups, which are listed in Table 1. As aforementioned, the Working Committee Against the construction of the Heliport in Henoko is joined by 39 groups from various fields of activities.

To sum up, the movement has not evolved as one big organization but has functioned as a network of groups and organizations of different

organizational capacity and scope, cooperating on the bases of individual projects.

Name	Place	Established	Legal status
LOCAL LEVEL			
1. Okinawa Dugong Environmental Assessment Surveillance Group	Naha	2003	
2. Okinawa Environment Network	Naha	1997	
3. Okinawa Dugong House	Nago	2000	
4. Okinawa Civic Peace Liaison Committee (Civic Liaison Committee for Eliminating Bases from Okinawa and Promoting World Peace	Naha	1999	
5. Okinawa Reefcheck and Research Group	Naha?	1997	
6. Dugong Network Okinawa (former Love Dugong Network)	Naha	1997	
7. Dugong Home	Nago	2000	
8. Save the Dugong Foundation	Nago	1999	
9. Association to Protect Northernmost Dugong	Nago, Tokyo	1999	
10. Association of 10 Districts Against Bases North of Futami	Nago	1997	
11.Association to Protect Life	Henoko	1996	
12. Association to Protect Sea of Shiraho and Yaeyama	Ishikawa city	1996	
13. Association to Appreciate Yambaru Nature	Nishihara town		
NATIONAL LEVEL			
14. Save the Dugong Campaign Center	Tokyo	2001	
15. Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation	Nagoya, Osaka	1996	
16. The Nature Conservation Society of Japan, Henoko Jangusa Watch	Tokyo	1951	Foundation (*zaidan hōjin*)
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL			
17. Green Peace Japan, Save the Dugong in Okinawa	Tokyo	1989	Public corporation NPO (NPO hōjin)
18. WWF Japan, Japan Dugong Protection	Tokyo	1971	Foundation (*zaidan hōjin*)
19. Reef Check Japan (Coral Network)	Tokyo	1997	
20. International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Japan Committee	Tokyo	1980	
21. United Nations Environmental Program, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific	Bangkok		

Table 2. List of Environmental Groups that are part of the Save the Dugong Movement.

Activities

The main activities of the environmental groups directed at saving the dugong include the initiation of various campaigns and programs, the organization of symposiums, seminars, conferences, writing petitions and collecting signs, lobbying activities at the local (Nago municipality, Okinawa prefecture), national (Japanese government) and international level (US government, UN). They also participate in international academic conferences building international support and solidarity for the movement.

Protests also take the form of sit-ins on Henoko's shore, which are to monitor and keep daily surveillance over the area in order to stop a boring survey of soil samples from the sea bottom, where the new base is to be built. The survey has been carried out by the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (NDFAB), the Okinawa branch of the National Defense Facilities Administration Agency. The sit-in protests were initiated in 2004 by Henoko's "Society for the Protection of Life," Nago's "Association to Oppose the Heliport Base," and the "Okinawa Citizens Network for Peace" which comprises 33 peace, human rights, environment, and women's groups and they have continued until the present day. For the purpose of coordinating the monitoring of the Henoko shore, these groups established the "Okinawa Dugong Environmental Assessment Monitors Group" (Monitors Group) (Yuki 2004).[5]

A very interesting and dramatic account of how the protest started and has continued is given by Kikuno Yumiko (2009), who visited the site and interviewed participants:

> On April 19, 2004, the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau (DFAB) tried to proceed with construction, but approximately 70 people erected a sit-in human barricade to keep dump trucks from passing through. At 5 a.m. on September 19, 2004, approximately 400 activists gathered and prepared for a confrontation with riot police. The DFAB learned of the sit-in and decided to access the site by going through Camp Schwab, chartering fishing boats from Henoko fishermen (whom they paid exceedingly well), and setting out to sea rather than risk confronting the barricade.
>
> The battle subsequently moved from the land to the sea. The anti-base activists attempted to stop the DFAB from setting up scaffolding towers to conduct the drilling – their plan being to drill at a rate of 63

[5] This organisation has also been joined by some prefectural and municipal assembly representatives and members of political parties.

borings per year. The activists set out to sea in canoes, surrounding the buoy markers, an hour before the construction workers started their workday. Despite repeated attempts over a two-month period to halt underwater surveying, four towers were completed. After that, some activists took to wrapping their bodies with a chain and locking themselves to the motor set on top of the tower in an attempt to interrupt the operation. In the course of this resistance some of the protesters, including one woman in her fifties, were pushed off the top of the scaffolding tower and were injured.

In November 2004, about 20 neighboring fishing boats joined the protesters. This support was a big help in interrupting the drilling. Activists in their fishing boats and canoes had to maintain a presence around the scaffold tower from 4 a.m. to 5 p.m. They covered themselves with straw mats to keep warm on the frigid waters. It was especially hard for women to spend long hours on the ocean without going to the bathroom, so they often participated without consuming any water.

DFAB commenced night shifts starting in April 2005 and since that time protesters have had to spend 24 hours a day hanging on to the towers. Activists are unable to leave the towers even for a minute, for if they do, DFAB crews would jump in and start working. Activists, consciously adhering to the principle of non-violent civil disobedience, have ensured they are already in place each day before DFAB crews arrive in order to avoid an altercation. At one point, activists remained on the towers for a 50-day period, alternating two 12-hour shifts. In the meantime, other anti-base organizations in Okinawa visited the Naha DFAB office many times in an attempt to convince officers to cease night-time operations, which posed a danger to DFAB workers and protesters alike. Night shifts were also keeping dugongs away from their feeding area. As a result of the protesters' unwavering campaign, the Government finally abandoned the plan to build an offshore air station on October 29, 2005. The number of people who participated in the campaign totalled 60,000, including 10,000 who protested at sea.

Among the environmental groups, the activities of the Association to Protect Northernmost Dugong (APND) with offices in Nago city and Tokyo presents an exemplary case of the types of activities the groups undertake in cooperation with each other. As Table 3 shows, the APND: publishes a quarterly newsletter in Japanese, maintains a very informative

homepage with information both in Japanese and English; organizes symposiums, seminars, workshops, and events; writes about protests and collects signatures in support of the movement; participates in international conferences; conducts surveys in cooperation with specialists from the US and the Philippines; cooperates with other environmental and peace movement groups, including the above mentioned sit-ins in Henoko. For its activities, the organization has been granted several prestigious awards: the Patagonia Environmental Grants Program in 2006, 2007 and 2008, the Conservation Alliance Japan Grant in 2006 and 2007, the Takagi Fund for Citizen Science in 2007 and 2008, the Pro Natura Fund in 2004, which, except individual donations, constitute the financial bases for activities.

Type of activity	Content of activity
Providing information	Website: http://sea-dugong.org/ (Japanese, English) Quarterly newsletter in Japanese
Conferences, symposiums, seminars, workshops	□ Friday Seminars: A 12 series dugong forum, discussions led by invitees from various fields in nature conservation. □ Dugong Café: A yearly setting for anyone to participate in talks about dugong. □ "Okinawa's Nature in Danger Now": A biyearly symposium held in cooperation with other nature conservation groups. □ Lecture by dr. Ellen Hines (San Francisco State University), the expert on dugongs in Asia, in Tokyo and Okinawa (January 2005). □ Open seminars in Okinawa with dr. Hines and dr. Lemnuel Aragones (University of Philippines), the experts on dugongs and seagrasses, on biology and ecology of dugongs and on the field survey methods (November 2006). □ Workshops on the future of dugong conservation and the survey plans by dr. Toshio Kasuya, the Japanese dugong scientist, and dr. Hines and dr. Aragones (June, 2007).
International conferences	□ The first international symposium on dugongs in Okinawa (April, 2000). □ The Fifth IUCN World Parks Congress in Durban, South Africa (September, 2003): appeal for the need of nature conservation in Okinawa. □ The 9th International Mammalogical Congress in Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan (July, 2005): Poster presentations on the history and culture of the dugongs in Okinawa. □ The 16th Biennial Conference on the Biology of Marine Mammals in San Diego, California, USA (December, 2005): Appeal for international supports concerning potential impact of the proposed Futemma Replacement Facilities (FRF) on the Okinawan dugongs and their habitats. □ Presentation on current state of the dugongs in Okinawa at a seminar held by the Center for Biological Diversity in California, USA (February 2006).
Surveys	□ Cultural and historical surveys: Field research in the region from Yaeyama Islands to Okinawa's main island and literature research, from October 2004, to explore the historical and cultural significance of the dugongs in Okinawa. The findings documented in a booklet. □ Feeding trail surveys: The survey initiated in November 2006 and is ongoing in cooperation with the local residents of Okinawa. Regular monitoring of the feeding trails and the adjacent seagrasses to predict the

	dugongs' population status and to understand their habitat environment. The survey methods by dr. Ellen Hines (San Francisco State University) and dr. Lemnuel Aragones (University of Philippines), who visited the field and participated in the preliminary survey.
Appeals and protests	□ Participation in the protest at Henoko, the proposed FRF site, since April 2004, to urge protection of the dugongs in Okinawa. □ Policy recommendations, opinions and protest letters to the Government of Japan. □ International Petition campaign to Protect the dugong in Okinawa (2002-2007) 13,479 signatures from 84 countries.
Events	□ Eco-Products and Earth Day: Participation in the annual exhibition to raise public awareness about the dugongs in Okinawa. □ Junior United Nations Environment Conference (2003, 2004): organization of workshops on the species extinction and the significance of the regional ecosystems for children. □ Patagonia's Speaker Series (2006, 2008): presentations. □ Ribbon Messages Action (2006): In cooperation with BEE (Bicycle for Everyone's Earth), the environmental education activists, collecting messages for the protection of the Okinawan dugongs and nature from other parts of the Japan (the total length of the ribbons approx. 750 m).

Source: Based on data available at: http://sea-dugong.org/english/index.html (2008.07.31).

Table 3. Activities of the Association to Protect the Northernmost Dugong (APND).

International Coalition-building Activities

One of the methods employed by the groups aimed at stopping the airport construction and saving the Okinawa dugongs was building a broader, international coalition. It included a variety of actions, such as cooperation with international organizations, the participation of specialists from foreign institutions, the publication of articles and advertisements in American newspapers, such as an advertisement in the *Washington Post* on April 28, 2010, by JUCON/NO[6] (Photo 4) to appeal to the international public, as well as sending petitions and appeals to international institutions to put pressure on both the Japanese and American governments, as well as public opinion in both countries.

The international efforts of the groups brought important results. On October 10, 2000, the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) adopted a recommendation titled *Conservation of Okinawan Dugong* (*Dugong dugon*), *Okinawa Woodpecker* (*Sapheopipo noguchii*), *and Okinawa Rail* (*Galirallus okinawae*) *in Japan*[7] at the World

[6] Japan-US Citizens for Okinawa Network (JUCON) and a Network for Okinawa (NO) – a coalition of Okinawa and Japan-based NGOs, citizens groups, journalists and prominent individuals.

[7] All the three species are enlisted as endangered: the dugong as critically endangered according to

Conservation Congress in Amman, Jordan, and again at the third session in Bangkok, Thailand, held on November 17-25, 2004, which urged the US and Japanese governments to undertake special measures for the protection of dugongs. Furthermore, in February 2002, the United Nations Environmental Programme, Department of Early Warning and Assessment (UNEP/DEWA) released a report *Dugong Status Report and Action Plans for Countries and Territories* that further urged the Japanese government to designate dugong habitats as marine-protected areas, as well as to apply domestic laws to dugongs (e.g. Law for the Conservation of Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna). It also recommended that both the Japanese and US authorities conduct an environmental impact assessment based on international standards.



Photograph 4. Advertisement in the *Washington Post* on April 28, 2010.

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the Mammalogical Society of Japan, 1997, and the Red Data Book by Japan's Ministry of the Environment, 2007, the Okinawa woodpecker – also critically endangered, and the Okinawa rail – as endangered according to Japan's Ministry of the Environment, both listed in 2002.

In the eyes of the environmental groups, the Japanese government did not respond in a satisfactory manner (also abstaining from signing the IUCN recommendation in 2004), which resulted in yet another action, this time under the US judicial system in the American courts.

The Legal Battle in the US Courts

Japanese environmental groups, in an unprecedented manner, brought a lawsuit in the US court against the US Department of Defense (Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld C-03-4350) (Taira 2008). The suit was filed on September 25, 2003 by a coalition of conservation groups from Japan and the US in the US District Court in San Francisco over plans to construct a new heliport facility on a coral reef off the east coast of Okinawa. The plaintiffs stated that they were concerned that the proposed airbase which was to be built on reclaimed land over a coral reef in Henoko would destroy the remaining habitat of the endangered Okinawa dugong, a mammal, which also plays an important role in Okinawan mythology and culture (The US and Japanese Conservation Groups Join in Legal Efforts to Save Okinawa Dugong from Extinction). They also argued that the US Department of Defense violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966, which bans any US government projects, including overseas, that would harm properties of historical and cultural significance. Furthermore, the plaintiffs demanded the DoD comply with the NHPA, by conducting a complete public analysis to assess the impacts of the proposed project on the Okinawa dugong. The NHPA requires agencies of the US government to conduct a full public process before undertaking activities outside the United States that might impact the cultural and natural resources of other nations.

The plaintiffs bringing the lawsuit included both Japanese and American actors, interestingly including also the Okinawa dugong, and besides: three individual Japanese citizens, and six American and Japanese associations: the Center for Biological Diversity and the Turtle Island Restoration Network in US, Dugong Network Okinawa, Save the Dugong Foundation, Committee Against Heliport Construction – Save Life Society, and the Japan Environmental Lawyers Federation, all of which are represented by the American foundation of environmental lawyers, Earthjustice.[8]

[8] After the examination of the plaintiffs, the dugong and two of the associations were found lacking while standing for litigation and dismissed. As a consequence only three individuals (Takuma Higashionna of Save the Dugong Foundation, Okinawa, Yoshikazu Makishi of Okinawa Environmental Network, and Anna Koshishi), and four associations (Save the Dugong Foundation, Okinawa, Center for Biological Diversity, Turtle Island Restoration Network, Japan Environmental

The court order issued on March 2, 2005 stated that the Okinawa dugong did indeed constitute a historically significant "property," rejecting the DoD's claim against it. As a result, the court decision became the first NHPA application to a U.S. government project abroad.

On January 24, 2008, the U.S. District Court in San Francisco granted the plaintiffs summary judgment that: (a) the US government has failed to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); (b) that "this case is held in abeyance until the information necessary for evaluating the effects of the FRF on the dugong is generated and until defendants take the information into account for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating adverse effects to the dugong"; and (c) that "defendants are ordered to submit to the court, within 90 days, documentation describing what additional information is necessary to evaluate the impacts of the FRF on the dugong; from what sources, including relevant individuals, organizations, and government agencies, the information will be derived; what is currently known or anticipated regarding the nature and scope of Japan's environmental assessment and whether that assessment will be sufficient for meeting defendants' obligations under the NHPA; and identifying the DOD official or officials with authorization and responsibility for reviewing and considering the information for purposes of mitigation." (Conclusion from the Court decision of Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, N.D.Cal., C-03-4350. Earth Justice 2008b).

This case, as pointed out by Miyume Tanji (2008: 482), "upsets the 'double standards'" applied to the US military facilities and forces in Okinawa. And hence, for instance, Futenma airbase would not satisfy US domestic safety standards, such as the DoD's Air Installation Compatible Use Zones (AICUZ) program that stipulates that areas within 4,500 meters of both ends of the runway are considered "Accident Potential Zones," and are not suitable for residential structures, schools, hospitals, and cultural facilities, which is not complied with in Ginowan city.

Furthermore, Sarah Burt of Earth Justice, who is representing plaintiffs in the lawsuit commented that this was "a significant victory for the people of Okinawa concerned with the preservation of their cultural heritage" (Earthjustice 2008a), although it has to be remembered that a court case alone will not be able to stop the construction of the FRF in Henoko.

The lawsuit concentrated only on the activities of the US government, as it was brought up in the United States, but its results might also have far-reaching consequences for the Japanese government. The dugong court case set a significant precedent.

Lawyers Foundations) became plaintiffs standing in the case.

It is of course interesting why Japanese environmental groups brought legal charges against the US government and not at home against the Japanese authorities. One might only speculate that the former means seemed most effective for achieving the particular goal of saving the dugong by way of stopping construction. The appeal to the US court seemed also more effective given the long history of Japanese courts staying out of political decisions.

Features of the Movement

The Save the Dugong movement in Okinawa presents an interesting case of civic groups' activities that have important implications for the development of civil society domestically, as well as for the regionalization process (Pempel 2005: 6) and the creation of a regional civil society.

First, the important feature of the movement is the cooperation of local and national Japanese environmental groups with international and particularly American partners rather than with regional ones.[9] The partial reason for such a situation might be the very nature of the problem, namely, the involvement of the US government in the construction of the new airport in Henoko. And yet another and probably more important reason is the lack of strong, active and strictly regional organizations comparable to the international giants of Green Peace, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) that could handle the particular issue of dugong protection. The existing regional frameworks for cooperation on environmental issues deal with particular problems of acid rain (Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in Asia or EANET), yellow dust (Tripartite Environment Ministers' Meeting or TEMM) or serve as a forum for the exchange of information and experience, and not as a general mechanism for solving regional environmental problems, particularly those opposed by the national authorities of a given country (Tsunekawa 2005: 134-148).

To give one example of the working of such a regional arrangement in the EU, is the case of a highway, which the Polish government was to build across the Rospuda valley, a designated nature reserve by the EU in 2000 (*The Herald Tribune*, April 10 and, July 30, 2007). The European

[9] A similar situation can be observed with the earlier activities of the peace, anti-base and anti-war movement. Even within Japan, the protests staged by the Okinawa local groups in the 1980s or beginning of the 1990s were dominated by local participants, while since the mid-1990s, an increasing number of participants has come from mainland Japan and abroad. See, for instance, remarks made by Yamauchi Tokushin, who organized human-chain protests around Kadena, in *The Okinawa Times*, July 21, 2000.

Commission took Poland to the European Court of Justice in March 2007, after the Polish government failed to propose an alternative route. Such a legally binding framework for environmental protection does not exist in East Asia and hence the appeal to US courts.

This pattern of connection between local-national and international organizations seems to have been predominant until recently in other fields in East Asia as well, such as for instance in trade and security (Pempel 2005: 9). It also persists in countries where national governments ignore domestic NGOs calling for environmental protection (Tsunekawa 2005: 141). Such was the case of a disastrous haze in 1997 caused by land and forest fires in Indonesia, where it was the WWF that monitored and informed the international public about the problem at the initial stage (Springer 2000: 300).

Another, interesting feature of the Save the Dugong movement is the cooperation with the anti-war, anti-military base, peace and women's groups. By propagating the 'zero-option', that is by calling to stop the construction of the FRF as a means to save the dugongs and their habitats, the environmental groups found new allies in the peace and women's movements that has a very long tradition of activity in Okinawa. The environmental groups gained particularly from the organizational experience of the peace movement, while for the latter, the cooperation helped transform it from a narrowly defined peace and security oriented to a more inclusive environmental protection protest, gaining them broader support from the public outside the prefecture and making the message of opposing the military bases more universal (Nakashima 2008: 77-94).

Closing Remarks

Cooperation between the local-national and international environmental groups poses questions about the effectiveness of national and regional frameworks in solving regional problems. Yet, at the present stage of East Asian integration and weakness of regional bodies, cooperation with international organizations seems to be the most effective way of achieving environmental protection goals. Moreover, it benefits national NGOs by having a learning effect on them. Environmental groups gain wider publicity and bring in new methods of protest by establishing ties with international environmental groups, which in the case of the Save the Dugong movement also included a lawsuit in an American court.

Furthermore, the groups participating in the Save the Dugong movement, by the very nature of opposing the government's policy, belong to the type of citizen-centered and anti-governmental groups, and as such are not

supported by the funds or other means that governmental agencies receive. The gross majority of them are also not registered under the NPO Law. This aspect of citizen-centered groups has to be taken into consideration when discussing the state of Japan's national and regional civil society.

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Japanese Minorities and The Question of Citizenship: The Case of The Ainu, Koreans and Okinawans

This paper discusses the situation of minorities in Japan from the perspective of citizenship. I use the term 'citizenship' as defined by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall, who extended its definition beyond the political and legal status and recognized its three aspects: the political, the civil and the social. Whereas political citizenship means the right to active participation in political life, civil citizenship denotes freedom of speech, thought and religion, and the right to property and justice. The last one, social citizenship, upholds the right to security, to economic welfare and to the life of a "civilised being as determined by the standards prevailing in the society" (Marshall 1950: 10). The three aspects are mutually interwoven: a lack of political citizenship often determines one's economic status and vice versa, rich people enjoy greater power in politics. But the point is that citizenship denotes not only passive status, but also dynamic participation; it is not only about rights, but also about having an ability to exercise one's rights. Hence the problems of marginalization lie often not in the sphere of law and paragraphs, but in social relations.

What Japanese minorities share in common is that they are in various ways disadvantaged in terms of citizenship. The most drastic case is that of Zainichi Koreans[1] who have been living in Japan for four generations without legal citizenship, being thus barred from social privileges protected by the citizenship proviso. The Ainu, *burakumin*, and Okinawans still have to cope with the legacy of social marginalization and, as Japanese citizens, cannot fully enjoy all rights and privileges they are entitled to. All minorities lag behind the social mainstream in terms of access to welfare. The Ainu and *burakumin* are still under-represented among highly qualified professionals (academic teachers, lawyers, physicians, company managers etc.) and the Okinawans cannot fully exercise their civil rights, being sacrificed to the imperative of the Japanese-American alliance.

In terms of ethnic diversity, Japan is a relatively heterogeneous country, falling into the same rank as Germany, Lebanon and the Netherlands (Sugimoto 2002: 7), where minority groups make up 3-6 per cent of population. If we include the three million *buraku* people, who are

[1] *Zainichi* (lit. "residing in Japan") is a popular name for the Korean and Taiwanese diasporas in Japan. Hereafter, I use, interchangeably, the terms "Zainichi" and "Zainichi Koreans".

ethnically Japanese but treated like outcastes, the proportion of minorities may rise up to 6-8 per cent. What makes it difficult to estimate the number of minority people in Japan is that the government, with the sole exception of the Ainu, does not acknowledge the existence of any ethnic minorities and thus no statistical data is kept regarding this matter. Anyone who holds Japanese citizenship is simply considered Japanese and his/her racial or ethnic background is irrelevant (Wetherall 2008: 280-81). Zainichi are regarded as foreigners and registered as 'special permanent residents', but official statistics do not include Zainichi who chose to naturalize or who were born to Japanese-Korean families and thus inherited citizenship from a Japanese parent. There is no such category as 'Okinawan' or 'burakumin'. Consequently, no one is entitled to claim any distinctive rights based upon his/her ethnic background and the government refuses to grant any collective rights to minority people. By the some token, anyone who wishes to naturalize is expected to assimilate and cut off his/her ethnic roots. Zainichi children are free to attend Korean schools as long as they do not hold Japanese citizenship, but if they naturalize they must follow the Japanese curriculum and their right to Korean education is not recognized.

The reason why Japan stubbornly refuses to acknowledge its diversity can partially be ascribed to the myth of racial homogeneity, which prevailed in the political discourse of postwar Japan. This myth enabled the Japanese to distance themselves from their colonial past. It also became an ideological cornerstone of the economic miracle. Although during the past thirty years Japan has significantly changed its policy towards minority groups, being pressed by obligations towards international covenants on human rights, it still has not dealt with the legacy of the ideology of homogeneity.

All minorities in Japan, including the *buraku* people, claim a distinctive identity. The Ainu define themselves as 'indigenous people'. The Okinawans claim the right to nationhood as successors of the historical heritage of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and Zainichi Koreans see themselves as an ethnic minority, either as 'Korean residents in Japan' or as 'Japanese of Korean background'. What interests us is how they translate their claims into political actions. And here we can make an interesting observation. Whereas the Ainu and Koreans demand recognition as an ethnic minority, this is not necessarily the case with the Okinawans. The Ainu and Zainichi demand not only official recognition, but also collective rights that would respect their peculiar position in Japanese society. In that sense they challenge the notion of Japanese citizenship in which the idea of homogeneity is embedded. The Okinawans, on the other hand, seem to be not interested in bargaining for any collective rights. The main objective of

their fight is to force the Japanese authorities to respect their constitutional rights. In other words, they do not demand any rights as Okinawans, but want to be treated equally like other ordinary citizens. In that sense they do not pose any threat to the institution of homogenous citizenship.

The Zainichi

Zainichi Koreans are a legacy of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1910-1945. During the interwar period, thousands of Korean economic migrants arrived each year in Japan with the hope of starting a better life. Hundred of thousands of conscripts arrived in Japan during the last years of World War II to work in mines and armaments factories. In August 1945, over two million Koreans welcomed the end of the war on Japanese soil. The majority of them returned home within the next two years, but more than 600,000 decided to stay in Japan and wait until the political situation on the peninsula was settled. The outbreak of the Korean War not only halted the repatriation process, but brought about a reverse migration. The Japanese government, on the other hand, was awaiting the moment it could deal with the problem without interference from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. In April 1952, just ten days before Japan regained sovereignty, the government issued circular no. 438, according to which all Japanese citizens with Korean or Taiwanese family registers (*koseki*) were stripped of citizenship (Kashiwazaki 2000: 22-23; Chee 1982: 21). This strengthened the institutional marginalization of the Korean community, as they became barred from jobs in public administration and denied access to social privileges protected by the citizenship proviso, such as the pension system, public housing system, preferential loans etc. The loss of citizenship complicated the situation of young Koreans, who encountered numerous obstacles in their pursuit of education. The only way to overcome these problems was to naturalize. This solution, however, was neither welcomed by the Koreans, nor sincerely promoted by the Japanese administration. The Zainichi considered naturalization as an act of national betrayal. One needs to remember that in the 1950s and 1960s many Koreans continued living with the hope that some day they would be able to return to Korea and thus they treated Japan as a temporary home. Japanese officials shared exactly the same idea: they expected the Koreans to pack their stuff and leave home – be it South or North Korea. Rather than encouraging them to naturalize, the government discretely launched a program of mass repatriation to North Korea using Red Cross channels.[2]

[2] For more about Japan's involvement in the repatriation program to North Korea see Morris-Suzuki (2007).

The Ministry of Home Affairs entrenched naturalization with various conditions, making the whole process long and humiliating for the applicant. Not only had the candidate to prove that he/she was a good citizen, but they were also expected to renounce their identity and adopt a Japanese name. Many Koreans found it unacceptable and therefore they chose to live with the status of foreigner. The two Korean organizations, Mindan and Chongryun, representing South and North Korea respectively, also discouraged Zainichi from applying for Japanese citizenship.

In 1965, Japan established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea. This improved the situation of Zainichi, whose legal status so far had been unsettled. Japan granted the Koreans unionized in Mindan the status of permanent residents. Being less vulnerable to harassment by Japanese authorities the Koreans felt more encouraged to fight for their rights. In the 1970s they began challenging the discriminatory practices of Japanese companies and public institutions. The case of Kim Kyŏng-dŭk was groundbreaking. Kim intended to become a lawyer. Having graduated from university, he applied in 1977 to the Legal Training & Research Center – an institution run by the Ministry of Justice, which every lawyer candidate in Japan must graduate from before being admitted to the bar. The school refused to admit Kim, arguing that he did not meet the formal criteria because he lacked Japanese citizenship. Although the legal profession was not protected by the citizenship proviso, the school authorities argued that students of the Center had the status of public officials, and thus no foreigners could be admitted. Kim brought the case to court and won. Later he successfully graduated from the Center and opened a private legal bureau. It should be mentioned that Kim was not the first foreigner who was admitted to the bar. There were a number of Taiwanese among Japanese lawyers, but all of them had previously naturalized. Kim had the same choice. He was advised to adopt Japanese citizenship and then to apply to the Center, but he refused (Iwasawa 1998: 165; Lee & De Vos 1981: 278-280, Lie 2008: 160).

In the 1980s the Koreans launched a campaign against being fingerprinted by the Immigration Bureau. Taking fingerprints was a standard procedure during the application for the Alien Registration Card. Such a card had to be carried by every foreign resident in Japan and its period of validity lasted only a couple of years. The Zainichi found it humiliating that each time they applied for the renewal of the card their fingerprints were taken as if they were criminals. Hence, they launched a movement of disobedience, in spite of the legal and financial consequences. Eventually, in 1993, the Japanese government canceled the requirement of taking

fingerprints from so-called “special permanent residents” – a newly invented category of foreigners, which included the Korean and Taiwanese Zainichi (Iwasawa 1998: 147-150; Neary 2002: 53, Lie 2008: 108).
In the 1980s the Zainichi raised the issue of Korean names. Japanese authorities maintained a very strict policy towards nomenclature and expected candidates for naturalization to choose a new Japanese-like name and surname. Although there was no law requiring candidates to choose a Japanese name, officials as a rule suggested applicants did so. The applicants, on the other hand, usually complied, fearing that otherwise their application might be rejected. In 1982 a group of naturalized Koreans applied for the restitution of their Korean surnames, but the court rejected their requests. In 1985, however, Japan revised the Nationality Law and the Family Registry Law, enabling Japanese citizens who married foreigners to adopt the surname of their spouses. This legitimized foreign surnames under Japanese law. Consequently, the naturalized Zainichi repeated their demands for the restitution of their surnames – this time with success (Iwasawa 1998: 138-141). Since then Zainichi have become more likely to naturalize under their original names, despite pressure from the Japanese authorities. They have successfully challenged the principle that Japanese citizens must carry Japanese names.
In the 1990s the Zainichi raised their demands for suffrage. Since they had been living in Japan for generations and paid taxes like other ordinary citizens, they argued, they should be allowed to participate in the affairs of local administration on an equal basis. In 1995 the High Court ruled that admitting foreigners to local elections would not violate the constitution, but left the decision of when to enact a new election law to the parliament. The Japanese government promised to change the election law, the South Korean government too got involved in the matter by exercising pressure on the Japanese government, but so far the issue has been shelved and not resolved (Takao 2003: 537).
In recent years the government has significantly eased the naturalization procedure for Zainichi. As a consequence, the naturalization ratio has increased and the number of people registered as “special permanent residents” is gradually decreasing. The revision of the citizenship law in 1985, which enabled children from mixed families to keep dual citizenship, also contributed to the drop in figures of the Zainichi. Yet, about 400.000 Zainichi still prefer to live with foreigner status. It should be noted that with the generation shifts during the past fifty years the attitude of Zainichi toward Korea has dramatically changed and nowadays those who consider themselves “Korean nationals” belong to the minority. Most Zainichi do

not identify themselves with either of the Korean states. They consider themselves as either members of the Korean diaspora, or being of Japanese or Korean descent. Nonetheless, they do not intend to give up their Korean identity, regardless of however they define their "Korean-ness". Whether they naturalize or decide to keep their foreigner status, they demand the Japanese state respect their Korean identity and allow them to function in Japanese society on an equal basis.[3]

The Ainu

The Ainu are the oldest minority in Japan. The Ainu's homeland originally extended over Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but due to mass relocations and repatriations following border shifts between Japan and Russia it has shrunk to Hokkaido. In the Edo Period (1600-1868) the Ainu's land lay beyond the borders of the Japanese state, but Japanese merchants vigorously exploited it for its natural resources. Commerce with the Japanese brought about tragic results for the Ainu. The Japanese made the most of their cultural and technological advancement to make the Ainu dependent on Japanese wares and consequently to subjugate them. Exploitation of the land shook Hokkaido's ecosystem and distorted the Ainu's traditional way of life.[4] By the dawn of the Meiji Era (1868-1912) Ainu communities were living in distress, plagued by illnesses and alcohol misuse. Their situation deteriorated furthermore after the Meiji state launched the program of Hokkaido's colonization.

By the end of the 19th century, the situation of the Ainu was so serious that the government acknowledged that they would soon perish unless something was done. In 1899 the government implemented the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act. Its objective was to raise the Ainu from poverty by turning them into farmers, but in reality it brought about adverse effects. The Ainu had little experience and no interest in farming, hence they quickly disposed their plots which they received from the state. In the longer term, the Protection Act only contributed to the social marginalization of the Ainu. Japanese policymakers seemed to have come to terms with the idea that the Ainu's culture was an unwanted remnant of the past and that the best solution for the Ainu was for them to assimilate and disappear in Japanese society. On the one hand they imposed a policy of Japanization, but on the other they implemented a policy of "positive segregation": Ainu children attended separate schools until 1937 (Siddle 1996: 72).

[3] For more about Zainichi identity see Chapman (2004), Ryang (2000), Lie (2008).
[4] For further reading on this subject see Walker (2001).

In comparison to other minority groups, the Ainu became politically active relatively late. The Association of Hokkaido Ainu (Hokkaidō Ainu Kyōkai) was only established in 1930. This association, which worked under the paternalistic guidance of the prefectural authorities, was headed by the Japanese official Kita Masaaki, and it focused primarily on promoting assimilation among the Ainu. Little was done to promote the protection of the Ainu's heritage. Nonetheless, the association had some achievements: it forced the government to make some revisions in the Protection Act and to abolish segregation at school.

The situation of the Ainu started improving remarkably only in the 1960s when the government launched a program of economic aid for Ainu communities. Since then, the Ainu have been lifted out of dire poverty, but nevertheless, nearly fifty years after the launch of the program, they continue to lag behind the social mainstream in nearly every social aspect (education, housing, incomes etc.). The government adopted a stance that substantial aid would be sufficient to solve the "Ainu issue" and therefore it resisted acknowledgement of the Ainu as an ethnic minority. This was quite a schizophrenic situation, as the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act of 1899 continued to be in force. Contrary to the expectations of Japanese policymakers, not only had the Ainu not given up their identity, but they had rediscovered their cultural heritage. This resulted in a revival of Ainu ethnicity. The Hokkaido Utari Association, which succeeded the Hokkaido Ainu Association in 1961, stopped looking at the government as the only partner and established closer ties with other organizations representing minorities in Japan, namely the Koreans and *burakumin*. In 1978 and 1979, Ainu leaders toured the USA and Canada, investigating the situation of North America's native people. The Ainu became more aware of their status as "indigenous people". They adopted a new political strategy, emphasizing the matter of their indigenousness. Improving their people's living conditions, of course, remained the main objective of their movement, but they began to demand that the Japanese government recognize them as indigenous people, extend institutional protection of their cultural heritage, and to acknowledge Japan's responsibility for the colonization of their ancestral land. In 1984 the Hokkaido Utari Association presented a resolution calling for the abolishment of the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and prepared a draft of a new bill. The proposal stipulated that a number of seats in the Diet and in the Hokkaido prefectural assembly would be reserved for Ainu representatives – a condition that was unacceptable for the Japanese government (Tsunemoto 2001: 122).

Having established links with organizations of indigenous people overseas, the Ainu managed to gain international sympathy and support. Nomura Giichi, an Ainu activist, represented the Ainu at the UN during the inauguration of the International Year of the World's Indigenous People in 1992. Under pressure from the international community, the Japanese government eventually acknowledged the existence of the Ainu in a report to the UN Committee on Human Rights in 1992. This, however, had no implication for domestic law.

The Ainu's cause received a positive impact after the Liberal Democratic Party lost power in 1993. In 1994 Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan Socialist Party formed a cabinet. The JSP has traditionally been more sympathetic towards Japanese minorities. Murayama assigned the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary to Igarashi Kōzō, a former mayor of the city of Asahigawa, which had a substantial Ainu community. The position of the Ainu was strengthened further when Kayano Shigeru, an Ainu scholar and politician linked to the Social Democratic Party, was elected to the parliament. The following year Japan ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This created propitious conditions for the enactment of a new Ainu law. A council of experts was formed to prepare a draft, but, as it should be emphasized, no Ainu representative was invited to join the council.

In March 1997 the government adopted the Ainu Culture Promotion Act,[5] which was enacted on the 1st of July. The new law replaced the old Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and obligated the government to undertake appropriate measures to promote Ainu culture. The law, however, did not explicitly recognize the Ainu as an ethnic minority, it speaks only about Ainu culture (the Ainu are referred to as *Ainu no hitobito*, or Ainu people, where the word *hitobito* is a plural form of "man" with no connotation of nationhood or ethnicity).[6] Naturally, it did not grant any collective rights to the Ainu. The Hokkaido Utari Association welcomed the new law, but not without criticism. The enactment of the Ainu Culture Promotion Act was a groundbreaking event, as it challenged the notion of Japan's homogeneity on legal bases, but without significant changes in the Ainu's position. As Richard Siddle (2002, 2003) noted, the Japanese state, as the main sponsor, retains the function of authorizing the shape of Ainu culture, and by doing so, it usurps the right to define "Ainu-ness".

[5] *Ainu bunka no shinkō narabi ni Ainu no dentō nado ni kansuru chishiki no fukyū oyobi keihatsu ni kansuru hōritsu* (Act for the Promotion of Ainu Culture, the Dissemination of Knowledge of Ainu Traditions, and an Education Campaign). English translation after Siddle (2002: 406).

[6] See the original text: http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H09/H09HO052.html [access on 3.3.2011]

The Cultural Promotion Act did not satisfy the Ainu and thus they continued their struggle for recognition as indigenous people. They scored a small, but important victory, when in March 1997 the Sapporo District Court handed down the verdict in the so-called Nibutani Dam Case. The case concerned the appropriation of land in Nibutani village in the 1980s, where the state planned to construct a dam. The village was mostly inhabited by the Ainu and some of them, including the above-mentioned Kayano Shigeru, refused to voluntarily sell their land. Then they sued the government on the basis that Nibutani was a historical site where many Ainu festivals were observed. By appropriating the land, they argued, the government violated their cultural rights. The court ruled that the government's decision to appropriate the Ainu land had indeed been illegal, and although it could not nullify the decision, as the dam had already been completed, it ordered the government to pay compensation. More importantly, the court created a precedence, because in the verdict the Ainu were referred to as "indigenous people" (*senjū minzoku*).[7]

It took a decade before the Ainu finally gained recognition as an ethnic minority. In September 2007 the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The following year, the Diet unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the recognition of the Ainu as an indigenous people. In this resolution, Japan admitted that the Ainu were the first inhabitants of Hokkaido and accepted the "historical fact that whilst equal in law to all other Japanese citizens, in the process of Japan's modernization, countless Ainu persons were discriminated against, and forced to live in great poverty" (Stevens 2008: 49). So far the resolution has had no substantial implications, but the future will show if it was the next step in the Ainu's struggle for collective rights.

The Okinawans

With 1.3 million people, the Okinawans are the largest ethnic minority in Japan. In many respects they are the most powerful. They have their own homeland, Okinawa prefecture, where they constitute an absolute majority and are in charge of local administration. No other minority enjoys the political luxury of having a constitutionally guaranteed representation in the Diet. And yet the Okinawans do not use their political potential to assert their rights as an "ethnic minority", "nation", or "indigenous people". The so-called "Okinawa struggle" (*Okinawa tōsō*) seems to be primarily about military bases and economic issues. Undoubtedly, the Okinawans skillfully use nationalistic rhetoric, which sometimes makes a misleading

[7] For more on this subject see Tsunemoto (2001), Siddle (2002, 2003).

impression that in Okinawa there is a strong pro-independence movement. But behind this nationalistic façade there are no demands for any collective rights designed specifically for Okinawan people. The struggle against bases is being conducted under the banner of the fight against Okinawa's oppression, and also in the name of the universal fight for human rights, women's rights and environmental protection. Its ultimate goal is to restore full citizenship rights to local people, so that they can live free of fear and all problems related to the presence of military bases.

Looking back at Okinawan modern history, we discover that the struggle for Japanese citizenship has always been prioritized in the political life of Okinawa. After the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, the Japanese government hesitated about integrating Okinawa and therefore Okinawa retained semi-colonial status until the beginning of the 20th century. There were many reasons why the government had delayed the process of integration, but to the great satisfaction of Tokyo, Okinawan people quickly embraced Japanese rule and began promoting a policy of assimilation out of their own initiative. Having adopted Japanese identity, the Okinawans started to raise complaints against their treatment as second-rate nationals. Teachers, journalists and officials launched a campaign to introduce suffrage and adjust the system of governance to the standards employed in Japan proper. Interestingly, the word "autonomy" frequently appeared in their arguments, but what they understood by "autonomy" was not a type of self-governance that would have respected Okinawa's socio-cultural distinctiveness, but "sameness" and "equality"; they wanted for Okinawa exactly the same status and same rights as other prefectures in Japan. This concept of autonomy required that Okinawa had first to assimilate and level all cultural differences as far as was possible. [8]

Eventually the Okinawans achieved what they wanted: in 1912, Okinawa received suffrage with two seats in the Diet and by 1920 all administrative differences between the prefecture and Japan proper were abolished. Nonetheless, Okinawa remained the poorest region in the country throughout the whole prewar period, with the lowest incomes per capita and poorly developed infrastructure. The Japanese continued to discriminate against Okinawan people, seeing them as country-bumpkins, who perhaps were Japanese, but whose manners and behavior were bringing shame to the civilized people of Japan. The emotional gap between the Okinawans and the Japanese deepened in the 1920s, when an economic crisis forced thousands of Okinawans to migrate to Japan proper

[8] I discuss in detail the topic of Okinawa's assimilation during the prewar period in Meyer (2007).

and abroad. Okinawan migrant workers received treatment similar to that of the Taiwanese and Koreans.

After World War II, Okinawa was detached from Japan and placed under American military occupation. The Americans hoped to keep Okinawa permanently and hence they tried to revive – or better say to invent – the Ryukyuan nation.[9] Yet the plan of "un-Japanizing" Okinawa failed. The more the Okinawans felt disappointed with American rule, the more they looked north towards their neighbors in Japan, despite fresh memories of how the Japanese state had spilled their blood during the Battle of Okinawa. By the beginning of the 1960s, the Reversion Movement became a major political force in Okinawa and it became clear to Washington that sooner or later the issue of Okinawa's occupation would have to be solved. In the meantime, the Okinawan local authorities undertook certain steps to ensure that Okinawa would not cut its ties with Japan. For example, the legal system was to a great extent copied from the Japanese. The Japanese civil code and the so-called Family Registry Law (*kosekihō*) were reintroduced almost without changes. This was a significant fact because in Japan the Family Registry Law is strictly correlated with the citizenship law – family registers (*koseki*) represent a legal confirmation of Japanese citizenship. By adopting the *koseki* system the Okinawans prepared the ground for the smooth restitution of Japanese citizenship in the future – after the reversion the Japanese government simply recognized the Okinawan registers.[10]

The struggle for reversion abounded with many dramatic events. Accidents and crimes committed by the American military personnel furthermore heated the atmosphere on the island. People protested and rallied nearly on a daily basis, sometimes resorting to violence, as happened in the city of Koza on the night of December 20, 1970, when an angry crowd clashed with American MPs, setting fire to American vehicles and facilities.

The Okinawan people welcomed Reversion Day on May 15, 1972 with a dose of reservation, fearing that Okinawa might be re-colonized by the Japanese capital. Yet they quickly embraced the Japanese "construction state" (Hook and Siddle 2003: 5), which poured billions of yen into Okinawa's infrastructure. With the rise of living standards, anti-Japanese feelings, which had resurfaced with double the force on the eve of the reversion, gradually declined. Tokyo relatively easily subdued the anti-bases opposition by raising compensation for landlords of occupied land and offering financial aid to local communities through public construction

[9] To find out more about the Americans' attempts to "un-Japanize" Okinawa see Rabson (1999) and Obermiller (2000).

[10] More on this subject see Kugai (1990) and Okuyama (2006).

works. Soon, Okinawa became, on its own wishes, hostage of Japanese subsidiaries, which successfully prevented people from forming a unified front against the bases. And here comes the question: why is it that during the American occupation the Okinawans were able to form a popular movement, whilst after the reversion their struggle seems to have lost impetus and the anti-bases movement became weak and fragmented? The answer is not simply "the money".

If we compare the pre-reversion and post-reversion periods, we may find the following difference. During the American occupation, people were more eager to violate public order and to resort to violence (although the riots in Koza were an exception). This demonstrated the high level of people's desperation. In a broader sense, people rejected the quasi-citizenship bestowed by the American military authorities and therefore they did not hesitate to revolt despite the legal and economic consequences. This changed – though not immediately – after the reversion. However dissatisfied with Japanese citizenship, people have accepted it and thus they have refrained from challenging Japan's constitutional framework. In other words, they have changed their strategy to conduct their struggle in conformity with the law. No one wants to risk jail for the cause – and this is what makes Okinawans different from Zainichi Koreans, who risked high penalties when launching the disobedience movement against fingerprinting.

Governor Ōta Masahide's "revolt" in 1995-96 and the G8 Summit in 2000 illustrate well the characteristics of the Okinawans' struggle against bases. In September 1995, at the heyday of anti-American protests that were ignited by a rape incident committed by three American servicemen on a teenage girl, Governor Ōta announced he would refuse to renew the lease of land used by the American facilities, even though he was obligated to do as a proxy of the government. The government faced an embarrassing situation that after the expiration of lease agreements the Americans would occupy the land illegally and thus it quickly brought Ōta to court. In the meantime, Ōta raised a campaign of support for his action that led to a prefectural referendum on September 8, in which citizens of Okinawa clearly expressed their voice against the bases. The referendum was legally non-binding, but the Okinawans sent a clear message to Tokyo. Yet Ōta's "revolt" received a severe blow just a few days before the referendum took place when the Supreme Court ruled that Ōta's refusal to sign the lease agreements was illegal. Ōta waited for the outcome of the referendum, but then, to the great confusion of many people, he flew to Tokyo to meet

Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and to announce that he would cooperate with the government.[11]

Did he have any other choice? He claimed that he didn't. He was afraid that the parliament might pass special legislation that would simplify the land-lease procedure by taking the governor out of the loop, and this would have weakened Okinawa's position. Undoubtedly, if he continued to revolt he would have faced legal consequences and, in the short-term, put his political career at risk. By conforming to the rule of the Supreme Court, Ōta demonstrated that he was not willing to challenge the constitutional order. After all, he invoked the constitution when testifying at the Supreme Court on July 10, 1996:

In Okinawa there are about 1.27 million Japanese nationals. Although this lawsuit [formally] concerns the prime minister's order to a prefectural governor to carry out certain duties, I believe that it implies issues of basic human rights such as constitutionally guaranteed property rights, people's right to a life in peace, and [the prefectures'] right to home rule. (…) Okinawa's base issue is not peculiar to one local area – Okinawa – but is eminently general as Japan's problem, with implications for sovereignty and democracy. (…) I would like to note that my people expect the Supreme Court, as the guardian of the constitution, to render a positive judgment concerning the military base issue in Okinawa. I sincerely request the Supreme Court to examine the past and present of my people who, denied the benefits of the Constitutional principles, have been living under the oppression of military bases (…). (Ota 2000: 251, 253-54)

In exchange for co-operation the government offered Okinawa a package of funds to bolster the local economy and made a promise to close the Futenma Airbase – an American base that is located in the middle of the densely populated city of Ginowan. In the meantime, Governor Ōta lost the elections and was replaced by a Tokyo-backed businessman, Inamine Kei'ichi. In order to placate people, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō designated Okinawa to host the G8 Summit in 2000. Special measures were taken to refresh local infrastructure before the Summit and to promote Okinawa to the world. Okinawa received its five minutes.

Despite a rare opportunity to address their problems in front of the whole world, the Okinawan people used it to please the government. Local politicians, officials and ordinary citizens mobilized enormous support for the Summit. Rather than demonstrating against the bases, the Okinawans preferred to promote an idyllic image of Okinawa – a tropical paradise inhabited by friendly and peace-loving people. Demonstrations against the

[11] Ōta's "revolt" has been discussed by Eldridge (1997) and Mulgan (2000).

bases were carefully orchestrated so that they would not distort the harmonious atmosphere of the Summit. The main demonstration – the Kadena Human Chain Rally, in which 27,000 people gathered together – turned into a familial happening, where veterans of the Reversion Movement took their small grandchildren for a picnic to recall the good old times when they were young and rebellious. All in all, it was a very peaceful and "boring" Summit, with a barely visible presence of antiglobalists and Green Peace activists.[12]

For one reason the G8 Summit was a remarkable event: President Clinton was the second acting president of the US to set foot on Okinawan soil. The first was Dwight Eisenhower, who visited Okinawa forty years earlier in 1960. These two visits were strikingly different and symbolically demonstrate the changes in the anti-bases movement. Eisenhower's visit was accompanied by mass demonstrations. He met with such a hostile reception that he left Okinawa after just a few hours and remembered this visit as one of his worst experiences in his presidential career. President Clinton, on the other hand, received an extraordinarily warm reception. He caught Okinawans' heart when he carved out one hour from his busy schedule to visit the Peace Memorial Park and pay respect to the victims of the Battle of Okinawa (Clinton arrived in Okinawa one day later than originally scheduled due to the prolonging of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations at Camp David). Apart from a small group of radical students, no one wanted to protest against the visit of an American president.

The Okinawa struggle is nowadays centered around the problem of the Futenma Airbase which the Japanese and American authorities plan to relocate to Nago in the north of Okinawa. Looking back at the past fifteen years we can see significant changes in the Okinawans' strategy: they have joined forces with environmentalists and human rights activists, they also moved the battleground from Japan to the USA, where they successfully blocked the Futenma relocation project at a court in California (Tanji 2008). Nonetheless, their struggle has little to do with bargaining for special collective rights. All the Okinawans want is to exercise their civil rights as stipulated by the Japanese law and constitution.

Conclusions

Now comes a question: why is it that the Okinawans, Ainu and Koreans employ different strategies when negotiating their citizenship rights? Why is it that the Ainu and Koreans have challenged the institution of citizenship that had been unilaterally defined by the Japanese state,

[12] These are my personal observations from the G8 Summit and the Kadena Human Chain Rally.

whereas the Okinawans have seemed to embrace it? How can we explain the shift in Okinawans' strategy from radicalism in the 1960s towards today's compromise? The answers are very complex, but we may try to draw some conclusions.

In the case of the Koreans, we must consider their strong nationalism that had no equivalent in Okinawa. Since the late 19th century, the Koreans have boasted a strong identity, which was further strengthened by the experience of the Japanese colonial occupation. After World War II, the two Korean organizations in Japan, Mindan and Chongryun, made efforts to cultivate national identity among the Zainichi and discouraged people from naturalizing. Chongryun engaged in building Korean schools and encouraged the Zainichi to repatriate to North Korea. The first and second generations of Zainichi treated Japan as a temporary home, waiting until the political situation on the peninsula normalized. Only gradually did they start to consider Japan as their homeland and it took a long time until they started identifying themselves with Japanese society. But they continue to maintain their identity and demand that their Korean-ness is somehow acknowledged by Japanese law.

The Ainu were imbued with the identity of a people who had failed to meet the challenges of the modern world. It is worth noting that before the war the Ainu had enjoyed a legal status theoretically higher than that of Koreans or Taiwanese, but nonetheless they did not escape the institutional differentiation (The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act, "positive discrimination" at schools). Secondly, the Ainu entered modern times with a burden of negative stereotypes and prejudices held by the Japanese, being depicted as subhuman. Japanese national ideology, which became strongly influenced by racism and theories of social evolutionism, placed the Ainu in the category of primitive natives – at best semi-civilized people. Thirdly, for the Ainu modernization was a much more shocking and disastrous experience in comparison to that of the Okinawans and Koreans. If the latter had been forced to make a jump from agrarian to industrial times, the Ainu at the dawn of the Meiji Era had been still at the stage of pre-agrarian societies, with no experience of statehood. This situation was eagerly exploited by Japanese colonizers who stripped the Ainu of their ancestral land and destroyed the traditional base of their livelihood. In that sense, the Ainu shared a fate similar to that of the indigenous people in Australia and America. With the typical manner of indigenous people, they created a strong identity, initially rejecting the state that had colonized them. Eventually, the Ainu started making use of their 'indigenousness'; they

established cooperation with organizations of Native Americans and employed similar strategies in bargaining collective rights.

The situation of the Okinawans, on the other hand, has been different. The Okinawans lost their independent Kingdom, but they relatively easily embraced Japanese rule and adopted Japanese identity. After all, Japanese rule in Okinawa was not so harsh and disastrous for the local people as it was in Korea and Hokkaido – although in the long-term it led to the catastrophe of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. What is important, the Okinawans welcomed modernization and eagerly promoted it. Since the Meiji Era, Japan has always been a source of modernity and an example for emulation. There remains of course the question of what happened to Okinawan nationalism. It is not easy to explain why the Okinawans did not raise any strong nationalism that would have demanded loosening ties with Japan, not to speak of divorce, but at least we can learn from Ernest Gellner that the Okinawan case is not unusual.[13] Considering the cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity of the world, only a small number of people managed to form a nation and the rest joined other nations – often out of their own will. Gellner made a point in noting that modernization and the rise of modern nations were mutually dependent processes. Where people allocated their "national" sentiments depended much on where they found "modernity". In the case of Okinawa the ticket to modernity lay in Japan and hence there was a strong push in Okinawan society towards assimilation and Japanization. In short, for the Okinawans Japan became a "desired" homeland, and this is what makes them different from the Ainu and Zainichi, for whom Japan became a homeland by historical coincidence.

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[13] As Gellner put it in his celebrated book on nationalism, some nationalisms "failed to bark" (Gellner 1983: 43).

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Sigrid Hofmeister-Watanabe

The Sound of Memories on the Battle of Okinawa: an Art-Project

This paper is about the artistic process to create a space and opportunity for the remembrance and commemoration of the Battle of Okinawa. The formative power of the past in the present is a major reason for my interest in researching and creating memory spaces. In my understanding, what is remembered and what is not shapes the present and sets the tracks for what is given possibility to happen in the future.

> "The question I asked myself in this context is: why artists always create monuments on behalf of politicians at certain times? Why is it not possible that people make their own monument with the artist only being a catalyst?" (Hoheisel: 2007)

Horst Hoheisel was born in Poznan in 1944 and is an internationally well-known German artist working in the genre of so-called Counter-Monuments.[1] I hadn't encountered his work or known of the above statement while carrying out research in Okinawa on memory spaces and practices on the Battle of Okinawa, and later working on creating them, yet I really did feel very much the same way. Memory spaces created without involving the people concerned and with disregard for their view of the past is very likely to cause heated controversy and conflict. Two very representative examples of the Battle of Okinawa are the Cornerstone of Peace Memorial and the Peace Memorial Museum, both located in the Peace Memorial Park in the South of Okinawa's main island.[2] Collecting

[1] James E. Young was one of the first people to discuss the expression "counter-monument". As a reaction to characteristics and materials which have traditionally been regarded as typical for monuments like e.g. permanency (therefore stone as the material to achieve this feature) artists started to work with materials which generate expressions that traditional monuments did not and therefore created works they considered to be more suitable for the complex phenomena of commemoration and war-memory (Michalski 1998: 171). Both of the art-projects I am presenting in this paper share some characteristics with, and are influenced by, counter-monuments.

[2] The Battle of Okinawa officially lasted from April 1st to June 23rd, 1945. It is commemorated in various ways.. The article "Waging Peace on Okinawa" by Gerald Figal discusses how the Battle is commemorated in the southern part of Okinawa's main island. It is part of the book *Islands of Discontent. Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power*, (edited by Laura Hein and Mark Selden) which presents articles that focus and discuss different perspectives of Okinawa. Some of them are directly related to the Battle of Okinawa. The book is a very good source for some of the most important issues on Okinawa. The book is available at http://books.google.de/books.

materials on memory spaces in the southern part of Okinawa started the process that was necessary to develop the art-project, which features an Okinawan folk-song at its centre, that I am going to present in this paper. Various impressions and experiences inspired me on my way. Researching places that are not at the center of public attention, like other islands as well as other memory spaces on Okinawa's main islands, gave me an important impetus. Many people told me their views on the Battle of Okinawa and what they considered to be important about it. I would like to start this paper by introducing an art-project that gave many interesting hints and ideas for the main project.

The Cave of Conscious Recollection and Commemoration of the Unconscious

This very large and intensive project was a collaborative effort between the Japanese artist Morito Yoshida and his students. It was presented in December 2002. The project took place in a 200-meter-long cave. It is located in the southern outskirts of Ishikawa, a city on the eastern side of the center of Okinawa's main island. As in many other caves on the island, people tried to find shelter in this cave. Some 300 people from surrounding villages hid in this cave for about three months during the Battle of Okinawa. The cave currently has two actively used entrances, which face each other. Entering the cave through the entrance located down the hill, one first has to pass a very narrow tunnel ending in a large chamber that measures several square meters. The entire cave is shaped like a long tunnel that varies in width, with chambers in-between. The entrance up the hill is very steep and is accessible via a long ladder. A narrow stream starts as a small pond in the first chamber, flows through the cave and finally trickles away a few meters before the entrance up the hill.

Eighteen dolls, all about, but not exactly, human-size and made of cotton, which I then painted with the leaves of the *fukugi*-tree, were placed at several places inside the cave. The *fukugi* tree is usually planted around houses to protect them from the wind. Since the name is written with the characters for "luck" and "tree" it is said to bring good fortune. The dolls were filled with pages from the two major daily newspapers of Okinawa: the *Okinawa Times* and *Ryūkyū Shimpō*. Newspapers are, in my opinion, a kind of collective diary, telling the stories of their societies. Plants from the area were placed at five points along the brook. Plants are living things that are not normally found in caves. They would therefore, according to my predictions, change while being in the cave's unusual environment. As with the people who had been hiding in the cave during the Battle of Okinawa,

water from the stream would help them endure the time they spent in the cave.

On the first day, the installation was opened by involving the visitors at the entrance down the hill. After gathering in front of the entrance they went into the cave and lit candles my colleague had placed all over the cave. The candles were made using small plates and cups filled with lard, the way it had been done during the Battle of Okinawa in order to produce some light inside the cave. Seian Ikehara, the man maintaining the cave guided the visitors. As during his tours for school groups, he told the visitors about the events in the cave during the Battle of Okinawa. It is said that there were no deaths in the cave during the entire battle, which stands in stark contrast to the incidents in other caves on the island.[3] Shortly before the entrance up the hill a friend sang folk songs from Okinawa whilst playing the *sanshin*, a local three-string instrument. Outside the entrance is a large meadow where the visitors were entertained with Okinawa-style Tempura and *awamori*, the popular local schnapps. Later in the project, the students and I guided visitors through the cave. On the last day, my *sanshin* teacher Masao Teruya, who hid in the cave during the Battle of Okinawa as a young boy, performed songs written about the battle and shared his memories of the time in the cave.[4]

With my work I intend to evoke memory and recollection. Being aware of past events and experiences changes the perception of current events that are always, in one way or another, connected with the past. In Okinawa, caves (or *gama*, as they are called there) are very important places within the collective memory of the Battle of Okinawa. Therefore, caves in Okinawa are very common places for remembering and commemorating the Battle of Okinawa and are present in the memories of the Battle of Okinawa. On the other hand, and generally speaking, caves are places that can be interpreted as a symbol of the subconscious. Memories are often located in the subconscious. These two aspects are characteristic for caves in the case of Okinawa, and this was very important for the project. The narratives communicated through speech or song and the various ways in which people participated whilst visiting the cave extended and completed the intention of my project to another important and interesting level.

[3] For the role of the caves during the Battle of Okinawa please have a look at the above-mentioned "Waging Peace on Okinawa" by Gerald Figal.

[4] The project was presented in an article by Japanese art critique Sawaragi Noi in the magazine *Voice* (2003/3) and was reported on NHK Okinawa News.

Moving in Time and Memory by Singing the Okinawan Folk-Song *Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa*

An Okinawan folk-song called *Kampō nu Ku nu Kusa* is the centerpiece of this art-project (see photographs at the end). I found the words "*Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa*" very touching. It was a common expression after the battle, used by the survivors who talked of themselves as the leftovers of bombs. The lyrics of the song tell more of the effects of a battle on future lives than about the battle itself. The song is a reminder of the Battle of Okinawa and its effects on the lives of those who were part of it. Events and experiences from the past are the basis for the future course of things.

1. There was a war when I was young
   The bloom of youth couldn't open
   Family, the ancestors shrine, parents, brothers and sisters
   They all became the targets of the bombings
   No clothes, no food, there was nothing
   We were eating palm trees, that's the way we were living.

   Chorus: you and me, you and me
   We are leftovers of the bombs.

2. We couldn't rely on the gods and on Buddha
   The fields were fenced in, there was nothing we could earn with them
   The house was blown away by the wind
   We were stealing from the American soldiers
   And they would just make fun of us
   Although we were all honest people.

   Chorus

3. Getting out of the mud
   I got married and started a family
   My children were born
   Every year
   The oldest one, the next one, one after the other
   It wasn't an easy life
   But there was comfort in their laughing voices.

   Chorus

4. There was peace for a couple of years
   The children became adults
   But like a boar that got hit
   Will war start again?
   I was so worried about my children, I couldn't sleep at night.

   Chorus

5. This war that has eaten up my parents
   This war that has eaten up my island
   Even if I were born again
   Can I ever forget it?
   Who has started it?
   I regret, I am full of anger, but it is not enough
   I have to tell my childen and my children's children.

   Chorus[5]

The lyrics are in *uchinaaguchi*, the local Okinawan dialect. It is written in the musical way of expression that has developed on the island, the *utasanshin*, meaning that the instrument, the sanshin cannot be without the voice singing the song. Therefore, it is very rare that the *sanshin* is performed without vocal accompaniment. *Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa* was written in 1969 by Koubin Higa who died four years later in a car accident caused by a car belonging to a US military base. The band Deigo Musume whose four members are daughters of the singer-songwriter released the song in 1975.[6] The song was very popular after its release. It is rather

[5] The translation is based on the lyrics and the translation into Japanese published in *Shimakutuba de Kataru Senyo-100nin no Kioku*, edited by the Ryūkyū O Kiroku Suru Kai, Page 210-211. *Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa* is e.g. the first song of the CD: Deigo Musume Tokushū, (Marufuku Rekōdo). The CD includes a booklet with the lyrics. There is no free source of *Kampo nu Kue nu Kusa* available on the internet.

[6] All information given on Higa Kōbin and his song *Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa* are based on the article written by Yamauchi Kenji "*Shimauta no naka no Sensō Denshō 'Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa' ta*". The article is published in the above-mentioned *Shimakutuba de Kataru Senyo-100nin no Kioku*," which is the transcription and translation of a documentary-film project by the Okinawan photographer Higa Toyomitsu and his assistant Murayama Tomoe, both calling themselves for this project the Ryūkyū o Kiroku Suru Kai. Higa and Murayama interviewed and video-documented people who witnessed the Battle of Okinawa in their own language *shimakutuba* (also referred to as *uchinaaguchi*). Higa is a very common name in Okinawa, especially in Yomitan, where both Higas, the singer-songwriter Higa Kōbin and the photographer Higa Toyomitsu, who are unrelated

unknown among the young generation in Okinawa, although it can be found in the Okinawa-section of Karaokes all over Japan and even abroad if they are based on a Japanese Karaoke System.
Another important reason to choose a song as a catalyst and carrier of memory and remembrance is in the work of German psychoanalyst Margarete Mitscherlich. She is of the opinion that the terrible events of the Third Reich are likely to reoccur in Germany in a modified form. This is due the lack of mourning among people in Germany. Mourning is a psychological process with which one learns to bear a loss by repeating an emotionally painful memory process. Remembrance and commemoration in Germany is done in an intellectual way, but it is hardly done emotionally. Therefore, the trauma of the Third Reich could not be processed (Mitscherlich 1993 [1987]: 13-15).
The idea of making a song the carrier element was furthermore inspired by the words of Taira Kōichi which accompanied his photo-exhibition in Nago city in 2002. Taira was quoted there with some lines he wrote in 1981 for the epilogue of his photo-album *kankarasanshin*. He was thinking about the importance of the *sanshin* for Okinawan people after the battle and how the instrument supported people emotionally. The *sanshin* is traditionally a very fine instrument made using the best quality materials. After the battle people made very basic versions using, for example, cans they had found in the trash of the US military called *kankarasanshin*. This very simple model helped, according to Taira, the survivors of the battle carry on with their lives (Taira 2002: 84). In Okinawa, the *sanshin* accompanies and supports people singing about everything that concerns them: love, life, and also the Battle of Okinawa. The performance of my *sanshin*-teacher teacher at the cave moved the visitors very much and I even had the impression that the sound changed the atmosphere of the space in front of the cave. This quality of the most representative instrument of Okinawan music was very suitable to evoke memories and remembering, both emotionally as well as intellectually.
The human voice and its sound are very important in this project.[7] The optical impact of the setting, which created the space for remembrance and commemoration, is therefore kept to a basic and neutral level. The space which I planned to invite people had to be mobile as I also wanted to

to each other, come from. Though unrelated to Higa Kōbin, Higa Toyomitsu introduced me to *Deigo Musume*, when I was trying to contact them to receive their permission for *Kampō nu kue nu kusa*.

[7] For information on the human voice in the context of memory and commemoration please see: *Erinnerung und Gedenken als skulpturaler Entstehungsprozess. Das Medium Stimme in Variationen des Monuments* by Sigrid Hofmeister.

commemorate and remember the Battle of Okinawa in places that are less commonly connected in the public's perception to the battle. Actually, there was no battlefield in this battle. The entire island was a battlefield. Therefore, I also wanted to allow visitors to commemorate and recall memories in as many places as possible. A cardboard-roll, one meter wide and 42 meters long, seemed suitable for this plan. It can be set up differently depending on the demands. And, like the cave of the previous project, the cardboard-roll could form wider and narrower spaces. I liked this feature of the cave and wanted the mobile setting to have similar features. Moreover, the space that was created by unrolling the cardboard-roll could become wider or narrower accordingly to the number of visitors. Finally, the space created with the cardboard-roll was open at the top. Taking a standing position the visitors were also partly outside and therefore maintained a connection with the space outside the cardboard roll. Taking a sitting position, the room offered the opportunity to get involved in the song and allowed the communication to continue. This feature of the space created by the cardboard-roll was important since it was a visible spatial integration of remembrance and commemoration of the Battle of Okinawa in a current context. Throughout the entire area of the space, copies of the song, along with the notes and the lyrics, could be found, including a Japanese translation and strips of paper to write down thoughts. These strips of paper could be stuck to the walls of the cardboard-roll to communicate with other visitors, who were not present at the same time in the same setting, to share their thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, it was possible to express oneself on the paper-strips using crayons. And finally, five *sanshin* were placed within the setting. Visitors who had rehearsed the song could use them to perform the song alone or together with others, to recite or to rehearse the song on the spot. To sit comfortably, cushions were provided.

First, I asked the people from my *sanshin* group to rehearse the song. I tried to attract people for my project through the radio, newspapers and flyers.[8] Rehearsing the song, repeating the text and thus developing an understanding of the song are important components of the project.

This interactive art-project took place in three locations. The community-house of Sobe, a hamlet near Yomitan village, was the first place. Singer-

[8] The flyer was actually a set of notes, text and tape with the recording of the song interpreted by Uehara Tomomi and Maeshiro Genyu, two members of my *sanshin* class. I was trying to spread them and, while doing so, I learned a lot about the places and the things that happened there during the Battle of Okinawa. Everybody I invited to join the project had something to say about it. Three Radio Stations (Radio FM-Naha, Radio Okinawa-City and Radio Tomigusuku) invited me to talk about the project.

Songwriter Higa Kōbin and his family are from Sobe and it is actually also the area where the battle started on Okinawa's main island. For the whole project the set-up and gathering in Sobe was very important since four daughters of Higa Kōbin (the members of Deigo Musume), his younger brother Higa Kōken and his friends were coming together to perform the song and share memories of their friends and relatives, on his song and on the Battle of Okinawa. The second and longest time the project took place was in mid-February 2004 in the context of the presentations of the graduation projects of the Institute of Art Education at Ryukyu University in the Urasoe city Art Museum. The setting was like the one in the community-house in Yomitan-village/Sobe. However, it also became larger because of the gathering in Yomitan. The paper-strips, which were written by the participants in Yomitan, and a TV with a video on which the visitors in Urasoe could watch the talking and singing in Yomitan were now also part of the setting. For five days, the project was performed in the museum. People sang and told each other their thoughts, feelings and memories. There was always somebody there to perform the song live and accompanied the singing of the visitors. In another corner of the setting, visitors had the opportunity to listen to recordings of the song performed by the members of my *sanshin* class.[9] The third time the project took place was in an art-center in Shuri district, Naha city. Shuri was the former political center of the Ryūkyū Kingdom. The event took place in late March 2004 and lasted for about three hours. These three occasions gave all kinds of people the opportunity to communicate with each other and take part and experience the art-project. The song was performed again and again and always differently. Before, after and between these three occasions there were reports and announcements in the newspapers of Okinawa about this art project. Visitors came because of the media coverage and the project grew with them. The project became part of the "collective diary" when reported in the newspapers of Okinawa. It was, furthermore, researched and published by Shimojima Tetsurō, a Japanese Non-Fiction Writer. It was presented in artist talks twice in 2007 at the Kyoto City University of Arts, once in the context of a group exhibition held as a part of the Upper Austrian Regional Exhibition in 2008 and once in spring 2010 at a meeting of the Austrian-Japanese Society. In November 2010, the project was presented in Poznan in English for the first time.[10]

[9] All pictures published in this paper were taken at Urasoe Art Museum by Teruya Yōichi.

[10] The project was mentioned in the article"Futatabi 'kōkai no dojū' to naranai tame ni," published in the magazine *Sekai* and the book *Heiwa wa 'Taikutsu' Desu ka. Moto Himeyuri Gakuto to Wakamonotachi no 500nichi* by Shimojima Testurō. Both daily newspapers, the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* and the *Okinawa Times* printed articles on the project at all three locations.

Many people and institutions helped, inspired and supported me to prepare and develop this project. It would not have been possible without them. It is impossible to mention all of them. Nevertheless, I would like to thank *Deigo Musume*, the daughters of singer-songwriter Higa Kōbin and their uncle Kouken Higa for their support and permission and Higa Kōbin for the creation of *Kampō nu Kue nu Kusa*, this very special and precious acoustic monument of the Battle of Okinawa.

This paper started with quoting the Poznan-born German artist Horst Hoheisel and I would also like to close it by quoting him:

> "Yet I know that in making the attempt to create a monument, one will never be able to actually grasp history. Monuments always tell more about the people who created them and about the time they were created in than about those they were made for." (Hoheisel 2007)

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

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